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Zusammenfassung 
Der intersektorale Wasserkonflikt zwischen urbaner und agrarischer Wassernutzung in 
Hyderabad und die Konkurrenz zwischen den Bedürfnissen der Stadt und den Ansprüchen der 
Landwirtschaft werden verschärft durch willkürliche Verteilungspraktiken, die den offiziellen 
Zuteilungsrichtlinien oft widersprechen. Übersetzt in die Sprache von Ostrom, gilt die 
vorliegende Untersuchung der Kernfrage, warum bestimmte praktizierte Regeln (rules-in-use) 
fortbestehen, obwohl formale Regeln (rules-in-form) im Bereich der  Nutzungsrechte an 
Wasser vorhanden sind. Ostroms Institutional Analysis and Development Framework (IAD) 
identifiziert exogene Variablen und deren Einfluss auf die Rolle von Institutionen, durch die 
die Interaktionen und Entscheidungsprozesse von Menschen gestaltet werden. Die Arbeit 
versucht dementsprechend zu erklären, wie bestehende Institutionen und 
Governancestrukturen die Interaktionen beteiligter Akteure und deren Verhalten beeinflussen 
und wie daraus eine durch Willkür gekennzeichnete Umverteilung erwächst. Knights 
Verteilungstheorie institutionellen Wandels und sein Ansatz über Machtressourcen vermögen 
zu erklären, wie menschliche Interaktionen in Zusammenhang mit solchen Konflikten über 
begrenzte Ressourcen zustande kommen. Die zentralen Ergebnisse der Untersuchung weisen 
darauf hin, dass 1) eine sektorübergreifende Planung von Wasserzuteilung und -managements 
im Bundesstaat Andhra Pradesh  fehlt, 2) die Beteiligung landwirtschaftlicher Akteure zu 
gering ist und eine Machtkonzentration bei staatlichen Akteuren vorliegt, 3) die 
Sanktionierung von Verstößen gegen regelwidriges Verhalten zu schwach ist, 4) die 
Auswirkungen klimatischer Schwankungen auf Wasserressourcen und deren Verfügbarkeit bei 
der Planung und dem Management von Wasserressourcen stärker zu berücksichtigen sind. Die 
Ergebnisse der Arbeit zeigen ebenfalls, welche Wirkungen die Charakteristika verschiedener 
Gruppen von Wassernutzern und deren spezifische Abhängigkeit von Wasserressourcen auf  
ihre Fähigkeit zur politischen Einflussnahme ausüben. Solche Ausprägungen von 
Ressourcenabhängigkeiten bedingen Machtasymmetrien und erhöhen das Ausmaß 
willkürlicher Umverteilungen von Wasser. Die Untersuchung  identifiziert eine Literaturlücke 
im Bereich der Politik der Wassergovernance, indem sie den Wählereinfluss als 
Machtressource im Land-Stadt-Konflikt um Wasserressourcen empirisch belegt. Die Arbeit 
zielt insgesamt darauf, das Erklärungspotential von Eigentumsrechtstheorien zu nutzen und 
anhand von  Wasserkonflikten in Hyderabad ein Beispiel zur Anwendbarkeit aktueller 
Theorien institutionellen Wandels zu geben.  
Abstract 
Hyderabad’s inter-sectoral water conflict and competition between the city’s urban needs and 
the agricultural sector have been fueled by persistent arbitrary water reallocations against the 
prescribed allocation guidelines. To translate the key question into Ostrom’s language; this 
study seeks to unravel the persistence of rules-in-use, despite the rules-in-form already in 
place within the realms of property rights. Ostrom’s Institutional Analysis and Development 
framework identifies exogenous variables and its influences on the role of institutions which 
shapes human interaction and decision making processes. It attempts to explain how the 
existing water-allocation mechanism has propagated the way rules and actors currently 
interact to influence such arbitrary water re-allocation. Knight’s distributional theory of 
institutional change and his concept of power resources provide good explanations of human 
interaction in the context of such conflicts over limited resources. Key results indicate 1) Lack 
of inter-sectoral planning and co-ordination in water resource allocation and management in 
the state of Andhra Pradesh, 2) Too little participation of farming actors and too much power 
vested in state actors, 3) Weak sanctions for violation of water management and regulations, 
4) The need to consider the impact of climate variability on water resources and its 
availability while planning and management of water resources in Andhra Pradesh. The study 
results also reveal how the characteristics of water-user groups and its dependence on water 
resource have the ability to exert political influence over water allocation. Such attributes of 
resource dependence characterizes power asymmetry, thereby increasing the scale of arbitrary 
water reallocations. Henceforth, this study addresses the gap in ‘politics of water governance’ 
in existing literature by empirically deriving ‘political electorate’ as a power resource in rural-
urban water contestation. Overall, this study seeks to employ the theoretical explanations of 
property rights and attempts to provide a case on the applicability of contemporary theories of 
institutional change by taking the case study of Hyderabad’s water contestation. 
Schlagwörter: intersektorale Wasserkonflikt, Knight’s distributional theory, IAD Framework, 
wassergovernance  
Keywords: inter-sectoral water conflict, Knight’s distrubutional theory, IAD Framework, 
water governance  
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1 Introduction: Inter-sectoral Competition for Water 
Resources 
Overview 
The competition and conflict of Hyderabad’s urbanization and its inter-sectoral water 
contestation with agriculture is the focal attention of this study. As a result of rapid 
urbanization around the world, water is being transferred to the cities out of the pre-existing 
multiple-use water sources. Conflicts under such circumstances are receiving considerable 
attention in water resource management ( van Veenhuizen, 2006; Celio and Giordano, 2007; 
Meinzen-Dick, 2006; Molle and Berkoff, 2006; Saleth and Dinar, 2001). However, much of 
the existing literature focuses on technical aspects of allocation of such water transfers 
without adequate attention to institutional frameworks required for any form of water 
allocation (Bruns and Meinzen-Dick, 2005: 9). Handling such conflicts and sectoral 
rebalancing is a major concern in the literature of water resource management. Whilst it is 
almost imperative to have new institutions to deal with such problems, however, what form 
these institutions should have and when and how they should be put in place is still a highly 
contested issue (van Veenhuizen, 2006). Hyderabad is a typical example of such inter-sectoral 
conflicts with the agricultural sector. Water allocations between these two competing sectors 
are administratively prescribed with allocation guidelines in place. However, arbitrary 
reallocation of water against the prescribed guidelines has been persisting over the years with 
detrimental consequences to both Hyderabad’s drinking needs and irrigation water for the 
agricultural sector. In this light, this study seeks to examine the institutional context of the 
‘water allocation mechanism’ in place and the underlying process of the interplay of water-
related actors and rules, and the dynamics of factors which eventually propagates such 
arbitrary water reallocations. 
1.1 Hyderabad’s Inter-sectoral Water Contestation: an Institutional Problem 
A long body of work exists where scholars have undertaken an interesting range of studies on 
inter-sectoral contestations of water in the context of Hyderabad urban water. Saleth and 
Dinar (2001) examined the shortcoming of the universal application of a market-based 
approach to such inter-sectoral water transfers by empirically demonstrating this by taking the 
case of Hyderabad. They identified the importance of economic and institutional conditions 
necessary to ensure the viability of such inter-sectoral water transfers, whether market-based 
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or otherwise. Van Rooijen et al. (2005) studied the impacts of urban growth on the agricultural 
sector by examining the water balance of the city of Hyderabad, giving an insight into long-
term trends in the impacts of urban growth on agricultural water use. While reviewing the 
inter-sectoral transfers around the world, Molle and Berkoff (2006) cited Hyderabad as a 
representative case in which the urban sector out-competed the irrigation sector to meet the 
increasing urban water demands by administrative allocation mechanism.  
Also highlighting Hyderabad urban water transfers and its associated persisting conflicts, 
Venot et al. (2007) underlined the importance of water being a disputed and highly politicized 
object, strongly shaped by the social and political conditions of the region. Studies on 
developing the city water balance model for Hyderabad by George et al. (2009) has also been 
undertaken on the account of poor water supply and increasing demand in the urban area. 
Similar studies have been carried out by Van Rooijen et al. (2009) to assess current and future 
water demand in the Krishna basin. Davidson et al. (2010) developed a model to study the 
economic impacts on the agricultural producer along the Krishna River when water was 
transferred to Hyderabad from the Nagarjuna Sagar dam. Van Rooi-jen et al. (2011) also 
investigated the water allocation to Hyderabad and its implication on the catchment area of 
two irrigation projects from where water was being reallocated. This study emphasized the 
need to take into account the importance of local and national politics and stakeholders 
involved in driving these water allocation practices.  
However, it was Celio and Giordiano (2007) who highlighted the institutional failure by 
characterizing the shortcoming of such allocation rules that governed these agricultural-urban 
water transfers, whereby water allocations were arbitrarily taking place overruling the 
administratively prescribed allocation guidelines. Due to high dependence on agriculture for 
livelihood, it manifested the persisting conflicts and competition between the rural and urban 
sectors. Celio (2009) further elaborated the appropriation of water by Hyderabad and the 
impacts it had on agriculture. He also underlined the importance to carry out an in-depth 
analysis of the political interplay of water allocation through the lenses and frameworks 
within the realms of political science, for further research. Taking up on the illustrious work 
of the scholars working on Hyderabad’s urban inter-sectoral water as a highly contested issue, 
this study revisits the mechanism of these urban water transfers facilitated by the urban water 
reforms. It specifically attempts to examine the underlying fundamental basis of why such 
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arbitrary water reallocations against the prescribed allocation guidelines have taken place over 
the years.  
1.2 Objectives of the Research 
Bruns et al. (2005) explains that an increase in scarcity of resources also increased the 
likelihood of competition, wherein property rights could clarify expectations and reduce 
conflict between users over a resource. Shiferaw (2009) further stresses the importance of 
getting the property relations right which seems to be more needful for water reforms. This 
lays the foundation for the study: assuming that we manage to get the relationship among 
water sharing parties right, then there is a possibility for almost all the problems to be 
resolved by the various parties exercising those rights. Therefore, it becomes almost 
imperative for this research to delve further into the institutional content of these evolving 
water reforms and the property rights provision for both users (city and agriculture) to 
facilitate such transfers, and the outcome it eventually has such inter-sectoral allocations.  
To examine why such an unstable inter-sectoral allocation mechanism exists that is 
detrimental not only to Hyderabad’s drinking needs but also for the agricultural sector, this 
study rests on the theoretical foundation of property rights. Thereafter, this leads to the 
following research inquiry to investigate the influencing factors under which governance of 
water allocation eventually change (institutional change) to cause such arbitrary reallocations. 
How water-related actors interact to negotiate and bargain to eventually secure water for 
themselves against the prescribed allocation guidelines is specifically examined. The essence 
of this study rests on these arbitrary reallocations that have a complex web of implications of 
water security not only for agriculture and rural livelihoods but also for urban drinking water. 
Therefore, within the backdrop of change in the dynamics of urbanization, agriculture and 
water variability, the key research question seeks to address “how has the water allocation 
mechanism in place propagated the way rules and actors currently interact to influence and 
employ strategies that eventually causes arbitrary reallocation of water resources?” This 
study attempts to answer the key research question by the following sub-questions: 
• Who are the water-related actors involved in the inter-sectoral water allocation and 
management and their relation with statutory powers (Legislative/ 
  
 
4 
 
Constitutional/Legal power) over waters entrenched in the Government water law 
framework? Subsequently, how have water-related actors positioned themselves 
informally to participate in allocation and management of water resources?  
• What are the evolving water institutions and the dynamics of the property rights 
provision of the two competing sectors (urban and the agricultural sector) that has 
facilitated such inter-sectoral arbitrary reallocations of water resources over the years?  
• Under the circumstances of water scarcity, how do these water-related actors interact 
and what influence do these water-related actors employ in the process of negotiating 
and bargaining to secure water for themselves to eventually cause arbitrary 
reallocation against the prescribed allocation guidelines?  
• How has the historical and political context influenced the dynamics of such arbitrary 
water reallocations that has persisted over the years? 
This study seeks to unravel the factors of how and why water-related actors break formal 
rules, to create their own rules and eventually play their own game of water allocation in 
Hyderabad's context. To succinctly translate the key research question of why such arbitrary 
reallocations persist against the allocation guidelines into Ostrom’s language, this study seeks 
to examine the persistence of rules-in-use, despite the rules-in-form already in place. The 
Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework developed by Ostrom (1982; 1990; 
2005; 2011) is employed for this study, as it provides a good platform for guiding such 
research studies of rules-in-use and rules-in-form (Carter and Weible, 2014; 2016: 175; 
Siddiki, 2012: 8). The study also uses Knight’s (1992) concept of power resources, as it 
provides a good explanation of human interaction in the context of such conflicts over limited 
resources (Acheson and Knight, 2000; Theesfeld, 2004). Overall the study seeks to employ 
the theoretical explanations of property rights within the realms of the IAD framework and 
attempts to provide a case on the applicability of contemporary theories of institutional 
change to the context of water resource management in Hyderabad.  
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1.3 Scope of the Study 
Whilst investigating any ‘problem’ there are inherently many interconnected causes and 
relational issues, but it is of paramount importance to distinctly define the boundaries and the 
scope to which any study is attempting to address. The core focus of this thesis is on the 
persistent ‘inter-sectoral conflicts’ in the allocation of water between drinking needs for 
Hyderabad and irrigation needs in the agricultural sector. Hyderabad essentially gets its water 
from five sources, but only those sources which share its water with the agricultural sector is 
taken into account for this study (i.e. Singur dam across Manjira River and Nagarjuna Sagar 
dam across Krishna River which supplies 80 percent of the water to Hyderabad). Henceforth, 
the site selection for data collection focuses in those villages that fall under the catchment 
areas of these irrigation projects (that share water with Hyderabad), thereby partaking in the 
process of competition and conflicts in securing water. It may be noted that the Hyderabad 
water supply system mainly depends on surface sources. The groundwater sources within the 
city which are mostly developed by private parties are barely able to meet just about 6 percent 
of the projected water demand of the city (Hyderabad Metropolitan Water Supply and 
Sewerage Board, 1995a). However, in the study context since the subject of study is on 
competition for surface water sources, ground water is not taken into consideration. Also, the 
two water sources, Osman Sagar and Himayat Sagar which supply about 20 percent of the 
water to the city is also refrained from coming to focus in the study. These two sources were 
originally constructed solely as drinking water reservoir for Hyderabad and do not share water 
with any other sector and hence falls beyond the purview of the study. Therefore, it is only 
those contested water sources which supply to both Hyderabad and the agriculture sector 
which is taken into consideration to carry out this research. 
1.4  Structure of the Study 
Chapter one introduces the research study, outlining the rationale, research objectives, 
research questions and the scope of the study. Chapter two describes the study context in 
details. It opens with the global review of 'urbanization versus agriculture' by taking 
Hyderabad city as a representative example. This is followed by an overview of the two 
competing sectors, underlining the ‘competition-conflict-reallocation’ nexus. It essentially 
explains how the increasing urbanization of Hyderabad and its growing demand for water has 
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subsequently put pressure for competition of water with the agricultural sector. The timeline 
of Hyderabad water issue is thereafter chronicled to set the historical and political context of 
the study. This chapter systematically charts the historical account of the shift of customary 
water rights to the Indian state and also describes the provision of water rights in India in the 
current context. Water in the Indian Constitution helps us to construct the study context 
relating to water jurisdictions for irrigation and urban drinking water sectors, as well as the 
water-related actors at the central and the state level in Andhra Pradesh. This chapter finally 
throws some light on the concepts of property rights and categorizes the institutional 
arrangements for water allocations and the type of water transfer under which Hyderabad 
falls. 
In Chapter three, the theoretical strand applicable to the study context of Hyderabad is 
presented. This chapter opens with a theoretical perspective on the definition and origins of 
property rights pertaining to the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework. It 
further explains the role of property rights in conflicts in natural resource management. In 
order to study such conflicts; the definition of institutions and institutional change is 
conceptualized. Thereafter, conflicts and institutional change in Knight’s theoretical concept 
is explained. Finally, the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework and its 
applicability to carry out the research in Hyderabad are elaborated. 
Chapter four presents the methodological approach. Taking Hyderabad’s context, this chapter 
presents the practical aspect of designing and conducting the research work. First, it defines 
the rationality of choosing the case study approach to carry out the research study and 
explains what purpose it serves from an epistemological point of view. The study region in 
various parts of Andhra Pradesh for data collection is described in detail. Then the empirical 
methods employed to carry out the case study research are presented. This starts with the data 
collection which primarily includes document analysis and interviews and finally describes 
the method to analyze the data collected.  
Chapter five presents the results from the case study research on site. It uses the Institutional 
Analysis and Development (IAD) framework in order to structure the findings and assign 
them to certain variables. Chapter six and Chapter seven presents the discussion which 
combines the theoretical background presented in Chapter three with the empirical 
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observations in Chapter five in order to answer the research questions of the study. It aims to 
answer the questions of ‘why’ and ‘how’ that was presented in the introduction. Chapter eight 
finally provides the overall conclusions of the study and the recommendations. 
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2 Cities versus Agriculture: Setting the Study Context of 
Hyderabad (India)  
Overview 
This chapter opens with a global review of 'urbanization versus agriculture' and taking 
Hyderabad as a typical example, an overview of the two competing sectors underlining the 
‘competition-conflict-reallocation’ nexus is presented. It elaborates the increasing 
urbanization of Hyderabad and its growing demand for water which subsequently puts 
pressure for competition of water with the agricultural sector. The timeline of the Hyderabad 
water issue is thereafter chronicled to set the historical and political context of the study. The 
current water status of Hyderabad’s water provision is described. It also systematically charts 
the historical account of the shift of customary water rights to the Indian state. It then explains 
the provision of water rights in India in the current context. Describing the water provision in 
the Indian Constitution helps us to construct the water jurisdictions for both irrigation and 
urban drinking water sectors and the water-related actors at the central level and the state level 
in Andhra Pradesh. This chapter finally throws some light on the concept of property rights 
and categorizes the institutional arrangements for water allocation and the types of water 
transfers under which Hyderabad fall. 
2.1 Cities vs. Agriculture: A Global Review 
With increasing urbanization, the domestic water demand is being met by sources that 
generally have pre-existing agricultural uses and such transfers are made at the cost of 
reducing the agricultural share (Abernethy, 2003: 59). Urbanization is a universal 
phenomenon resulting from a gradual shift from agriculture to industry and modern services 
(Pholo Bala, 2009: 2). As a result of urbanization, water requirements and henceforth 
competition with the agricultural sector is projected to be more prevalent in Asia and Africa. 
The demographic trend of urbanization indicates that by the 1990s, Europe, The Americas, 
and Oceania were urbanized over 70 percent; while Asia and Africa were only 34 percent 
urban. However, it is also projected that as much as 95 percent of these increases in 
urbanization will occur in developing countries, especially in Asia and Africa (Catley-
Carlson, 1988: 184). According to the World Urbanization Prospects-The 2011 Revision 
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(Heilig, 2012: 1), 50 percent urbanization rate will be attained by 2020 in Asia, whilst Africa 
will catch up by 2035. Mohan et al. (2011: 1274) argue that the current pattern of rapid 
urbanization has major repercussions on increasing additional demand on natural resources, 
particularly on land use, energy, and water consumption, thereby exerting significant pressure 
on the environment. Whilst the sectoral water demand indicates that agriculture continues to 
take up the largest share of water accounting for an estimated 72 percent of water withdrawals 
(Meinzen-Dick and Appasamy, 2002: 28), however, with increasing urbanization, the 
domestic and industrial demands are growing much faster, especially in the developing 
countries (Meinzen‐Dick and Ringler, 2008; Molle and Berkoff, 2006; Rosegrant and Ringler, 
1999). There is evidence of emerging trend of cities competing for water as a result of 
urbanization in water-scarce river basins in Asia (Van Rooijen et al., 2005: 81). India and 
China, perhaps the two most important country representative of the problem in this decade 
shows an interesting trend. The urban water demand in China is projected to grow 60 percent 
while the industrial water demand will increase 62 percent over the next ten years (Nyberg 
and Rozelle, 1999: 85). According to the World Bank (1998), the domestic and industrial 
water withdrawals in India will double over the next 25 years, accounting for 27 percent of 
total withdrawals for the country by 2025, compared to 17 percent in the mid-1990s. As a 
result of the increase in urban water demands occurring at a much quicker pace especially in 
the developing countries, there has been an increasing trend to re-appropriate water from 
other sectors; generally agriculture. With the perception of domestic and industrial use having 
a higher value than agriculture, the requirement of inevitably transferring water out of the 
agricultural sector is a growing phenomenon (Molle and Berkoff, 2006; Rosegrant and 
Ringler, 1999). Meinzen-Dick and Appasamy (2002: 39) pointed out, how such water urban 
transfers from the agricultural sector prevailed because of the perception of higher value in 
the non-agricultural sector. Therefore, they reiterated not to undermine the importance of 
irrigation in agriculture, as irrigation played a huge role towards food security and rural 
livelihoods. For instance, in India, 55 percent of agricultural output is from irrigated land 
(Singh et al., 2013).  
Numerous studies on effects in agriculture as a result of such urban water transfers have been 
studied, particularly in China (Cai, 2008; Huang, Rozelle, Lohmar, Huang, and Wang, 2006; 
Jiang, Luo, Peng, Wang, and Jiao, 2012; Zhou, Zhang, Abbaspour, Mosler, and Yang, 2009) 
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and various countries around the world such as Tanzania (Kashaigili, Kadigi, Sokile, and 
Mahoo, 2003), South Africa (Farolfi and Perret, 2002; Juana, Kirsten, and Strzepek, 2006), 
Nepal (Bhattarai, Pant, and Molden, 2005), Philippines (Pascua, 2007) and Cyprus (Ansink 
and Marchiori, 2010). Molle and Berkoff (2006) reviewed a number of cities worldwide 
which increased their water supply from the agricultural sources. They concluded that, despite 
the critical importance to rural livelihood, transfers of water out of agriculture have always 
and will continue to prevail, giving rise to such inter-sectoral competition and conflicts. 
2.2 Hyderabad Case Study: 'Competition-Conflict-Reallocation’ Nexus 
Hyderabad, the capital of Andhra Pradesh is a typical example of a city entrenched in the 
inter-sectoral water competition and conflicts. An emerging megacity of importance, it is the 
fifth largest city in India and also continues to be the fastest growing city. Rapid urbanization 
and population growth have been manifested as a result of hugely successful economic 
reforms initiated by the government promoting investments, both foreign and national 
(Kennedy, 2007). This has eventually increased the water demand of the city manifold. Celio 
and Giordano (2007) has articulated how Hyderabad over the years began withdrawing water 
from pre-existing agricultural sources to meet the city’s demand despite vehement opposition 
from the agricultural sector. With a high degree of livelihood dependence on water by the pre-
existing agricultural users, it eventually started off the conflicts between the rural and urban 
sectors, as we see in the present day. 
According to Narain (2006), Hyderabad is hydrologically a severely water-constrained city. 
The city’s inability to meet the growing water demand despite drawing water from the 
agricultural sources amidst fierce opposition, therefore makes a valid case to examine the 
inter-sectoral competition and conflict of water resources in the rural-urban context. Chawla 
et al. (2012) reviewed the priorities and challenges in the inter-sectoral water allocation of 
water in India. He noted that the National Water Policy indicated priorities in water allocation 
to different sectors. However, it failed to explicitly address the mechanisms to handle the 
competing demand among different sectors. Though some mechanisms have evolved to 
resolve inter-state water disputes, however to date, there is none to appreciate and address 
such emerging inter-sectoral conflicts.  
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The population of Hyderabad was estimated at around 5.7 million in 2001 (Kundu et al., 
2005). According to Mekala et al. (2009), the city had an estimated population of 
approximately 7 million, which has seen an average growth rate of 8.73 percent per year 
(Government of Andhra Pradesh and Centre for Economic and Social Studies, 2008). 
Hyderabad’s population is expected to reach an estimated 9.3 million by 2016 (Table 2-4). 
The economic growth was pegged at an average rate of 8.73 percent per year between 2007-
2008 (Government of Andhra Pradesh and Centre for Economic and Social Studies, 2008). 
This rapid pace of economic development with the increasing city population eventually 
increased its water demand as well. Reckien et al. (2011: 12) stated that the provision of an 
adequate amount of safe water has not been able to keep up with the continuing growth rate of 
the city. For instance, the supply intervals of drinking water have declined over the years, 
from 19 hours per day in the early 1980s to 1.5 hours per day in the 2000s. Shortages in the 
city water supply coupled with the drying up of reservoirs along with the steady decline in 
groundwater show that the future of Hyderabad’s water problems continues to be bleak. 
According to Celio and Giordano (2007), Hyderabad began withdrawing water from pre-
existing agricultural sources to cater to the city’s increasing demand. Over the years water 
from the two major sources of Rivers; Manjira (a tributary of River Godavari), and Krishna 
have been administratively allocated to Hyderabad. The transfer of Manjira water to 
Hyderabad from the Singur reservoir (also catering to the Ghaaranpur irrigation project and 
Nizamsagar irrigation project) was administratively sanctioned via Government Orders 
(G.Os). It may be noted that the G.O. gave priority to drinking water for Hyderabad, where it 
clearly stated that water would not be allocated to the agricultural sector, and be reserved only 
for Hyderabad’s drinking needs if the water level in the reservoir fell below a prescribed level. 
However, over the years it has been recorded that water was released to the agricultural sector 
to both Ghanpur and Nizamsagar irrigation projects, even though the water levels in Singur 
reservoir fell below the minimum prescribed level in the G.O. From the data available, Celio 
and Giordano (2007) suggested that a number of such arbitrary reallocations of water to the 
agricultural sector over the years seem to have been determined by various factors. Those 
factors under which such arbitrary reallocations persisted typically were political pressures on 
the State government or by public representatives of farmers in both the Nizamsagar and 
Ghanpur command area. Also, there is strong evidence of electoral politics influencing such 
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arbitrary water reallocations, where water released to farmers in the agricultural sector has 
preceded key electoral milestones in some instances. 
The situation accounted by Ali (2013), is a typical representation of the inter-sectoral conflicts 
which has been unfolding over the last twenty years since water has been brought to the city 
from Manjira River and Krishna River originally meant only for agricultural purpose. In the 
year 2013, due to poor monsoon, the five sources supplying water to the city declined. Osman 
Sagar and Himayat Sagar dwindled to cause a deficiency of 40 million gallons of water per 
day, as against the required supply of 120 Million Gallons Per Day (MGD). The water level in 
Singur reservoir across Manjira River supplying a large proportion of drinking water to city 
and irrigation water for agriculture severely declined as well. The Andhra Pradesh 
government was left in a dilemma; whether to reduce the supply of drinking water to the city 
or reduce water for irrigation to the two irrigation projects; Ghanpur irrigation project in 
Medak District and Nizamsagar irrigation project in Nizamabad District. It may be interesting 
to note that reducing water for irrigation would have a negative impact on the ruling political 
party, as the government was under huge pressure from the farmers, supported by their local 
Ministers, Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLA) and Members of Parliament (MP) 
from Medak and Nizamabad districts. The Singur dam with a total capacity of 30 Thousand 
Million Cubic Feet (TMC) was down to 9.608 TMC in its reservoir, which was already two 
feet below the prescribed limit set by the government. The set condition was; if the water 
level falls below the prescribed limit, water was to be stored solely for Hyderabad’s drinking 
water needs and not be released for irrigation. Even if the farmers were given as little as 3 
TMC of water as against their demand of 5 TMC, the city would have still had to bear the 
brunt. The city needed nearly 6 TMC of water at the rate of 0.9 TMC per month for up to five 
months, to continue the prevailing supply of 120 MGD per day. However, there has been a 
trend of water being re-allocated to the agricultural sector against the administratively 
prescribed allocation guidelines, over the years. Henceforth, this study seeks to examine the 
institutional context of the water allocation mechanism in place and underlying process of the 
interplay of water-related actors and rules and the dynamics of various factors which 
eventually propagates such arbitrary water reallocations that have detrimental consequences 
for both the sectors. 
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2.3 Historical and Political Perspective of Hyderabad’s Water Issue 
In the year 1908, there was flooding of the Musi River, a tributary of Krishna River flowing 
through Hyderabad. As a result, two reservoirs were constructed to serve as flood protection 
measures as well to provide drinking water for Hyderabad. Osman Sagar reservoir was 
created by damming the Musi River in 1920, followed by Himayat Sagar reservoir in 1927. 
Hyderabad water works were restructured in 1930 which included Osman Sagar and Himayat 
Sagar into the Hyderabad Water system, sufficiently supplying about 35 Million Cubic Meter 
per year (MCM/year) to the city until the 1950s. However, as population increased with 
economic development, there was the need to seek for new water sources. In 1947, with India 
gaining independence, the Indian government appointed the Reorganization Commission in 
1953 where Andhra Pradesh was formed by bringing together coastal Andhra which was 
relatively economically well off and Rayalseema which was drought prone and relatively ill-
developed (Government of India, 1955). Finally, on the 1st of November 1956, Andhra 
Pradesh was formed, where the "Gentlemen’s Agreement" was signed by the leaders of 
Telangana and the Andhra state. This agreement was essentially meant to safeguard the 
interest and economic development of Telangana. In 1956, the state formed the constitution 
where the political scene in Andhra Pradesh was dominated by the Congress Party.  
However, in the year 1969, the first agitation for a separate Telangana state ensued due to 
regional disparities and the non-respect of the provisions of the Gentlemen’s Agreement. This 
was followed by the second agitation in 1973 for bifurcation of the state. The key reason of 
agitation was over the disparity of ac-cess to water and irrigation facilities between the three 
regions; amongst other factors (Begari, 2009). There have been long-standing perceived inter-
regional economic disparities, coupled with the politicization of regional identities which 
have affected politics in the state within the realms of contestation of economic resources 
such as water, amongst other (Suri, 2002). With the gradual urban growth in Andhra Pradesh, 
it eventually resulted in the increasing gap between water demand and supply. In the 1960s, 
plans were proposed to convey water from Manjira River, a tributary of Godavari to 
Hyderabad which was approximately 60 km north-west of the city. In 1965 the Manjira 
project was completed to convey 26.5 MCM/year of water to the city. In 1972, with further 
urbanization and the increasing need for water, the Government of Andhra Pradesh appointed 
the Sreenivasa Rao Expert Commission to recommend options for augmenting the Hyderabad 
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water supply. The Commission recommended groundwater to be inappropriate since it was 
scarce and pollution-prone. The Commission also argued that the Manjira River was already 
largely committed to agricultural uses, and the option of bringing water from the Godavari 
River was eliminated based on high costs. In 1973, the Commission, therefore, suggested 
conducting further investigations for drawing water from the Krishna River (Government of 
Andhra Pradesh, 1973), which was however rejected.  
It is vital to note that the two major Rivers of Andhra Pradesh, Godavari and Krishna flow 
through three Indian states (Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra and Karnataka), causing inter-state 
water disputes. Therefore in 1969, the Government of India constituted the Godavari Water 
Disputes Tribunal (GWDT) as well as the Krishna Water Disputes Tribunal (KWDT). In 
1988, the Godavari Water Disputes Bachawat Tribunal Award allocated 60 TMC of Manjira 
water to Maharashtra and 65 TMC to Andhra Pradesh, which was to be specifically allocated 
to Nizamabad and Medak districts. Complying with the agreements of the award, the Singur 
reservoir was constructed with a storage capacity of 850 Million Cubic Metres (Mm3) across 
the Manjira. The reservoir was completed in two phases; one in 1991 and one in 1993 
(Government of Andhra Pradesh, 2005). The reservoir came into operation in 1991 with the 
allocation of water for both urban (Hyderabad) and agricultural (Ghanpur and Nizamsagar 
irrigation projects) sectors with allocation rules issued by the Government in 1989. The 
Government Order specified Hyderabad’s entitlement to 197 Mm3 of water annually; while 
352 Mm3 was allocated to Ghanpur and Nizamsagar irrigation projects. It is interesting to 
note that the 1990 G.O. indicated the priority for water supply to Hyderabad by specifying 
conditions to the operation rules of the Singur reservoir. There was a prescribed minimum 
water level at the reservoir, below which water was to be solely reserved for Hyderabad's 
drinking water and not to be released to the agricultural sector. The specified minimum levels 
were set to ensure that water stored in the Singur reservoir would always remain sufficient to 
cater to the water needs of Hyderabad (Celio and Giordano, 2007). The Singur reservoir was 
the main water source for the city of Hyderabad until the onset of the Krishna Water Supply 
Project in 2004.  
In 1982, the Telugu Desam Party (TDP) came to power ending the dominance of the Congress 
party for three decades and went on to retain power until 1989. While the TDP was still in 
power, the Government of Andhra Pradesh in 1998 issued a Government Order to sanction the 
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supply of water from Krishna River to Hyderabad, which was initiated in 1986 by the Sri J. 
Raja Rao Expert Commission. This Commission was appointed by the government of India to 
submit a range of technically and economically sound alternatives for further augmenting 
water supply to Hyderabad. The Commission in its report recommended drawing the required 
467 Mm3 of water annually from the Nagarjuna Sagar reservoir of the Krishna basin. 
Drawing out water as recommended by the mission meant having to reallocate water out of 
the agricultural sector. However, the Commission justified the priority to be given on drinking 
water over irrigation, based on the report of the India Irrigation Commission (Government of 
India, 1972). In addition, the award of the Krishna River Disputes Tribunal of 1976 allocated 
75 percent dependable flow of the Krishna River as follows; 15.8 Billion cubic meters per 
year (Bcm/yr) to Maharashtra, 19.8 Bcm/yr to Karna-taka and 22.6 Bcm/yr to Andhra Pradesh 
(Government of India – Krishna Water Disputes Tribunal, 1976). The Commission further 
asserted that priority of water supply to Hyderabad was also justified because people 
belonging to all the districts in the state inhabited in the capital city of Hyderabad 
(Government of Andhra Pradesh, 1987). This decision was staunchly objected by legislators 
of the Indian National Congress from the Rayalseema region, by organizing sit-ins and hunger 
strikes in the State Legislative Assembly. The contention was to first bring water to 
Rayalaseema before conveying water to Hyderabad as per the Krishna Waters Dispute 
Tribunal and the specifications of the Sri Bagh Pact of 1937 1 (Government of Andhra 
Pradesh, 1988). The legislators from the Rayaleema region, which is predominantly a dry 
region of Andhra Pradesh, argued that it would be most affected by Hyderabad’s water 
transfer from the Krishna River (Deccan Chronicle, 1988). This protest also highlighted the 
links of water supply to Hyderabad that is ingrained into the wider context of regional issues.  
In 1990 the Congress came back into power and the government under the Congress rule 
appointed another expert commission. The commission’s recommendation led the government 
to sanction the withdrawal of 467 Mm3 annually from the Nagarjuna Sagar reservoir across 
the Krishna River (D’souza, 2006). But the following years until 1994, the government under 
the rule of the Congress party was politically unstable, due to which the project to supply 
water from Krishna almost did not progress beyond the laying of the foundation stone. In 
1994, the TDP was voted back into power. With the increase in demand for water in 
Hyderabad, the TDP Government in 1996 decided to draw water from Krishna River near 
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Nagarjuna Sagar dam which was about 120 km away from Hyderabad. Eventually in 1997, 
water withdrawal from the Krishna was sanctioned through various Government Orders 
(G.O.), and finally, in 2002 and 2003, the implementation and execution of the Krishna 
Drinking Water Project were undertaken (Celio, Scott, and Giordano, 2010). In 2004 the 
Krishna Water Supply Project Phase-I was finally commissioned to supply water to 
Hyderabad drawing 75 MCM/year. In the year 2005, water was finally diverted from the from 
the Akkampalli Balancing reservoir of the Krishna Water Supply Project Phase-I, despite 
strong opposition from the farmers.It is interesting to note that the waters of Krishna finally 
reached Hyderabad only in the year 2005. It took thirty-two years after the submission of the 
report of the Sreenivasa Rao Expert Committee in 1972 (Celio and Giordano, 2007: 11). This 
was attributed mainly due to the prolonged and non-consensus decision-making process on 
water reallocation from the Krishna River. The reason behind the contention of the water 
transfer was because of the vehement opposition by the legislators from Rayalaseema region 
whose constituencies were mostly affected as a result of such water transfers to Hyderabad. 
Hence this section clearly highlights and charts how the regional considerations strongly 
underlined the politicization of the process of augmenting Hyderabad water supply over the 
years. 
2.4 Provision of Drinking Water for Hyderabad 
The Hyderabad Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board (HMWSSB from hereon) 
was constituted on the 1st of November, 1989. The Board is an ‘autonomous’ body under the 
Hyderabad Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Act, 1989. It was created to give 
administrative and financial independence and increased responsibility while supplying 
drinking water to the people. It is the statutory authority in charge of providing and 
maintaining water supply and sewerage facilities in Hyderabad and the surrounding 
municipalities. The HMWSSB has a mandate to plan, design, construct, organize, execute and 
manage water supply systems in the city. The water supply service area covered by HMWSSB 
(Fig 2-1) is 688.2 Square Kilometres (Sq.Kms), including Municipal Corporation of 
Hyderabad (MCH) area covering 169.3 sq.kms, the ten adjoining Municipalities covering 377 
Sq.Kms, Secunderabad Cantonment and the University of Osmania Campus covering 44.1 
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Sq.Kms, the 10 en route villages covering 97.8 Sq.Kms and finally the two new 
municipalities of Patancheru and Ramchandrapuram. 
 
Figure 2-1: Hyderabad Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board  (HMWSSB) Service  
                    Area covering Hyderabad  
 
Source: Hyderabad Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board  (2008) 
 
It is reported that the water service covers 95 percent of the city’s population with up to 90 
percent in the slum areas (GHMC, 2006; Water and Sanitation Program, 2008). However, 
water access is very poor and intermittent with water being supplied for a few hours on 
alternate days, or twice a week especially in the low-income areas (George et al., 2009; 
McKenzie and Ray, 2009). The main surface source of water for the city of Hyderabad is from 
five impoundments of the following four Rivers (Table 2-1): Musi, Esi, Manjira and Krishna, 
out of which sources from Musi and Esi, i.e. Osman Sagar and Himayat Sagar were originally 
constructed to cater drinking water for Hyderabad, as it is today (Figure 2-2). Manjira and 
Krishna sources were originally meant for the agricultural purpose, but water has been 
diverted over the years to the city to cater to its increasing demand as a result of rampant 
urbanization. 
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Table 2-1: Characteristics of the Four Surface Source of Water   
Source River Year Impoundment Distance 
from city 
Drawls  
MGD 
Osmansagar  
Himayatsagar 
Manjira Phase I 
Manjira Phase II 
Manjira Phase III 
Manjira Phase IV 
Krishna Phase I 
Krishna Phase II 
Total 
Musi 
Esi 
Manjira 
Manjira 
Manjira 
Manjira  
Krishna 
Krishna 
1920 
1927 
1965 
1981 
1991 
1993 
2004 
2008 
Osmansagar 
Himayatsagar 
Manjira Barrage 
Manjira Barrage 
Singur Dam 
Singur Dam 
Nag.Sagar Dam 
Nag.Sagar Dam 
 
  15.0 
    9.6 
  58.0 
  59.0 
  80.0 
  80.0 
116.0 
116.0 
15.0 
15.0 
15.0 
30.0 
40.0 
45.0 
90.0 
90.0 
340.0 
Source: Ramachandraiah and Vedakumar (2007: 2) 
The current demand of the city's water needs is 450 MGD (Million Gallons Litre per /Day). 
However, the Hyderabad Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board supplied only 340 
MGD from its five sources of water (Table 2-1) to different categories of users. Projections of 
water demand and deficit in Hyderabad (in MGD) against the population in the coming years 
indicated a growing gap between the demand and the deficit (Table 2-2). The domestic users 
(including the slums) accounted for almost 96 percent, while commercial and industrial users 
account for just 3 percent (Table 2-3), with an abysmal supply of water on alternate days in 
the city and once in five days in surrounding municipal circles. 
Table 2-2: Current Water Demand-Supply of Hyderabad 
Municipal area of Hyderabad    707 sq km 
Total area (Hyderabad Metropolitan Area) 1,905 sq km 
Population (2005) 7.0 Million 
Population (2011) as projected in 2005-06 
Water sourced from surface sources 
Water sourced from groundwater 
Population served by water supply system 
Current population      (2012) 
Current water demand (2012) 
Current water supply   (2012) 
Current deficit             (2012) 
8.2 Million 
88 percent 
12 percent 
70 percent 
9 Million approx. 
460 MGD 
340 MGD 
187 MGD 
Source: Centre for Science and Environment (2011) 
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Table 2-3: Water Users of Hyderabad 
Category Connection  Percentage 
Domestic                      387,532  77.38 
Slums     98,696     19.71 
Commercial     13,451       2.69 
Industrial         936       0.19 
Others         194       0.04 
Total   500,809    100.00 
Source: Centre for Science and Environment (2011) 
Table 2-4: Projections of Water Demand and Deficit in Hyderabad (in Million Gallons per Day)  
Years    2001           2006         2011    2016   2021 
Population (Million) 
Supply 
Demand 
Deficit 
    5.50 
153.00 
230.00 
  77.00 
           6.74 
       162.00 
       290.00 
       128.00 
        7.72 
    162.00 
    328.00 
    166.00 
    9.30 
162.00 
360.00 
198.00 
  10.90 
162.00 
400.00 
238.00 
Source: Hyderabad Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board (2012) 
With the current projection of the water demand and supply, the future seems to be bleak 
(Table 2-4). Furthermore, in the process of transferring long-distance water to the city, at least 
one-third of the water is lost during distribution and livery (Van Rooijen et al., 2005: 86). In 
addition, innovative ideas such as rain-water harvesting approaches to augment water supply, 
allocation and distribution in the city have not received due attention even though there is 
huge potential for rainwater harvesting (Narain, 2006: 4). George et al. (2009: 295) stated that 
with the amount of average rainfall that Hyderabad receives annually, about 80,000 litres of 
water can be comfortably generated from a 100 square meter roof area. As a result, a close 
average of 40 million cubic meters of water from the rooftop and rainwater tanks in the city 
could potentially meet about 35 percent of the domestic demand each year (Nastar, 2014: 57). 
However, not much attention has been paid to water reforms and policies in the area of 
rainwater harvesting technology due to pressure mostly from real estate lobbies and lack of 
governmental incentives (Narain, 2006: 8). For instance, under the urban renewal plans in 
Hyderabad, Nastar (2014: 57) noted that rainwater harvesting has been made an optional non-
mandatory reform. Additionally, the government has withdrawn the 50 percent subsidy on 
Hyderabad rainwater harvesting “Neeru-Meeru” initiative (HMWSSB, 2008; JNNURM, 
2011). 
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The following section gives a brief account of the current water augmentation projects that 
have been taken up and is underway. Additional water from Phase-I of Godavari and Phase-III 
of Krishna have been planned, after taking into ac-count the predicted water requirements of 
the city up to 2017 (Ali, 2012). The Godavari Drinking Water Supply Project Phase-I was 
intended to bring 180 million gallons of water a day to the city. As of May 2012, to complete 
the Rupees 3,375 crore project, the HMWSSB had mortgaged its properties to avail a loan of 
Rupees 2,000 crore from HUDCO (Housing and Urban Development Corporation) a 
government of India undertaking. The State government had sanctioned Rupees 1,400 crore, 
with an additional amount of Rupees 400 crore in the following financial year. As of June 
2013 (Ifthekar, 2013), the much-awaited forest clearance for the Godavari Drinking Water 
Supply Project Phase-I was cleared. In the case of Krishna Drinking water Augmentation 
Project Phase-III, as of April 2012, in order to complete the Rupees 1,670 crore project, the 
State government sanctioned a meagre Rupees 30 crore as against the original demand of 
Rupees 1,660. This meagre sanction was in view to reduce dependency on Krishna water due 
to the recent award of the tribunal on sharing of the River water between Andhra Pradesh and 
Karnataka. However, by May 2012, the state government approved the HMWSSB’s loan 
proposal from HUDCO a sum of Rupees 1,670 crore for the Krishna Drinking water 
Augmentation Project Phase-III to meet the water needs of the Greater Hyderabad Municipal 
Corporation (GHMC) area. As of January 2013, it was stated that the government was 
committed to complete the third phase of the Krishna water supply to the state capital within 
18 months (Times of India Jan 27, 2013). The water requirement projected as against the pace 
of current water augmentation projects underway clearly indicated that water scarcity will 
continue to prevail. Under such water-stressed condition, competition and conflicts are 
predicted to continue to persist across all sectors.  
Saleth and Dinar (1997: 11) identified the pattern of water conveyance to Hyderabad since 
1922 that closely corresponded to the figures in Table 2-1. They noted that the time gap of 
drinking water projects undertaken had decreased, indicating the obvious increase in water 
demand. In addition, the distance between each successive drinking water project has moved 
further away from Hyderabad. This has not only increased the costs but has also resulted in 
massive transmission and distribution losses. In this regard, George et al. (2009: 694) noted 
the average cost of water previously brought to the city from Osman Sagar and Himayat 
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Sagar which was just 15 km away from Hyderabad. However, the cost increased five folds as 
water was brought from Krishna and Godavari Rivers which is almost 120 km away from 
Hyderabad. This pattern according to Saleth and Dinar (2001: 122), not only had major 
repercussion on costs as well as transmission and distribution loss of water but having to 
divert water from sources with existing multiple users have engendered inter-sectoral water 
conflicts over the years. Concerning groundwater sources and its share of supplying to the 
city, the Hyderabad Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board (1995b: 5) reported that 
it met only as much as 6 percent of the total demand, which was mostly distributed by private 
entities.  
2.5 Shift of Customary Water Rights to the Indian State 
In order to investigate the key research question as to why an arbitrary reallocation of water 
persists, this section systematically charts the historical account of the shift of customary 
water rights to the Indian state. Cullet and Gupta (2009: 159) documented the fragmentation 
of water law, which is well known to be both a state subject as well as at the Union level 
where the elements of water laws are embedded in health or environment laws. This is further 
coupled with a complex administrative arrangement with often overlapping or contradicting 
rights and responsibilities. Siddiqui (2008: 577) succinctly gave an interesting account on 
customary rights over water in India and its evolution, which were influenced by physical and 
climatic conditions and evolving technological development.  
With colonialism and formation of a welfare state, there was a gradual shift of power 
relations; eventually diminishing these customary rights over water resources. Tracing back 
the historical account of customary rights, there were two tiers of management which were 
defined on caste and hereditary basis. The higher caste was responsible for regulating and 
enforcing rules of water resource management assuming a supervisory role. The other was 
involved in construction and other hard labour. Whilst there were no codified rules, there were 
well-laid informal rules and regulations to undertake various aspect of water resource 
management such as water sharing, and the penalty for not participating in the management of 
water resources including dispute resolution. However, according to Majumdar et al. (1948), 
it was the British who introduced the concept of government control over surface waters. 
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Until the revolution of 1857, the customs and local rules were only intervened where it 
clashed with their interest and laws such as the Charter Act of 1833 was enacted to codify the 
laws in India. It was only after the revolution of 1857 when the British began to exercise its 
power and control.  
After Independence post-1947, the Irrigation Bill of 1953 secured the control of water 
resources by the state, thereby curtailing the customary rights. These rights were further 
curtailed with industrialization allowing more rights to the state to bring more irrigation 
command and growing cities under their control (Siddiqui, 2008: 577). Eventually, the 
Northern India Canal and Drainage Act (1873) was put into place. This Act which recognized 
the right of the Government to “use and control for public purposes the water of all Rivers 
and streams flowing in natural channels, and of all lakes” was a landmark towards 
strengthening of state control over the surface water of the state (Majumdar et al., 1948). 
Siddiqui (2008: 577) further pointed out the characteristics of water law in India being 
associated with land, pushed farmers into further depth of insecurity as almost 80 percent do 
not own land. It may be noted that the existing legal and institutional framework for water 
laws in India are embodied in the National Legislations such as the Water Prevention and 
Control of Pollution Act 1974; Air Prevention and Control of Pollution Act 1977; 
Environment Protection Act 1986; Forest Conservation Act 1988 and the Environment 
Assessment Development of Projects, 1994. The nodal agency which acts as the 
administrative entity of the central government is the Ministry of Environment and Forest. 
2.6 Types of Water Rights in India  
The previous section charted the historical account of the shift of customary water rights to 
the Indian state. This section describes the provision of water rights in India in the current 
context. Abernethy (2005) explained that the foundation to carry out the institutional analysis 
of water governance lie in tracing the basis in which access to water is controlled and 
influenced by social institutions. Institutions are essentially rules of the game that structure 
access to water when competition over water increases, as a result of which interactions 
occurs between water-related actors. These water-related actors may have few other common 
concerns beyond sharing an increasingly contested resource. It is, therefore, important to look 
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beyond the conventional analysis of water rights and not just formal water rights supported 
and derived by government law books and regulatory agencies.  In other words, beyond 
formal water rights, it is important to further delve into other types of water rights that exist in 
practice informally, such as a range of different negotiation arenas through which different 
stakeholders in water management may seek to increase, defend, or otherwise influence their 
access to water. For instance, by negotiating disputes, approaching bureaucratic agencies, 
court appeals, or lobbying for a change in legislation (Bruns and Meinzen-Dick, 2005: 4). 
In order to understand the formal institutions that structure access to water, it is vital to 
examine the concept and development of water rights and different types of water rights 
relating to property rights. Issues relating to ownership of water are not only a complex one 
but also different compared to other resources. The use, control and ownership of water are 
linked to the ownership of land and irrigation structures. Thus water ownership cannot be 
discussed in isolation. While the common concept associated with property rights refers to 
ownership to a particular resource with the permission to be able to do anything with it, it is, 
however, more important to also consider and examine what bundles of rights may different 
parties hold (Bruns and Meinzen-Dick, 2003: 4). These bundles of rights according to 
Schlager and Ostrom (1992: 250-251) are classified as access and withdrawal, management, 
exclusion and alienation rights. 
Table 2-5: Water Rights in India 
Types of 
Perspectives 
Right Holders  Applicability and Remarks Examples 
Riparian Rights to waters of flowing 
River inherited-in, or claimed 
by, different users located 
alongside that River 
At levels of households, farms, 
communities, villages and towns. It occurs 
in a more marked form at the level of 
political or administrative units within or 
with another country 
Inter-state Cauvery 
dispute, Indus 
Treaty 1960 (India-
Pakistan) 
Federalist  Distribution of rights and 
powers to water between 
different levels in the federal 
structure 
Three list-Union, State and Concurrent. A 
distribution of legislative power of the 
Union Parliament and State Legislatures  
Water is listed as 
state subject in the 
constitution  
Formal Law Includes judicial The right to drinking water is a  
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determination fundamental right 
Customary 
Law 
Communities allocate water 
according to land ownership, 
caste or community 
membership 
Farmers managed irrigation systems, 
domestic water supply not built by 
government   
Small tanks in 
South India, Kuhls 
in Himalayas, wells 
Civil Society Individuals/Organization Arises in three different but inter-
connected contexts where local 
communities are involved 
Anna Hazare’s 
movement in 
Maharashtra  
Source: Raju and Sarma (2004: 3) 
These rights are use rights (for access and withdrawal), control or decision-making rights (to 
manage the resource, exclude others from it, and to alienate, or transfer) and finally rights to 
the resource to others (von Benda-Beckmann, 1995: 224). Depending on the types of 
perspectives, the question of rights relating to water in India has been succinctly elaborated by 
Raju and Sarma (2004: 3) in the above Table 2-5. 
2.7 Water in the Indian Constitution 
This section describes ‘Water’ in the Indian Constitution which maps out and further 
constructs the study context relating to water jurisdictions (for both irrigation and urban 
drinking water sectors) and water-related actors at both the central level as well as the state 
level in Andhra Pradesh. Mishra (2015: 2) accounts the complexity of power, roles and 
responsibilities embodied in the constitutional and legislative framework of the water rights 
regime in India. The Constitution of India lays down the legislative and functional jurisdiction 
of the Union, State and local Governments regarding 'Water'. Therefore, the constitutional 
provisions in respect of allocation of responsibilities between the State and Centre fall into 
three categories: The Union List (List-I), the State List (List-II) and the Concurrent List (List-
III). However, most of the Rivers in the country are inter-state and the regulation and 
development of waters of these Rivers is a constant source of inter-state disputes.  
Therefore whilst 'Water' is basically a State subject, the Union comes in only in the case of 
inter-state River waters. In such case of inter-state water, which states have jurisdiction over 
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such water is prescribed in List II (i.e. the State List) of the Seventh Schedule. It has the 
following as Entry 17: "Water, that is to say, water supplies, irrigation and canals, drainage 
and embankments, water storage and water power subject to the provisions of Entry 56 of List 
I". Entry 56 of List I (Union list) reads as follows: "Regulation and development of inter- state 
Rivers and River valleys to the extent to which such regulation and development under the 
control of the Union, is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest".  
In case of disputes relating to inter-state waters, the Constitution has a specific article (Article 
262), dealing with adjudication of disputes relating to matters of inter-state Rivers or River 
valleys, which reads as follows: “(1) Parliament may by law provide for the adjudication of 
any dispute or complaint with respect to the use, distribution or control of the waters of, or in, 
any inter-state River or River Valley. (2) Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, 
Parliament may, by law provide that neither the Supreme Court nor any other court shall 
exercise jurisdiction in respect of any such dispute or complaint as is referred to in Clause 
(1)”. Under the Article 262, the Parliament enacted the Inter-State Water Disputes Act of 
1956, under which a number of tribunals have been set up to resolve water disputes among 
the states. Article 262 grants Parliament the right to legislate over the matters in Entry 56, 
superseding the Supreme Court (Richards and Singh, 2002: 613). The Environment 
(Protection) Act, 1996, and notifications issued under it by the Union Ministry of 
Environment and Forests (MoEF), require all states to get central clearance for major water 
projects. When two or more states with the approval of their respective assemblies want to 
adopt uniform water legislation, they can request the Union government to provide such 
legislation. However, subject to the above limitations, and limitations enforced by central 
administrative, (i.e. limitations laid down by Parliament), the power and authority to define 
laws pertaining to water resources in a particular state lie in its respective government 
(Mishra, 2015: 2).  
Hence, the two laws enacted by the Union under Article 262 and Entry 56 of List I are the 
Inter-State Water Disputes Act, 1956 (as amended up to 1980) and the River Boards Act, 
1956. The recent 1992 amendments to the Constitution regarding Panchayats and 
Municipalities introduced the following entries in the schedules. It listed the subject areas in 
which the State Governments and legislatures may devolve functions to such bodies, so as to 
make them evolve as local self-governing institutions. In the Eighth Schedule (Part IX) 
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dealing with Panchayats, the subjects, ''Minor irrigation, Water management and Watershed 
development", "drinking water" and "maintenance of community assets" are listed. In the 
Twelfth Schedule (Part IX A) dealing with municipalities, the subjects "water supply of 
domestic, industrial and commercial purposes" is listed. Therefore, there are also provisions 
in the Constitution for local Government's responsibilities in respect of several aspects of 
water use.  
In the study context, Celio and Giordano (2007: 233) pointed that the State imposed absolute 
rights over surface waters. Therefore the state government designated different departments to 
administer different sectors. Because of the provision of the State’s rights over surface water, 
there were provisions for the government of Andhra Pradesh to reallocate water through 
bureaucratic means. However, the States’ rights over surface waters are restrained in the case 
of inter-state Rivers whose waters are disputed between some or all of their riparian states. In 
such cases, under the provision of Article 262 of the Constitution, the central parliament can 
provide for the adjudication of the inter-state dispute of water. Hence, the Inter-State Water 
Disputes Act (1956) laid down under Article 262 gives the provision to the Central 
Government to refer the matter to a tribunal for settling disputes between states (Iyer, 2003).  
In this regard, Celio and Giordano (2007: 232) concisely charted the River disputes in the 
study context. The two major Rivers of Andhra Pradesh; Godavari and Krishna flow through 
three Indian states (Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra and Karnataka) causing inter-state water 
disputes. Therefore, in 1969 the Government of India constituted The Godavari Water 
Disputes Tribunal (GWDT) as well as the Krishna Water Disputes Tribunal (KWDT). The 
Manjira River (across which the Singur dam is constructed) originates in the State of 
Maharashtra and crosses Karnataka to finally enter Andhra Pradesh to eventually join the 
Godavari River. To plan the sharing of Godavari River between the riparian states, as per the 
provision of the Indian constitution; Godavari Water Disputes Tribunal was constituted in 
1969 and gave its award in 1980 to the three respective states. In this tribunal award, 
provision of water transfer from the Manjira River to Hyderabad was made. Eventually, in 
1988, the Godavari Water Disputes Bachawat Tribunal Award allocated 60 TMC of Manjira 
water to Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh was awarded 65 TMC of Manjira water; which was 
to be specifically allocated to Nizamabad and Medak districts. Complying with the 
agreements of the award, Singur reservoir was constructed with a storage capacity of 850 
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Mm3 across the Manjira River in order to supply water to Hyderabad. In the year 1975, 
Andhra Pradesh signed agreements independently with Karnataka and Maharashtra making 
provision for Andhra Pradesh to draw 113.3 Mm3 of Manjira water to Hyderabad which was 
to be drawn via the Singur reservoir. Similarly, in 1976, the Krishna Water Disputes Tribunal 
(KWDT) allocated 75 percent dependable flow of the Krishna River as follows: 15.8 Bcm/yr 
to Maharashtra; 19.8 Bcm/yr to Karnataka and 22.6 Bcm/yr to Andhra Pradesh (Government 
of India-Krishna Water Disputes Tribunal, 1976).  
The following section describes the administrative provision of water resources of the Indian 
state as per the Indian constitution. According to Sahu (2012: 88), India came up with its first 
ever National Water Policy (NWP) in the year 1987, declaring water as a prime natural 
resource and a basic human need. In this regard, it accorded drinking water as its highest 
priority. However, the participation of stakeholders and private sectors were missing, which 
led to the revision of the policy. Therefore in 2002, a revised National Water Policy was 
adopted, where different states crafted their own water policies with priorities accorded to 
drinking water. The provision within the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India 
equipped the Central Government with the River Boards Act-1956 and Inter-state Water 
Dispute Act-1956. The state governments were given powers to manage and govern the 
domestic water supply in their respective states. According to Vaidya (2009: 5), the 74th 
Constitution Amendment Act (CAA) was enacted in 1993 with an aim towards strengthening 
the urban governance and management of essential services. This Act empowered the urban 
local bodies to govern and take responsibility for urban water supply. However, it may be 
noted that the water supply is not solely governed by the urban local body. In addition to the 
urban local body, there are other agencies (both national and state) which continue to 
influence its operation and management directly or indirectly.  
The Ministry of Urban Development (MUD) takes care of the Urban Water Supply (UWS), 
under which responsibilities not only include policy formulation and promoting new 
strategies, setting norms and standards, monitoring but also provide support in form of 
expertise and finance to state programs. The technical arm of the MUD is the Central Public 
Health and Environmental Engineering Organization (CPHEEO from hereon) created in 1953. 
This arm mainly provides advisory services to the Ministry in the area of technical issues. The 
CPHEEO also works and collaborate with the state agencies on matters and activities 
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pertaining to water supply and sanitation. Whilst the role of CPHEEO is essentially at the 
national level, it is the Public Health Engineering Department (PHED) at the state level, 
responsible for planning and management of water resources mainly through the local 
government or the municipalities. In some few states such as Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and 
Tamil Nadu, the responsibilities are given to the Water Supply and Sewerage Boards. These 
Water Boards were created to look after supply and management of water in relatively larger 
metropolitan cities, such as the Hyderabad Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board 
(Further discussed in Section 2.9).  
Water resource management in India falls under a broad umbrella of different Ministries such 
as the Ministry of Water Resources (MoWR) and the Ministry of Environment and Forests 
(MoEF). In addition, various other departments under the MoWR are also involved in some 
way or the other such as the Central Water Commission (CWC), the Central Ground Water 
Board (CGWB). The CWC is mainly responsible for regulating surface water use for different 
sectoral purposes such as irrigation, drinking, electricity and industrial purposes, besides 
mediating interstate water allocation disputes. The CGWB looks into management and 
monitoring of groundwater resources. Under the Ministry of Environment and Forests 
(MoEF), the National Rivers Conservation Directorate (NRCD) takes responsibilities in 
overseeing plans towards improving the quality of the India’s Rivers. Ministry of Agriculture 
(MoA) is also either directly or indirectly involved while dealing with watershed projects 
(Sahu 2012: 93). An overall hierarchy of water resource planning on the legislative and 
functional jurisdiction of the Union, State and local Governments are described in Figure 2-2. 
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Figure 2-2: Hierarchy of Water Resource Planning Departments in India 
Source: own interpretation adapted from Department of Irrigation, Government of Andhra 
Pradesh (2012) 
30 
2.8 Provision for Water Resources in Andhra Pradesh 
 The case study of Hyderabad water allocation essentially deals with water user, uses and 
allocation across different sectors in Andhra Pradesh, which is entrenched and characterized 
by a complex network of different water-related departments and its responsibilities in the 
state. Whilst Table 2.6 gives the overall administrative provision of water resources in Andhra 
Pradesh, this section outlines the independent and corresponding departments to handle both 
irrigation and drinking water and the overlapping of the jurisdiction of departments involved 
in the inter-sectoral allocation of water in Hyderabad’s study context. 
Table 2-6: Administrative Provision of Water Resources in Andhra Pradesh 
Nature of 
responsibility 
Ministries 
responsible 
Departments 
responsible 
Specific sub-divisions responsible for 
‘water’ related activities 
Drinking water, 
water 
development 
and wage 
employment 
Ministry for 
Panchayat Raj, 
Rural 
Development, 
Rural Water 
Supply 
and Wage 
Employment 
Panchayat Raj and 
Rural Department 
Planning, construction, operation and 
management of  rural water supply, 
minor irrigation tanks having a 
command area of less than 40 ha,  
implementation of watershed 
development, drought-prone area, 
employment assurance schemes 
Ministry for 
Municipal 
Administration 
and Urban 
Development 
Public Health and 
Municipal 
Engineering 
Department 
Planning, construction and maintenance 
of urban water supply, drainage, 
sanitation and sewage treatment systems 
in urban local bodies 
Hyderabad Metro Water Supply and 
Sewerage Board: Planning, construction 
and maintenance of urban water supply, 
drainage, sanitation and sewage 
treatment systems in Hyderabad and 10 
surrounding municipalities 
Water Resources 
Development 
Ministry for Minor 
Irrigation, 
AP Industrial 
Development 
Corporation 
(APIDC), 
Departments for 
Major, Medium 
and Minor 
Irrigation, 
APIDC and 
Groundwater 
Basin-wise planning of State water 
resources, monitoring of river flows, 
sediment loads, hydrological studies for 
projects and seeking approval from 
central waters commission, design, 
planning, construction and maintenance 
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Ground Water 
Development and 
Sericulture 
Ministry for Major 
and Medium 
Irrigation 
Development and 
Sericulture 
of major, medium and minor irrigation 
schemes, Implementing the APFMIS 
 Ministry for 
Agriculture and 
Horticulture 
 
Agriculture and  
Horticulture 
Department 
Formation of district-wise agriculture – 
production, intensification plans, 
agriculture extension, integrated nutrient 
and pest management, promotion and 
extension of horticulture activities and 
drip irrigation 
 Ministry for  
Energy  
 
Ministry for 
Forest, 
Environment, 
Science and 
Technology 
 
Energy 
Department 
 
Department of 
Forest, 
Environment, 
Science and 
Technology 
 
Hydro and thermal power generation and 
distribution 
 
Promotion of forests regeneration and 
rainwater harvesting in forest areas, 
supervision of works of wildlife wing, 
Andhra Pradesh Pollution Control Board 
responsible for enforcement of: Water 
Prevention and Control of Pollution Act 
1974, Water Prevention and Control of 
Pollution Act 1977, Air Water 
Prevention and Control of Pollution Act 
1981, the Environment Protection Act 
1986, Hazardous Chemicals and Wastes 
Handling Rules 1989 
 
Source:  Government of Andhra Pradesh (2012) 
2.8.1 Irrigation Water in Andhra Pradesh 
Raymond (2001: 7) examined the irrigation reforms in Andhra Pradesh and elaborately 
charted the administrative structure of the irrigation sector, which is principally under the 
Irrigation and Command Area Development Department (ICADD from hereon). There are 
three levels of administration. The highest level is governed by the following; Minister of 
Major and Medium Irrigation, the Minister of Minor Irrigation and the Principal Secretary of 
ICADD. In addition, three to four Secretaries of related departments are included, each of 
whom is further supported by three to four Deputy or Joint Secretaries. The second level 
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comprises of the heads of the following departments; the Engineer in Chief (Irrigation and 
Administration), the Director General of the Water and Land Management, Training, and 
Research Institute (WALAMTARI), the Com- missioner of the Command Area Development 
Authority (CADA), and the Director (Ground Water Board). The third level is placed at the 
district level, mainly responsible for field operations and management. Here the 
Superintending Engineer has jurisdiction over one or more districts. In practice, each 
irrigation division comprises of three or four subdivisions which are overseen by a Deputy 
Executive Engineer. Each subdivision is further sub-divided into three or more sections under 
the jurisdiction of an Assistant Engineer, which is supported by one or more inspectors. At the 
lowest level are the gatekeepers (lascars), assisting the management and distribution of water 
in the fields. Figure 2-3 shows the structure of the Irrigation Department at the State and 
District Levels. 
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Figure 2-3: Structure of the Irrigation Department of Andhra Pradesh                
Source: Department of Irrigation, Government of Andhra Pradesh (2013) 
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2.8.2 Drinking Water in Andhra Pradesh and Hyderabad 
Ramachandrudu et al. (2009: 10) charted the administrative set-up of the rural drinking water 
in Andhra Pradesh. The Rural Water Supply Department is the key agency responsible for 
designing and implementation of Water Supply ser-vice in the rural areas. It was formed in 
2007 by the Government of Andhra Pradesh. To chronologically trace back the evolution of 
the Rural Water Supply Department, in 1960 the Panchayati Raj and Engineering Department 
(PRED) was created to take care of rural development which also included the rural water 
supply. In the year 1965, a separate independent post was formed to look after rural water 
supply and sanitation, which however did not meet the desired expectations. Therefore, the 
Government trifurcated the Panchayati Raj and Engineering Department (PRED) into 
Panchayati Raj, Rural Water Supply Department and Rural Development.  
In the case of urban drinking water, Rao et al. (2012) noted that under the Municipal 
Administration and Urban Development Department (MAUDD), the Public Health 
Engineering Department (PHED) is responsible for all operations and activity concerning 
Water Supply and Sewerage Schemes in all the 110 Municipalities in the state of Andhra 
Pradesh and 11 Municipal Corporations. However, in the case study context, under the same 
department of MAUDD, Hyderabad city has an independent body called the Hyderabad 
Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board (HMWSSB) responsible for all operational 
and management activities pertaining to Hyderabad’s water supply. Prior to the creation of the 
Water Board in its current form, it was the Hyderabad Water Works Department (Government 
of Andhra Pradesh) which was responsible for supplying drinking water to the city of 
Hyderabad. A Chief Engineer under the Municipal Administration Department headed the 
Hyderabad Water Works which functioned as an Engineering Department to facilitate water 
supply to the city. However, to ensure a greater degree of financial autonomy in order to 
enable effective planning and management, the government created the Water Board in 1982.  
Sahu (2012: 150) chronologically charted the institutional arrangement for urban water 
resources in the state of Andhra Pradesh. The Water Board was created through the enactment 
of Act 6 in 1982. The administrative arrangement of the Water Board made provision for a 
competent person (experienced Administrator or Engineer with technical expertise in the area 
of water) to head the Board. In addition, provisions were made for community representation 
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with different interests to specifically endorse and encourage public participation in water 
resource management. It is interesting to note that the very premise of forming the Water 
Board was one of the pre-condition set by the World Bank to avail its loan. However, the loan 
failed to come through and the Water Board ceased to exist. The water management in the 
state resumed as how it functioned prior to the setting of the Water Board. The government 
however re-drafted the Act in 1989 in order to create the Board, what is today known as the 
Hyderabad Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board (Act 15 of 1989) with the 
organizational structure as described in Figure 2.4. Subsequently, in 1990, a loan from the 
World Bank for Hyderabad water supply and sanitation was granted. The provision for public 
representation was removed on the grounds that too many diverging interests would have 
hindered the smooth functioning of the Water Board. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-4: Organization Chart of Hyderabad Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board 
. 
Source: Sahu (2012: 153) 
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Celio (2007: 6) illustrated how the constitution of the Hyderabad Metropolitan Water Supply 
and Sewerage Board was formed with the encouragement of the World Bank to allow and 
equip the Water Board with financial autonomy. Provisions were made in order to enable the 
Water Board to function with great financial autonomy. Provisions were also made in order to 
enable the Water Board to function with great operational and decision-making control. This 
arrangement of financial autonomy was to specifically safeguard the Water Board from 
political interferences. However, the Water Board was far from achieving its objective of 
financial autonomy because water fee collected was extremely low. Further, the Chief 
Minister serves as the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the HMWSSB, which rather 
emphasized the Water Board's dependence on the Government of Andhra Pradesh, to be 
eventually under the control of the political establishment (Table 2-7).  
Table 2-7: Board Members of Hyderabad Metropolitan Water Supply and                    Sewerage Board   
Hon'ble Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh Chairman 
Hon'ble Minister for Municipal Administration  
and Urban development 
Vice Chairman 
Chairman A.P Pollution Control Board Ex–Officio Director 
Principal Secretary, Municipal Admin and Urban Dev.,  
Secretary Finance, Govt. of Andhra Pradesh  
Special Officer and Commissioner, Municipal Corporation 
of Hyderabad 
Director, Health, Govt. of Andhra Pradesh 
Director (Technical ), HMWSSB  
Director (Finance), HMWSSB 
Managing Director, HMWSSB 
Ex–Officio Director  
 
Ex–Officio Director  
Ex–Officio Director  
Ex–Officio Director  
Ex–Officio Director  
Director 
Director 
 
Source: Hyderabad Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board (2012) 
In principle, the HMWSSB is supposed to have the overall control over its five water supply 
sources and its infrastructures. However, the two key water sources are under the control of 
the Irrigation Department with a water sharing mechanism in place which has been a basis for 
protracted contention. These two key water sources are Singur reservoir across Manjira River 
and Nagarjuna Sagar dam across Krishna River (I and II Phases), supplying almost 70 percent 
of the water to Hyderabad. The Singur reservoir is operated by the Irrigation Department and 
releases water to Ghanpur and Nizamsagar for irrigation purposes after being jointly agreed 
upon by the Principal Secretary for Irrigation and the Managing Director of the HMWSSB. 
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Such release of water is based on the dam operation rules of water allocation for Hyderabad 
and agriculture (Government Order 93). However, in the case of disagreement between the 
Principal Secretary and Managing Director, the Chief Minister who is also the Chairman of 
the Water Board takes the final decision on the matter. Celio (2007: 7) further illustrated a 
comparable situation of water being brought to Hyderabad from Krishna River by utilizing 
pre-existing structures controlled by the Irrigation Department. 
2.9 Property Regimes and Institutional Arrangement for Water Allocation 
This section explains the concept of property rights and categorizes the institutional 
arrangement for water allocation and the type of water transfers relevant to Hyderabad's study 
context. According to Bromley (1992), the concept of property regime defines the role of 
different actors in relation to a resource system and characterizes relationships between 
individuals with respect to a specific good or benefit. Based on this, different property 
regimes exist as pointed out by Ostrom (1990) and Bromley (1992). In private property, legal 
individuals hold rights, whereas a group of individuals hold rights in common property. In 
state property, the state holds the rights; however open access characterizes the absence of any 
property rights. Based on this characterization, three key institutional arrangements for water 
allocation have been identified by Bruns and Meinzen-Dick (2005) which essentially centers 
on different actors managing the resource. However, it must be noted that water allocation 
arrangements in general exists in a combination of several aspects of the three forms and is 
rarely present in the pure form.  
User-Based Allocation. A very good example of this type of allocation is farmer-managed 
irrigation systems (Dinar, Rosegrant, and Meinzen-Dick, 1997). Here variation of rules for 
allocation is based on timed rotation; the area of land owned or shares of the flow (Yoder, 
1994). In general, for this type of water allocation, the presence of collective action 
institutions is necessary with authority entrusted to them in them to make decisions on water 
rights. Empirical evidence on studies of common-pool resource management including water 
has shown such institutions evolve spontaneously. However, this type of allocation does not 
necessarily ensure efficient water allocation (Meinzen-Dick and Men-doza, 1996). In this type 
of allocation mechanism, property rights remain a critical factor (Coward, 1986). If they have 
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no rights, (de facto or de jure) over that particular water resource, then the user groups are 
unable to make decisions (Meinzen-Dick and Mendoza, 1996).  
Market Allocation. In this type of allocation, water markets allocate water by means of 
tradable water use rights. Here, voluntary exchange of water use rights between willing 
buyers and willing sellers for legal rights of water take place. In such an exchange process, 
water can be transferred all or in part, separately from the transfer of land. To implement such 
an exchange, it is important to have clearly defined characteristics of water rights and the 
regulations governing the trade of such water rights which in a way asserts the bargaining 
power of the farmers and the farmer groups. This will allow the water users to exercise their 
rights to consent to any reallocation of water or compensation for any water transferred (Dinar 
et al., 1997; Wang, Fang, and Hipel, 2003). However, a necessary condition for such market 
to become operational must be created by the government. Conditions, such as defining the 
original allocation of water rights, creating the institutional and legal frameworks for trade 
and finally investing basic necessary infrastructure to allow such water transfers to take place 
(Holden and Thobani, 1996).  
Public (Administrative) Allocation. This type of allocation takes place where water is 
considered as a public good (Wang et al., 2003). This is generally applicable in large-scale 
irrigation systems. Here the state decides what water resources can be used and accordingly 
allocates and distributes water within different parts of such system. Municipal, industrial and 
rural water supply also falls under this type of allocation. Even though Hydropower sector is a 
non-consumptive use, it falls under this category of water allocation. This type of water 
allocation is fundamentally determined by water quantities based on the physical norm and 
also more importantly on the political influence. The role of the state is of prime importance, 
particularly in the inter-sectoral allocation, be-cause the state not only has jurisdiction over all 
sectors of water use, but the state is the only institution. In this regard, most countries 
maintain the fact that the state holds navigable waters as an aspect of sovereignty, as a result 
of which it has reaffirmed the state's role in allocating water between different sectors such as 
agricultural, industrial, municipal, electricity and the environmental sector. In the research 
context, Hyderabad's case of water allocation falls under this category which will be discussed 
in detail in the later sections of the thesis. 
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2.10 Perspectives on Inter-Sectoral Water Allocations and Types of Transfers.  
Lund and Israel (1995: 195) suggested that whilst water transfer among similar users, such as 
such as farmer to farmer and municipality to municipality were common, water transfer 
between sectors is a relatively recent phenomenon. This obviously reflected the trend in the 
increasing need of municipal and industrial demand. As a result, there was increasing pressure 
to transfer water from major water user, primarily from the agricultural sector to these water 
hungry sectors (Levine, Barker, and Huang, 2007). Saleth and Dinar (2001) pointed that in or-
der to meet the growing urban demand, water supply has been augmented by bringing water 
to the city from distant sources by tapping new sources as well as multiple-use water sources. 
This inherently disrupted the existing water allocation between these different sectors, 
eventually giving rise to inter-sectoral water conflicts. Molle and Berkoff (2006: 13) describe 
a typology of how water is transferred in practice from agricultural to urban uses. He 
proposed different types of transfer and transfer mechanisms and explained how water 
transfers occur in practice as well as their consequences with some examples of cities that are 
reviewed in Table 2-8. 
Temporary transfers typically occur during a drought. If the source is large, the impact on 
irrigation users may diffuse and be unidentifiable. If the transfer is a large portion of the 
source, often the case during droughts, then temporary allocation directly impacts on a known 
group of farmers who may have to be compensated for their temporary loss. Once the 
emergency is over, allocations revert to the original pattern. Gradual permanent transfers 
occur when a source of water already tapped by several users is progressively diverted to the 
benefit of a city. In such cases, the transfer typically first amounts to a limited percentage of 
the source of origin and the effects diffuse and are largely unidentifiable since the source 
continues to provide a large share of water to other users. Out-right permanent transfers often 
involve viciously reallocating water from one user to another. If the amount of water is 
relatively limited it can be more easily accommodated. However, if the transfer or diversion 
makes up a large part or all of an existing source, for instance, converting irrigation reservoirs 
to municipal use, then the transfer is likely to be chaotic if no compensation mechanism is in 
place. Whilst some transfers are explicit and obvious; others are carried out underhand.  
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Table 2-8: Classification of the Types of Water Transfers 
Large percentage of the source 
of origin 
Limited percentage of the source of origin 
Temporary 
transfers 
Deep wells to Chennai; 
Transfers to Seville, Manila 
Drought transfers from Krishna River to 
Chennai; The Californian Water Bank 
Permanent 
transfers 
A.Gradual
transfers
Zanghe reservoir and Northern 
Plains (China); Jordan River to 
Amman, and Chao Phraya 
River to Bangkok 
Irrigation water to Chiang Mai; Krishna 
River water to Hyderabad; Transfers from 
Acequias in New Mexico 
B.Outright
transfers
Diversions to Mexico City and 
from Yangtze to North China; 
Diversion of the San Juan River 
to supply Monterrey; Buying 
out of irrigation dams by 
Tsingtao and of wells by 
Chennai 
Transfer from Bhavani River to Tirupur or 
from the Zayandeh Rud to Yazd; 
Diversion of Mae Klong River to 
Bangkok; of Kelau River to Kuala 
Lumpur and Melamchi River to 
Katmandu 
Source: Molle and Berkoff (2006: 13) 
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3 Property Rights and Distributional Conflicts in Resource 
Allocation 
Overview  
This chapter opens by giving a theoretical perspective on the definition and origins of 
property rights and explains the role of property rights in conflicts in natural resource 
management. However, to study such conflicts; the definition of institutions and institutional 
change is conceptualized. Thereafter, conflicts and institutional change in Knight’s theoretical 
concept is explained with its applicability to Hyderabad’s inter-sectoral water conflicts. 
Finally, the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) Framework and its applicability to 
carry out the research is elaborated. 
Hyderabad’s urbanization and its inter-sectoral water contestation, conflict and competition 
with the agricultural sector have been fuelled by persistent arbitrary water reallocations. These 
arbitrary water reallocations have been taking place against the administratively prescribed 
allocation guidelines over the years, with detrimental consequences for both the sectors. 
Resting on the foundations of the New Institutional Economics (NIE) perspectives on 
property rights; this study seeks to examine the ‘inter-sectoral allocation mechanism’ in place 
which perpetuates such arbitrary reallocations. To succinctly translate the key research 
question of why such arbitrary reallocations persist against the prescribed allocation 
guidelines into Ostrom’s language, this study seeks to fundamentally examine the persistence 
of rules-in-use, despite the rules-in-form already in place. 
From an NIE perspective, property rights include the full range of rules that impact individual 
actions regarding the use and exchange of the benefits flowing from a good. The concept of 
property rights is essentially understood as occurring within institutional rules whose design is 
sometimes exogenous to individual decision-makers. These same individuals then react to 
external rules and create other institutional mechanisms to reallocate the benefits and 
responsibilities assigned to various goods depending on the incentives and resulting 
transaction costs of external institutional structures. Therefore, property rights institutions 
may be understood as a result of ‘individual decisions to support specific institutions’ as 
nested within broader institutional structures. This study employs the Institutional Analysis 
and Development (IAD) framework (Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker, 1994). The 
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framework can explain such variation of property rights institutions by examining the full 
range of influences on individual decision makers at multiple levels with the impact of formal 
institutional structures. The framework integrates multiple levels with the impact of formal 
institutional structures. The framework integrates multiple disciplines dealing with the 
question of how institutions affect the incentives that confront individuals and their resultant 
behaviour, to eventually help explain the ways in which institutions operate and change over 
time. In order to study such human interaction in the context of limited resources and the 
resulting resource conflicts, Knight’s distributive bargaining theory of institutional change 
provides an explanation why institutional change and conflict persists over time. Overall, the 
study seeks to employ the existing theoretical explanations of property rights and attempts to 
provide a case on the applicability of contemporary theories of institutional change to the 
context of water resource conflicts in Hyderabad. 
3.1 Definition and Origins of Property Rights: A Theoretical Perspective 
An array of definition on property rights exists in the literature. Furubotn and Pejovich (1972: 
1139) explain property rights as a claim to a resource with entitlements. These entitlements 
include not only to its use but also entitlements to change its form or transfer the rights 
through sale or rental. They added that behavioral sanctions pertaining to the use of the 
resources that must be abided by others are also crafted. Bromley (1991: 15) views property 
rights as a claim on a stream of benefits. It is essentially characterized by the enforcement 
mechanisms where others have the obligation to abide by it, which makes provision for its 
access, use and overexploitation. 
Libecap (1998: 77) views property rights as social institutions which define the entitlements 
that are granted to water and a specific parcel of land. According to Commons (1968), 
property rights are essentially recognized claims and obligations, rights and duties or 
responsibilities. When it comes to property rights over resources, it includes ownership rights, 
use rights which typically includes access and withdrawal rights, and decision-making rights 
which entails not only managing the resource, but also excluding or alienating others from 
accessing the resource (Rout,  2008; Schlager and Ostrom, 1992: 250; von Benda-Beckmann, 
von Benda-Beckmann, and Spiertz, 1997). In terms of property rights in natural resources, 
Hanna et al. (1996: 1) explain how property rights structure human behavior and their 
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interaction towards the use and regulation of the environment. Here, both the rights to 
resources are crafted as well as the rules under which those rights are explicitly exercised.  
Alston et al. (1996: 31) similarly view property rights as an individual’s rights to access and 
use of resources, which is enforced upon other members to recognize the individual’s rights. 
Therefore, the central to the array of definitions implies that property rights are essentially 
social institutions that craft relationships among people with regard to a particular resource. It 
does in no way imply physical ownership, or relations between the owner and the physical 
entity, but rather crafts relation amongst people pertaining that particular resource, object or 
physical entity. One of the most important sets of rules influencing resource management is 
property rights (Ostrom, 1993). According to Ostrom and Schlager (1992: 249), the political 
economists view that property rights and the rules that enforce these rights often shape how 
resource degradation problems are perceived. Therein prescriptions are recommended to solve 
such degradation problems. Whilst the terms rights and rules are interchangeably when made 
in reference to natural resources, Ostrom and Schlager (1992: 250) however reiterates that 
rights are in fact the product of rules and in no way equal to rules. Whilst rights authorize 
action, rules are essentially prescriptions that create such authorizations. This concept implies 
when an individual holds a property right; rights can only be exercised according to what is 
authorized in the rules.   
The different schools of thoughts have varying perspective on the concept of property 
rights. The legal perspective understands property rights as a set of relationship between 
individuals. Here it not only prescribes liberties of an individual to take a set of action but also 
enforces others to uphold and respect those liberties of the individual (Hohfeld, 1920). In this 
line, Cole and Grossman (2002) subscribe to the notion that property rights for most legal 
scholars entail legal recognition by formal enforcement authority. The institutional economists 
understand property right as a form of authority enforced to take on particular actions within a 
specific domain (Commons, 1968). On the other hand, the modern institutional economists 
perceive property rights as a claim on a stream of benefits, which is not secure unless it is 
characterized by enforcement mechanisms where others have the obligation to abide by the 
conditions that protect that particular stream of benefit. In other words, it structures the rights 
and duties that prompt relationship amongst individuals pertaining to a particular resource 
(Bromley and Cernea, 1989: 5). According to economic historians, rights to a particular 
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property are almost never completely specified and enforced in any society. While some of 
those rights are inherently reserved for the society, other rights cannot be enforced; which 
results in those rights being appropriated by others (North, 1990: 33). 
Kauneckis (2004) eloquently highlights the debate and reviews the definition, origins and the 
sources of property rights institutions by tracing the essence of property rights in four 
traditions: legal scholarship, economic, political science and institutional perspective on 
‘property’. According to Kauneckis (2004: 36), most of the legal scholars base their concept 
of property rights, which must be backed by some form of legal recognition by formal 
enforcement authority (Cole, 2001). It was Hohfield's (1919) work which made way into the 
legal perspective of property rights. Here, property rights were understood as the relationship 
between individuals to both liberties and duties and legally defined four types of relationships. 
Cook (1919: 724) highlighted Hohfeld’s interpretation of these four rights rights as legally 
defined social relationships, which included a liberty that is bestowed to undertake an action, 
a claim to the benefit that others are obliged to respect and uphold that individual’s action, the 
capacity and the liberty to change legal relations, and finally enjoying the protection of 
immunity that denies others to change one’s legal relation. According to Lazarev (2005), 
Hohfeld's analysis of rights underlines the legal positions or entitlements which are essentially 
interconnected with each other based on logical relations of entailment. 
Under this ‘legal perspective of property’ school of thought, the rights enforced and protected 
by legal actions is based on 'public trust' doctrine. Here some categories and types of natural 
resources are deliberately protected from public access. In addition, the state’s responsibilities 
to protect the resources from over-exploitation are also justified.  
However, critique to this school of thought particularly the modern economist pointed out the 
existence of property rights in some stateless societies. This argument underlined the need for 
alternative mechanisms that essentially guaranteed property rights. Despite modern 
economists’ view on how the state can sometimes be the violator of these rights, rather than 
protecting them, the legal literature ascertained that property rights rests on the enforcement 
activity and continued to emphasize how the state can act as the only source of enforcement. 
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Kauneckis (2004: 39) further summarized the economic perspective on property rights. Whilst 
property rights from the legal perspective implied legal recognition by formal enforcement 
authority (Cole, 2001); the economic thought did not emphasize on either the source or 
ownership institutions (Demsetz, 2002: 653-654) until Coase’s work in 1959. He argued and 
disagreed with the justified perception for the government to manage and regulate the use of 
shared resources. Coase’s concept was on the premise that as long as property rights are well-
defined with low transactions costs, there is every possibility of internalizing the externalities 
through bargaining among affected parties. Interestingly, the effect of transaction costs on the 
ability of cooperative solutions to emerge (Allen, 1998) came into focus, which is the basis of 
what is today known as the new institutional economics school of thought. 
Following this school of thought, Demsetz (1967: 348) further argued that private property is 
the most appropriate way to make the individuals internalize the externalities. It also 
perceived that the institution of private property was bound to inherently emerge 
spontaneously as per desirable circumstances after weighing in the cost-benefit comparisons. 
In other words, private property rights in reality will emerge spontaneously to increase 
efficiency and makes an attempt to internalize transaction costs. Sole ownership essentially 
allows the owner (private, community or the government) the opportunity to manage and 
regulate in a way that maximizes the net present value of the resource. If the owner is entitled 
to the sole right to reap the benefits of good and rational decisions, she or he would have 
every motivation and incentive to make them. Kauneckis (2004: 41) further explained how 
Barzel (1989) similarly subscribed to the argument in assuming property rights as an 
institutional tool to rectify or provide solutions to ill-defined rights. Overall, the economists 
have provided an explanation of property rights institutions, independent of any government 
action. 
Kauneckis (2004: 42) also elaborated the shift of the political approach to property rights 
from the state enforcement activity, to the decisions particularly made by specific actors 
within the government. It focused on the strategic choices made by the actors within the 
government and the institutions that exert influence over those choices being made. Whilst the 
economic tradition largely kept the political aspect of property rights away from its 
mainstream argument, the tone of its importance subtly surfaced throughout the literature 
particularly in the work of Coase (1959: 14), where he cited the importance in the role of 
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formal government institutions. Similarly, Demsetz (2002: 664), a proponent of private 
property explained the role of government, without which a private enterprise would not 
function properly. The role of political actors was brought to the forefront by public choice 
scholars. Buchanan’s approach to property rights institutions (Buchanan, 1975; 1977; 1993) 
argued that the source of property rights security was to be vested primarily in the 
constitutional structure. This argument was largely criticized by Sened (1997) by explaining 
that in Buchanan’s concept, securing property rights has no distributional consequences and 
all would benefit from the final outcome. Furthermore, by expressing it in cooperative terms, 
it assumed that a constitutional promise was credible enough to guarantee property rights 
security. The state had no reason to abandon its position from the strategy of providing 
enforcement of property rights. Rights would emerge as a dominant strategy where no party 
would have any incentive to abandon. Addressing property rights as a result of political 
institutions has also been examined under the new institutional economics framework. North 
(1990) in observing the relationship between economic growth and property rights institutions 
argued that while the government was the best provider of effective enforcement, however, 
there was no guarantee that government would necessarily protect rights that would promote 
efficiency. 
Libecap (1989) further argued the valid consideration of efficient property rights, when such 
variation in property rights systems exists. He explained that property rights would emerge 
from the political process of negotiation, instead of merely being enforced or allocated 
efficiently, by elaborating the history of property rights formation in the United States of 
America. Here rights were allocated according to political favor, without any considerations 
of efficiency. Similarly, Firmin-Sellers (1996: 4) explained property rights as emerging from a 
process independent from the considerations of efficiency.  
Kauneckis (2004: 50) explained how the political approach to property rights institutions 
exerting emphasis on the decisions made by specific government actors (and rather moving 
away from the concept of state enforcement), made way to another school of thought. It 
typically consisted of economist and political scientists within the new institutional 
economics tradition. Scholars within this approach contested that focusing on the role of 
formal government alone (legal approach) or that of individual agents in a market exchange 
(economic approach) overlooked the real institutions that define relationships of property. 
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Hence they drew their attention towards examining the specific configuration of institutions 
that influenced property rights arrangements. It examined on how actions by the government 
entities and individual right-holders may actually influence the various forms of property 
rights. Researchers undertaking the institutional analysis approach have provided an 
interesting perspective on how the various types of institutions influence property rights 
arrangements. This approach known as the Institutional Economics approach draws from both 
the legal scholarship and economic understanding of property. 
The Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework (Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom, 
Gardner, and Walker, 1994) is an analytic framework that can explain the variation in the 
institutional form in complex nested institutional structures, determining the specific choice 
situation of individual actors. It is a conceptual framework which integrates multiple 
disciplines dealing with the question of how institutions affect the incentives that confront 
individuals and their resultant behavior that can be applied towards understanding the water 
conflicts in Hyderabad.  
 
Figure 3-1: The Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) Framework     
Source: Ostrom (2005) 
 
The core essence of the framework lies in the action arena, essentially consisting of an action 
situation and the participant. An action situation is the social space where individuals or 
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groups of individuals interact and outcomes are produced. The behavior of participants in the 
action situation is influenced by three sets of exogenous variables which include the 
biophysical and material conditions of the setting, attributes of the community and the rules 
that participants have to follow. The action situation can be further broken down into seven 
working components; (1) the set of participants, (2) the positions to be filled by participants, 
(3) the potential outcomes, (4) the set of allowable actions and the function that maps actions 
into realized outcomes, (5) the control that an individual has in regard to this function, (6) the 
information available to participants about actions and outcomes and their linkages, and (7) 
the costs and benefits which serve as incentives and deterrents assigned to actions and 
outcomes (Ostrom 2005: 14). The action arena leads to interactions, which produce outcomes, 
which can in turn feedback and change the action arena and the exogenous variables. The 
IAD framework adapted to carry out the study, describing each variable is presented in 
Section 3.5. 
3.2 Property Rights and Conflicts in Natural Resource Management 
While looking into the concept of conflict of property rights in natural resources; the term 
‘conflict’ as used here refers to situations where disputes question existing and settled formal 
and informal institutions. According to Yandle (2007: 2), some scholars, particularly Demsetz 
(1967), Libecap (1989), Hanna et al. (1996) and Pearse (1988), focused their work in 
examining the role and influence of property rights in natural resource governance regimes. 
Yandle (2007: 2) stated that the likelihood of persistent conflicts among different sectors 
arises when a variety of property rights arrangements are created to manage individual 
resources. The result may be the creation of incompletely defined property rights 
arrangements, causing conflicting expectations among resource users. In some cases, there are 
property rights mismatches (Cash et al., 2006; Crowder et al., 2006; Wilson, 2006; Young, 
2002), creating ambiguity and thereby causing conflict in resource use  (Yandle, 
2007: 2). Mismatches in property rights generally imply problems in the incompatibility of 
temporal and spatial resource characteristics with institutional characteristics. Typically, 
property rights mismatches are likely to occur over water resources (Yandle, 2007: 1), where 
multiple types of resource use and resource user can be engaged and managed under a variety 
of regulatory regimes. 
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Bues (2011: 20) explained the analysis of three different situations with regard to conflicts in 
natural resource management. The first type of conflict takes place under a situation where no 
rules are present. Here, the property rights school considers non-established, poorly defined or 
enforced property rights as an important reason for conflict (Alston, Eggertsson, and North, 
1996; Demsetz, 1967). In the context of water resources, coordination becomes more 
complex, as water scarcity increases with increase in population (Meinzen-Dick and Nkonya, 
2005), as a result of which pressure emerges to define rights (Alchian and Demsetz, 1973). 
The central to the property rights theory propounded by these scholars essentially forms the 
property rights paradigm, where it assumes that better the property rights are delineated and 
the lower the transaction costs, the better the parties involved are capable of internalizing the 
externalities. According to Bues (2011: 21), the second type of conflict situation which occurs 
in the process of creating rules is essentially characterized by a bargaining process (Knight 
1992). As property rights distribute social outcomes, each strategic actor eventually seeks to 
achieve the best distributive outcome. Therefore conflicts are inevitable in process of rules 
creation over institutions which seek to distribute benefits. The third conflict situation 
presents the case where conflicts occur even after the rules are established. According to 
Knight (1992), the actors with the more powerful bargaining power will make a full endeavor 
to promote their interest of distributional goals. On the other hand, the other group of actors 
unhappy with the arrangement will try to rectify it. The process to change and rectify the rules 
will entail violations, individually or collectively, which will likely be resisted by the group of 
actors benefitting the current arrangement of rules (Knight 1992: 59). In this sense, conflict 
persists despite an agreed rule is already established. 
3.3 Institutions and Institutional Change 
The array of definitions of institutions that exists along with its various constituents reflects 
the range of diversity and the various levels at which they exist. North (1991: 97) explains 
institutions as constraints that are crafted to regulate interactions within the political, 
economic and social spectrum of the society. However, North (1995: 15) subsequently 
redefined institutions as the constraints on human interactions that human beings impose on. 
The redefinition of institutions as constraints, rather than rules further opened the possible 
discussion of the distinction between formal and informal constraints. According to Ostrom 
(2005: 3), institutions are defined as a “set of prescriptions and constraints that humans use to 
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regulate all forms of repetitive and structured interactions. These set of prescriptions can 
generally be embedded in rules, norms, and shared strategies” (Crawford and Ostrom, 1995; 
Ostrom, 1997).  
Ostrom (2005: 3) pointed out that the opportunities and constraints that individuals face in 
any situation, the information and the benefits they obtain or benefits excluded from, and how 
they reason about the situation are all affected by the rules or the lack of it, which eventually 
structures the situation. This is due to the presence of formal or informal rules which crafts 
and assigns what access individuals can have, to the resources in question. Thereof, this 
allows individuals to make certain choices and decisions to gain the maximum benefit out of 
such an arrangement.  Knight (1992: 2) considers an institution to be a set of rules that 
structure social interaction in particular ways.  According to North (1990) and Ostrom (1998), 
institutions exist as long as interactions exist and thereby play a role in an exchange process 
between individuals with different resource entitlements. For instance, Ostrom (1990; 2003) 
pointed out the role of institutions in governing interactions amongst multiple individuals 
dependent on the same resource, where each individual has their own interest and hence their 
action influences the benefits of others. Similarly, for diverse interactions; diverse institutions 
are constantly being created due to increasing economic development that eventually requires 
new forms of interactions. Institutions are thus inherently embedded in complexity. While 
institutions provide opportunities for interaction; it also comes with huge challenges to 
understand them (Ostrom 2005; Yifu Lin and Nugent, 1995). 
Schmid (2004) classified institutions as formal and informal institutions, where the formal are 
those often written and adopted consciously. Formal institutions which generally are 
constitutions and laws, before being enacted are deliberated upon by the public, after which 
they are essentially protected and enforced by the state. On the other hand, informal 
institutions are those unwritten rules and norms which spontaneously emerge, as a result of 
continuous interactions amongst individuals within the society. In this regard, North (1995: 
15) while defining institutions as constraints on human interactions imposed by humans 
beings themselves, points out that these constraints with enforcement characteristics may be 
formal (constitutions, law or regulation) and informal (norms, conventions, codes of conduct). 
Ostrom (2005: 3) similarly defines institutions as a “set of prescriptions and constraints that 
humans use to organize structured interactions”. She further delineated such institution as 
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being formal (rules-in-form) or informal (rules-in-use). Anderson (2006) summarized the 
concept of formal and informal rules as present in the literature. The formal comprises of 
rules and procedures that are created, communicated, and enforced through official channels 
which essentially includes state institutions (courts, legislatures, bureaucracies) and state-
enforced rules (constitutions, laws, regulations). While the informal implied personal 
networks, corruption, traditional culture, clientelism and civil society.  
Helmke and Levitsky (2004: 731) explained how crafting of formal institutions differs 
markedly from informal rule-making processes. The formal rules assume written form of rules 
(political, economic, agreements and contracts) created through official channels (such as 
executives and legislatures) which are enforced by the state (courts and police). While the 
informal institutions according to North (1990) and Knight (1992), does not assume any 
written form but rather evolve spontaneously which is enforced beyond the public channels, 
in the form of social norms and customs, habits and customary laws. Because of the 
difference of how formal and informal rules are crafted, Helmke and Levitsky (2004: 731) 
pointed out the suggestions to examine the process of informal rule-making by identifying the 
actors, their coalitions, and interests largely behind the creation of informal rules, which is 
characterized by uneven distribution of power and resources (Knight 1992). Taking a cue 
from Knight (1992), they suggested that the underlying processes of such conflict ought to be 
brought to the forefront and examined, rather than assuming pure coordination.  
When we talk about institutional change, we understand that institutions, in general, are 
dynamic in nature in that there are continuous emergence and evolution of new and old 
institutions. While formal institutions are consciously designed by individuals, most of the 
informal ones originate and evolve over time with little deliberation by individuals. Several 
reasons have been offered as to why institutions emerge or change. For example, Ostrom 
(1998) believes that groups of individuals consciously design new rules to overcome 
collective action dilemmas. Demsetz (1967) posits that different actors are continuously 
searching for cost-minimizing institutions. Whereas, according to Meyer (1995), formal 
institutions or political goods in some instances are exchanged for votes as a part of political 
process. Schmid (2004: 8) summarizes the multi-dimensional concept of institutional change. 
He explains the changes occurring in terms of increasing population, resources scarcity, 
technology advancement and people’s subjective perception compels people’s behavior and 
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interaction to change accordingly. When such behaviors and interactions are aggregated and 
regularized, new informal institutions emerge. Those behaviors may as well eventually result 
in pressure for formal institutional change. 
The underlying question of ‘how institutions emerge and change’ has resulted in different 
theories from various disciplinary perspectives; each reflecting the respective empirical 
situations in which they aim to understand institutional change. In this regard, Allio et al. 
(1997) distinguishes between three types of institutional change namely, economic theories, 
public choice theories and the distributional theories of institutional change. First, the 
economic theories of institutional change take a neo-classical economic approach to explain 
and seek solutions for institutional innovation and change in order to reach a Pareto-efficient 
outcome in a competitive setting (Barzel, 1997; Demsetz, 1967; Eggertsson, 1990; Libecap, 
1989). The second strand is the public choice theories of institutional change where the 
change occurs as a result of a process of exchange of institutions by political entrepreneurs in 
return for revenue and votes of the electorate (Allio et al., 1997). Both strands of theories 
explain the institutional change in situations where resources of power are symmetrically 
distributed amongst actors in a society. However, they fail to offer an explanation of 
institutional emergence, persistence and change in situations where these resources are 
asymmetrically distributed allowing inefficient institutions to thrive (Bardhan, 2005). 
Therefore, scholars such as Bates (1995), Knight (1992) Bardhan (2005) and Ostrom (2000) 
now assume that asymmetries of power lead to the emergence, and persistence of inefficient 
institutions. Knight (1992) analyzes institutional change from the perspective of distributional 
conflict theories, which assumes that each strategic actor in an action situation has different 
interests and endowed with different power; which positions actors to have conflicting 
interests. Therefore to resolve these conflicting interests, the actors undertake some strategies 
to find solutions according to power resources that they are endowed with. The actors who 
can control power resources (such as information, political access, and capital) tend to 
influence the process of institutional change and resolve conflicting interests by creating or 
changing to their favour, eventually satisfying the interests of individuals, rather than 
collective interests (Knight, 1992: 146). 
Knight’s (1992) distributional conflict theory of institutional change is a universal theory that 
attempts to explain institutional change at all institutional levels. This theory is applicable to 
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both formal and informal institutions, where institutions emerge as a result of strategic 
conflicts over distributive gains under conditions where power asymmetries exist. Changes in 
informal rules can be accomplished intentionally, because of difference in interests and 
asymmetries of power (Knight, 1992: 147). According to Knight (1995), changes in the 
distribution of power give self-interested actors an incentive to change their institutional 
setting toward one that favors their interest. Further discussion on the application of 
distributional theory to the study context is detailed in the following section. 
3.4 Knight’s Distributional Theory of Institutional Change and its Applicability to 
Hyderabad's Case 
Whilst many theories explain resource conflict, Bues (2011) described the applicability of the 
distributive bargaining theory of institutional change. The term ‘conflict’ is contextualized to 
situations where disputes occur over existing and settled formal and informal institutions. 
According to Bues (2011: 21), conflict situations occur in the process of creating rules that are 
essentially characterized by a bargaining process (Knight 1992). As property rights distribute 
social outcomes, each strategic actor eventually seeks to achieve the best distributive 
outcome. Therefore conflicts are inevitable in process of rules creation over institutions which 
seek to distribute benefits. The other type of conflict situation occurs even after the rules are 
established. According to Knight (1992), on the one hand, the actors with the more powerful 
bargaining power will make a full endeavor to promote their interest of distributional goals; 
while on the other hand, the other group of actors, unhappy with the arrangement will try to 
rectify it. The process to change and rectify the rules will entail violations, individually or 
collectively, which will likely be resisted by the group of actors benefitting the current 
arrangement of rules (Knight, 1992: 59). In this sense, conflicts persist despite an agreed rule 
is established, which forms the theoretical basis of the research study, where water 
reallocation against the prescribed allocation guidelines have persisted in the ensuing conflict 
and competition for water between Hyderabad's urban need and the irrigation sector.  
This study takes a cue from the work of Bues and Theesfeld (2012), where they asserted that 
analysis of land and water governance systems necessitates the inclusion of social and 
political dimensions. Their study on the characteristics of ‘Water grabbing and role of power’ 
draws primarily on the distributional theory of institutional change (Knight, 1992). This 
theory particularly provides good explanations of human interaction in the context of limited 
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resources and resulting resource conflicts (Acheson and Knight, 2000; Theesfeld, 2004). They 
employed the concept of power resources as the central analytical concept and draw on 
Theesfeld’s work (2011) who conceptualized the institutional change in Bulgaria’s water 
sector reform as a struggle among power-asymmetric actors.  
In order to examine the limited water resources and the resulting resource conflicts in the case 
of Hyderabad’s arbitrary water reallocation, Knight’s distributive theory provides a good 
explanation of why institutional change and conflict persisted over time. Focusing on property 
rights as one form of institutions, Knight (1992: 107) describes institutions as a by-product of 
distributional conflict over substantive outcomes, where the process of creating institutions 
inherently manifests conflict. Whilst the actors with more bargaining power further their 
distributional goal, the other actors dissatisfied with the agreement will try to change it, which 
is apt to the Hyderabad’s case study context of water conflict between the urban and the 
agricultural sector. Despite the water allocation rules already in place, arbitrary reallocations 
of water against the prescribed guidelines have persisted over the years, resulting in conflicts 
and competition between the two sectors. It may be interesting to note that Araral and Yu 
(2012: 7) pointed out the fact that studying water governance particularly conflicts in the 
allocation and use of property rights inherently involves a political dimension, yet not much 
attention has been laid on the politics of water governance in the existing literature. Therefore 
this study also attempts to empirically define the political dimension and the dynamics 
involved in such arbitrary reallocation by employing Knight’s (1992) concept in 
understanding such resource conflicts.  
In understanding the persistence of such rules-in-use despite the rules-in-form already in place 
in Hyderabad’s context, Helmke and Levitsky (2004: 727) supported Knight’s (1992) concept 
of power in the process of bargaining. They elaborated the stark contrast in the way informal 
institutions are created in the bargaining process, from the formal rule-making processes. 
How effective are those formal rules enforced, largely depends on informal institutions such 
as social attitude, norms, and pattern of interactions which individuals assume in any activity.  
It is important to understand and examine where informal institutions come from, and how 
they evolve or change to fully understand how the interaction between formal and informal 
institutions can be harnessed to lead to an outcome with desirable policy goals. Therefore, 
they suggested that research emphasis should essentially examine the process of informal 
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rule-making by primarily identifying the actors, coalitions, and interests behind the creation of 
informal rules.  
Farrell and Heritier (2005: 277) also similarly argued that when informal rules are created, it 
is largely influenced by how the formal rules are interpreted, which they define as written 
rules of behavior subject to third-party dispute resolution. With the popular perception of the 
ambiguous characteristic of formal rules, based on their own interpretation, actors create 
informal rules guiding the daily application of these rules. Because of the ambiguous 
characteristic of these formal rules, actors will have different interests over the content of 
these rules, in particular when these rules effectively allocate differential decision-making 
weight. In such case, each actor obviously prefers those rules that maximize its own decision-
making. Thus, they also suggest that the rule-making process is bound to entail conflict over 
how these common gains are allocated and distributed, rather than this rule-making process 
being characterized by common gains from co-ordination (Knight, 1992).  
Hyderabad's water conflicts are also inclined towards the political influence and dynamics of 
water resource management and allocation. In this regard, Moe (2005: 215) gave an 
interesting insight on the conventional rational choice theory of political institutions, where 
the theory views political institutions as structures of voluntary cooperation which seeks to 
find solutions to collective action problems in a way to beneficial to all concerned parties. The 
rational choice theory emphasizes on cooperation and hardly speaks of power. Therefore, Moe 
(2005) argues the fact that the political process often gives rise to institutions that are good 
and beneficial for some people, contrary to being bad for others. It implies the power an 
individual or groups of people possess in order to exercise their will. He, therefore, stated that 
while institutions may be structures of cooperation, such political institutions may also be 
structures of power as well. Moe (2005: 224) further stated that while Levi (1998) and Bates 
(1989) brought the concept of power to the forefront, however, it was Knight (1992) who was 
the first to examine it systematically by propounding that institutions are mainly explained by 
distributional conflicts and power rather than collective benefits. 
According to Kingston (2009: 163), in examining the role of distributional conflict in the 
process of institutional change, many scholars such as Libecap (1989) pointed out 
institutional change as a centralized political process. However, others such as Knight (1992) 
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opposed to being decentralized and spontaneous process. In the centralized process, the state 
specifies formal rules i.e. property rights and individuals and organizations in a bid to achieve 
maximum benefits, engage in conflict and bargaining and make full attempt to change these 
rules. In this process, different property rights arrangements entail different distributional 
consequences. Individuals and groups, therefore, make full endeavor in trying to change the 
rules that benefit them. This takes place either in private amongst themselves or the other 
channel of change would be to lobby the government. The contracting process whereby 
property rights rules alter and change is in turn generally governed by political rules arranged 
at higher levels. 
However, this is markedly different from Knight’s understanding of bargaining which is 
characterized as a decentralized and spontaneous process. Here, bargaining takes place at the 
level of the individual transaction rather than through a centralized political process. Over 
time, out of this decentralized process, a common convention may emerge. Here, if some kind 
of actors possesses greater bargaining power than others, Knight argues that this may 
systematically influence and affect the kind of rule that eventually becomes widely-used by 
the society in general. It is important to note that whilst the applicability of Knight's 
distribution theory pertains to consciously and unconsciously created institutions as well as 
for formal and informal institutions, his body of work, however, is largely directed on the 
spontaneous decentralized emergence of informal institutions. He argues that not much 
attention has been accorded to the role of distributional conflict for the explanation of the 
informal rule, norms, and conventions. Whereas, numerous studies have already been carried 
out on the role of distributional conflict in the creation of formal, social and political 
institutions by scholars such as Bates (1990), Libecap (1989) and North (1990). Further, 
Knight pointed out that the concept of power asymmetries as an explanation for the 
emergence and existence of informal rules in a society has largely been neglected, to which 
this study addresses. 
Defining power, Knight (1992: 41) states that exercising power over someone or some group 
implies how it will affect by some means, the alternatives available to that person or group. In 
an interaction between actor A and B, If actor A has more alternatives or choice when a 
specific relationship breaks down between them, actor B will be considered less powerful 
than actor A. In other words, If B is found to possess far fewer alternatives, which eventually 
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positions actor A to exert credible threats to call in a bargaining process. According to Knight 
(1992: 126), social institutions are a result of one’s own preference of alternatives, through 
concerted efforts which inherently constrains the strategies and alternatives of others. 
Interdependence of society makes it important to anticipate the actions of others for strategic 
actors, in order to make an assessment of what is best for them to do. The best way to 
constrain other actors' choices is, therefore, to affect their expectations about our own actions. 
Social institutions regularize these constraints, by providing information about the expected 
actions of others and thereby, constraining our choices. As mentioned earlier, Knight focuses 
specifically on the spontaneous emergence of informal institutions, where actors endowed 
with asymmetric resources essentially try to constrain one another's actions by influencing 
their expectations. Hence the ‘asymmetries in power resources’ is central to Knight’s 
explanation. This theory propounds that asymmetries in resource ownership invariably affect 
the willingness of rational self-interested actors to accept the bargaining demands of other 
actors (Knight, 1995: 108). 
It is always the powerful actor who compels the other actor to take actions that they would not 
otherwise choose to do themselves (Knight, 1992: 42). ‘More powerful’ here refers to 
resource ownership. Therefore the power to bargain is a consequence of the asymmetric 
distribution of power resources in the society, and eventually, bargaining power and resource 
ownership are regarded as the main determinants of institutional change (Schlüter, 2001: 89). 
In other words, the bargaining theory of institutional emergence and change that Knight 
(1992) explains essentially starts with the interactions between actors in society. Interactions 
offer the potential for mutual benefits for the participating actors. However, these benefits 
may be differentially distributed to the actors. By using the power that they bring to 
interactions, actors attempt to influence the outcome of interactions to benefit them. 
Hence, asymmetries in bargaining power and resource ownership are central to the theory of 
bargaining and institutional change. Therefore the factors that create such asymmetries 
between actors and lead to a bargaining outcome in favour of one of the actors need to be 
identified and analyzed (Knight, 1995: 108). However, what kind of power needs to be 
possessed by strategic actors in order to influence institutional change or to create a new 
social institution has always been a question of concern. In this regard, several power 
resources have been identified as being important in the analysis of an actor's bargaining 
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power. Though originally devised by Knight (1992), these power resources have been further 
developed by Schlüter (2001) and Theesfeld (2005). The application of these power resources 
has been described by Bueus and Theesfeld (2012) in their work on ‘water grabbing and the 
role of power’ in Ethiopia. 
An actor's ability to survive several rounds of the game without co-operating signifies 'power' 
in game theory. This could be due to his asset availability or the fact that he would bear 
relatively lower opportunity costs (Knight, 1992: 132). This power resource can be named 
exit costs (Schlüter, 2001: 91) which arise when bargaining essentially breaks down. Attitude 
toward risk and time preference is closely linked to exit costs. Risk behavior is closely linked 
to actor's resource availability. Knight (1992: 133) pointed out a positive relationship between 
ownership of resources and risk acceptance, on the other hand, a negative relationship 
between ownership and risk aversion. This allows an actor to withstand the duration or rather 
a several rounds of bargaining process as he would be less dependent on the bargaining 
outcome because he essentially possesses sufficient resources. Similarly, time preference 
represents another power resource, where actors with a lower time preference will have 
advantages in the bargain (Knight 1992: 135). 
Credible commitment is another power resource. The crucial point is to convince a social 
actor to accept the commitment of another actor (Knight, 1995: 108-109).  Credible 
commitment is a believable attitude demonstrated by actors that they will, in fact, do what 
they actually claim. In such a case actors with a good reputation will more easily be able to 
convince the other actors. With this power resource, an actor can determine the choice of 
other people (Knight, 1992: 175). Trustworthiness is closely linked to credible commitment 
and is one of the key power resources as highlighted by Knight (1992). Sanctioning is a 
mechanism that ensures commitment. In general, sanctions reduce the expected benefits of 
non-compliance and make compliance a more beneficial long-term strategy (Knight, 1992: 
179). In other words, sanction power refers to the threat of sanctions imposed by one actor on 
the other in case there is non-compliance. This threat influences the bargaining situation of the 
threatened actor to the benefit of the threatening actor.  
When there is a threat of sanctions for non-compliance, compliance to informal rules becomes 
a rational long-term strategy (Knight, 1992: 179). Information is considered to be key power 
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resources (Knight, 1992: 75), as information is crucial in order to compete. Strategic actors 
who seek to control information and are more aware of the expectation and strategy of those 
with whom they interact, and hence generally have a greater potential to win. Having an upper 
hand on the information they possess, they can potentially change an established institution or 
otherwise create a new one according to their advantage. As Knight (1992: 46) points out that 
information asymmetries are crucial in influencing actors’ evaluations of individual 
alternatives, hiding institutional alternatives, or adding new alternatives.  
Theesfeld (2011: 94) noted instances where imperfect information exists; education, 
experience or access to media and sources of information become important to be taken into 
consideration. Organizability of a group is another power resource (Knight, 1992: 197), where 
actors organize and act collectively, rather than in isolation or in a fragmented way in order to 
have a higher bargaining power. Schlüter (2001: 99) accentuated the importance of this factor 
equally at the local, informal level. The ability of group leaders to maintain discipline and 
unity and also to resolve the free-riding problem is crucial to enhance the groups’ bargaining 
power (Knight, 1992: 197). Theesfeld (2005: 76) defines joint mental models as another form 
of power resource. This power resource considers norms and values that constrain the pool of 
possible alternative that actors have. Finally, there are networks and positional power, where 
networking provides members with information and thereby reduces transaction costs for 
specific interactions. Positional power refers to the assigned strategic position that allows for 
certain actions. For instance, access to important information, controlling power over assets or 
the opportunity to carry out credible threats (Shleifer and Treisman, 1998: 20) are 
characteristics of the positional power.  
3.5 Inter-sectoral Water Reallocation and the ‘Politicized’ Institutional Analysis and 
Development (IAD) Framework 
Hyderabad’s inter-sectoral water contestation, conflict and competition with agriculture have 
been aggravated by persistent arbitrary water reallocations, against the administratively 
prescribed allocation guidelines over the years, with detrimental consequences for both the 
sectors. This study seeks to examine the persistence of rules-in-use, despite the rules-in-form 
already in place. The analytical framework adopted for this study is that of the Institutional 
Analysis and Development (IAD) framework (Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom et al., 1994). The 
framework not only assists in identifying the elements and associated relationships that should 
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be considered for institutional analysis (Ostrom, 2005) but also used to create a coherent 
structure for inquiry by identifying and organizing the general sets of variables of interest and 
their relationships to each other (Koontz, 2003). 
In undertaking the study on policy analysis of the inter-sectoral water allocation in Hyderabad 
to understand ‘why a particular set of policy is giving a certain outcome’; the framework 
identifies three exogenous variables (biophysical attribute, attributes of community and rules-
in-use). It guides us to analyze how these exogenous variables influence the role of 
institutions which shapes human interaction and decision-making process to eventually 
produce an outcome of such arbitrary water reallocations against the prescribed allocation 
guidelines. However, it may be noted that the study of water governance, particularly conflict 
in allocation and use of property rights amongst other, emerges as an essential component that 
is inherently a political subject, yet the politics of water governance continue to remain a 
black hole in the existing literature (Araral and Yu, 2012). This study, therefore adapts a 
'politicized' IAD framework, adding the 'politico-economic' context as the fourth exogenous 
variable as illustrated by Clement (2010) in analyzing the natural resource governance in 
Vietnam. This fourth exogenous factor adapted in the IAD framework not only assists in 
identifying ‘political’ elements and associated relationships that should be considered for 
institutional analysis (Ostrom, 2005), but also used to create a coherent structure for inquiry to 
empirically define the dynamics of political influence as a ‘power resource’ in rural-urban 
water governance by taking the case study of Hyderabad. 
The IAD framework identifies the action arena as the core unit of analysis, where actors 
undertake the process of informing themselves, based on which they consider alternative 
courses of action, take action based on their decision, and face the consequences of the actions 
that they take. The action arena has two elements. First, the action situation, and secondly the 
actors who interact in the action situation (Polski and Ostrom, 1999: 20). What goes on in the 
action arena are all affected by factors in the bio-physical world, the attributes of the 
community and the rules-in-use. In addition to these three factors, this study includes the 
fourth factor, i.e. the 'politico-economic context' as illustrated in Clement's (2010) politicized 
IAD framework. The political and economic factors influencing the behavior of actors in the 
action situation may be conceptualized by the ‘political-economic’ variable (Whaley and 
Weatherhead, 2014: 5). They asserted that an understanding of the local as well as the wider 
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political and economic situation is vital to understand the distribution of power among social 
actors. This serves as a good guide towards analysing the power dynamics and its influence 
on the behavior of individuals. How the biophysical conditions influence the action arena 
particularly depends on the substractability and exclusion of the resources. While other 
attributes of the resources such as their size, abundance, uncertainty (Wilson, 2002) or 
vulnerability (Ostrom, 2007) might also substantially affect their use. To ensure the 
effectiveness of the rules which have been laid down to govern the resources, it is vital for 
these rules to be compatible with the nature of that particular resources as well as its physical 
setting (Ostrom et al., 1994: 44). The attributes of the community which influence the action 
arena may depend on the shared value the community (Cleaver, 2000; Klooster, 2000; Mosse, 
1997), level of trust within the community, its size (Agrawal and Goyal, 2001; Olson, 1965) 
as well as the heterogeneity among the community (Hong and Page, 2004). This attributes 
may also be influenced by the demographic set-up of the community, norms of behavior, 
homogeneity of preferences and also the distribution of resources. Pertaining to a policy 
action situation, the attributes to be considered are generally accepted norms about policy 
activities, the degree of common understanding potential participants share about activities in 
the policy area, and the extent to which potential participants values, beliefs, and preferences 
about policy-oriented strategies and outcomes are homogeneous (Polski and Ostrom, 1999: 
13). It also includes relevant socio-economic factors (Ostrom et al., 1994: 45). 
 
Figure 3-2: The ‘Politicized’ Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) Framework   
                    
Source: adapted from Clement (2010), Ostrom (2007: 27) 
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How the 'political-economic context' influences and affects the action arena will depend on 
how the participants are positioned in the action situation. This variable helps us to identify 
the distribution of decision making power among various actors who essentially take 
decisions. When such a decision is taken, it focuses on how the political and economic 
interest influences such decision-making process, within the realms a particular set of rules-
in-use (Clement, 2010: 137). How that rules-in-use affect the action arena involves an 
understanding of the formal and informal rules affecting the behavior in the action arena. 
Ostrom defines such rules-in-use as the shared understandings that generally refer to enforced 
prescriptions which define what kind of actions are required, prohibited or permitted (Ostrom, 
1999: 50). 
They may refer to both formal and informal prescriptions, for instance, legal documents 
issued by the governments and informal rules allowing interpreting these documents with 
relative freedom. The IAD framework prescribes seven types of rules (Polski and Ostrom, 
1999: 16). They are position rules; specifying the set of positions that participants assume and 
their role in an action situation. Position rules also specify the number and type of participants 
who hold each position.  Boundary rules specify which participants can enter or leave 
positions, more of an entry and exit rules and also how they do so. Authority rules stipulate 
the range of actions any participant in given position may undertake. Aggregation rules 
govern how decisions are essentially made in an action situation. Scope rules outline the 
jurisdiction of outcomes that can be affected. Information rules prescribe not only the type of 
information but also the amount of information that may be available to participants in an 
action arena. Finally, payoff rules regulate the costs and benefits in the action arena. The 
pattern of interaction is the result of the interaction of the exogenous variables affecting the 
action arena, which eventually lead to the outcomes. Once the characteristics of the 
biophysical and material world, community attributes, and rules-in-use are taken into 
consideration,  patterns of interaction are seen to unfold logically as a result of the behavior of 
actors in the action arena (Ostrom et al., 1994; Polski and Ostrom, 1999: 24). 
The last two components i.e. the outcome and evaluative criteria within the IAD framework 
are the results of all the components described above. Just as patterns of interaction logically 
flow from a rigorous IAD analysis, insights about outcomes flow logically from similarly 
well-founded observations about the pattern of interactions. When analysis of the outcome is 
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undertaken, it implies that the performance of the policy system is analyzed. Hence, some 
kind of objective standard or principle is needed for comparison. Sometimes, programs and 
policies provide these baselines. But in many cases, evaluative criteria must be specified as 
part of the policy analysis process, which the IAD identifies specifically in the political-
economic analysis. This is generally employed to examine the outcome of policy 
implementation and also the performance of the policy. Operationalizing the politicized IAD 
framework to carry out the Hyderabad study context is detailed in chapter five. 
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4 Methodological Approach  
4.1 Case Study as a Research Strategy   
This section presents the rationality of employing the case study approach based on its 
applicability in carrying out institutional analysis and its ability to capture epistemological 
diversity (which may also be explained as the diversity of beliefs that people hold). It 
addresses the theoretical and philosophical underpinning concerning the nature of the case 
study approach. Thereon, it introduces an explicit explanation on what purpose a case study 
serves. Finally, from an epistemological point of view, it explains the place and contribution 
of the case study research pertaining to Hyderabad's study context. In order to examine 
institutions, Ostrom et al. (1994) suggested the necessity to understand how rules combine 
with the cultural and physical setting to generate diverse situations. A case study approach 
precisely allows for identifying the interrelatedness and inter-connected relationships and 
process of rules with the cultural and physical setting in a holistic manner. It involves the 
collation of information from a variety of sources, employing a variety of methods with a 
variety of data. Beckmann and Padmanabhan (2009: 343) also emphasized the case study 
approach as one of the most common ways to carry out an empirical institutional analysis. It 
investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the 
boundaries between the phenomenon (i.e. arbitrary water reallocations) and the context (i.e. 
inter-sectoral water resource management) are not clearly evident (Yin, 1994). This research 
work employs the explanatory case study approach which ideally seeks to link an event with 
its effects and is suitable for investigating causality (Yin, 2003). The case study is a 
comprehensive research strategy or framework of design that comprises the logic of design, 
data collection techniques, and specific approaches to data analysis (Dufour and Fortin, 
1992). 
4.2 Research Paradigm and the Case Study 
Based on the ontological perspective of how one perceives nature of reality, epistemology 
guides us about the appropriate ways of enquiring into the nature of reality. The research 
philosophy distinguishes two approaches; interpretive, and positivist, which differ 
fundamentally in their epistemological and ontological position. In reference to the study 
context of Hyderabad, to examine why arbitrary reallocations persist against the prescribed 
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allocation guidelines, there is ‘no single reality’ as different contexts have different realities. 
Therefore this study seeks to construct the reality to examine ‘how’ and ‘why’ such a 
phenomenon of ‘arbitrary reallocation’ occurs. This forms the basis of the ontological stance 
which guides our philosophy of reality. In order to acquire ‘reality’, this study employs the 
constructivist/interpretive paradigm approach where the ‘reality’ is constructed and 
interpreted which is grounded in the epistemological reflection that serves as a guiding theory 
of acquiring ‘reality’ or knowledge. According to Searle (1995: 28), the constructivist 
approach that involves data collection in form of interview, claims truth is relative and that it 
is dependent on one’s perspective which is built upon the foundation of a social construction 
of reality. It is important to note that this approach whilst acknowledging the importance of 
the subjective human creation of meaning, however, does not out rightly reject some notion of 
objectivity. The strength of this approach lies in the close collaboration that the researcher and 
the interviewee share in the process of communication. Here the interviewees describe their 
story and views of reality (Crabtree and Miller, 1999: 10), which allows the researcher to 
comprehend the interviewees’ actions (Robottom and Hart, 1993: 9). Since ‘all knowledge is 
relative to the interviewee’, in order to understand their points of view, the researcher works 
alongside to draw meaning and sense to eventually create their realities. The researcher then 
interprets these experiences in the context of their academic knowledge and experience and 
hence is inductive or theory building. Robert Stake (1995) and Robert Yin (2003) described 
two key approaches that guide case study methodology, based on a constructivist/Interpretive 
paradigm. Constructivists claim that truth is relative and that it is dependent on one’s 
perspective. Interpretive case studies are grounded in subjective understandings which 
provide a local explanation of the social phenomenon of interest. Therefore such case studies 
should seek to be explanatory, providing ways of understanding the social phenomenon. 
Eisenhardt (1989: 535) pointed out that in such interpretive approach, theories are employed. 
Accordingly, this study takes Knight’s distributional theory of institutional change to help 
create an initial theoretical approach to carrying out the empirical work.  
4.3 Description and Rationale of Study Region Selected 
Andhra Pradesh (Fig. 4-1) is situated in the southern part of the country. It is the 
4th largest state in India with an area of about 0.275 million Sq.km. It lies 
between Latitudes 12º 37' N and 19º 54' N, and Longitudes 76º 46' E and 84º 46' 
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E. The climate of Andhra Pradesh is tropical in nature. The State receives about 
66 percent of rainfall from south-west monsoon (June - September) and about 25 
percent from northeast monsoon (October - December). The remaining 9 percent 
of the monsoon is received during winter and summer months. Data also 
indicated the prevailing recurrent droughts in certain parts of the State (Rao, 
2009). The research study to analyze the factors for arbitrary reallocation of 
water against the prescribed guidelines between the city of Hyderabad and the 
agricultural sector was based on the empirical fieldwork undertaken in selected 
regions of Andhra Pradesh. 
Firstly, this section described the two reservoirs (Singur reservoir across 
Godavari River and the Nagarjuna Sagar reservoir across Krishna River) 
relevant to the study context. These two reservoirs were principally meant for 
agricultural purposes but eventually ended up sharing water with the city of 
Hyderabad. Together, water from these two sources supplies almost 70 percent 
of the water to the city of Hyderabad. In addition, the irrigated catchment areas 
affected by water reallocation to the city are also highlighted. These catchment 
areas are subjected to the contestation of water with subsequent arbitrary water 
reallocations, which form the basis for site selection to carry out the empirical 
field work. Data has also been collected from key water-related actors in 
Hyderabad ranging from government agencies to non-governmental 
organizations and research institutes including the citizens of the city. 
4.3.1 The Singur Reservoir and the Water Allocation Mechanism in Place 
 The Manjira River is a tributary of River Godavari that originates in the state of Maharashtra 
and flows through the three riparian states (Maharashtra, Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh). 
Water is shared between the three states as per the Godavari Waters Dispute Tribunal (also 
known as the Bachawat Tribunal, Government of India, 1979 and 1980). The Tribunal 
awarded Andhra Pradesh 65 TMC of water that was specifically meant to be allocated to 
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Nizamabad and Medak districts. However, since the Nizamsagar project (30TMC capacity) in 
Nizamabad district and Ghanpur dam (4 TMC) in Medak district were already in place, 
Andhra Pradesh was permitted to construct the 30 TMC capacity Singur project in 1975. 
Originally the Singur project was meant to serve as a balancing reservoir for the two irrigation 
projects, i.e. Nizamabad and Ghanpur anicuts (catchment area), and later to also supply 
drinking water to Hyderabad. In effect, 4 TMC of water was earmarked to meet the drinking 
water requirements of Hyderabad, as well as to generate 15 MW of power. In addition, a 
Government Order was issued in 1980 allocating water from the Singur project for irrigating 
40,000 acres of en route villages in Medak and Nizamabad districts (Lakshmipathi, 2001). 
Water allocation guidelines from the Singur Dam to both the city and the irrigation projects 
were administratively sanctioned via two Government Orders (G.O.s) in 1989 and 1990. The 
government of Andhra Pradesh devised the operation rules for allocating water between the 
two sectors. It particularly placed priority to drinking water for the city over agricultural uses, 
as per condition set out by the World Bank to fund and undertake the urban water supply 
project. The first Government Order (G.O. 90) passed in 1989 specified volumes of water to 
be allocated to Hyderabad as well as to the Ghanpur and Nizamsagar irrigation projects. 
 
Figure 4-1: Manjira River Originating in Maharashtra Passing Through   Three Riparian States   
Source: adapted from Celio (2007) 
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Annually Hyderabad was entitled to 197.1 Mm3 of water from Singur dam, whilst 
Nizamsagar irrigation scheme was entitled to 236.4 Mm3 and Ghanpur irrigation scheme to 
receive 115 Mm3 of water (The Andhra Pradesh Housing, Municipal Administration and 
Development (A2) Department, Government Order Ms No. 190, dated April 12, 1989). The 
other Government Order (G.O. 93) passed in 1990 put the operation rules of the Singur dam in 
place, particularly setting up the conditions as per the World Bank's insistence. Water was to 
be released to the agricultural sector only when the water level at the Singur Dam was above a 
prescribed level for each month. The prescribed levels were devised in such a way to ensure 
that the water stored in the Singur Dam was always sufficient to cover Hyderabad water needs 
(The Andhra Pradesh Irrigation and CAD Department, Government Order Ms No. 93, dated 
February 24, 1990). Celio and Giordano (2007) interestingly noted that since the inception of 
the Singur dam, even though Hyderabad had been given priority over agricultural uses, the 
two sectors have never met their amount allocated to their full potential. The city never 
received its allocated share because of the poor transmission system, whereas the irrigation 
sector never received its allocated share due to the high variability and uncertainty of the 
monsoon inflow into the Singur dam each year. Under such circumstances, the government of 
Andhra Pradesh was averse to the risk of providing Nizamsagar with its due share of water 
which would eventually reduce the storage in Singur dam. Celio (2009) stated that 
contestation for water from this source has been steadily increasing over the years. 
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Figure 4-2: Singur Dam, Medak Dist. Andhra Pradesh  
Source: photo documentation, (Own) October 2011 
 
Figure 4-3: Specification of the Singur Dam, Medak Dist. Andhra Pradesh  
Source: photo documentation, (Own) October 2011 
  
 
70 
 
4.3.2 The Ghanpur and Nizamsagar Irrigation Projects 
As mentioned in section 4.3.1, the Godavari Waters Dispute Tribunal allocated water to the 
three states. Andhra Pradesh was awarded 65 TMC of water that was specifically meant for 
Nizamabad and Medak districts. The Singur project was constructed in 1975 originally as a 
balancing reservoir for these two existing irrigation projects, i.e. Nizamabad and Ghanpur. 
The Ghanpur irrigation project was the first scheme constructed across Manjira River in 1904 
at a cost of Rupees 18.00 Lakhs. Some years later, the left canal was added to increase the 
utility of the River. The ayacut (catchment area) of 17,308 acres was being irrigated under this 
Ghanpur irrigation project, which was subsequently increased to 30,000 acres. The villages 
under the catchment area of this irrigation project undertaken as study sites for data collection 
were Rampur, Chityal and Macharam. 
 
Figure 4-4: Catchment Area of the Ghanpur Irrigation Project  
Source: Celio (2009) 
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The Nizamsagar irrigation project (Fig. 2-4) is the second irrigation scheme on Manjira River 
and the largest in the former Hyderabad state. It was taken up during the year 1923 and 
completed by the year 1931. The Nizamsagar irrigation scheme across the Manjira River was 
commissioned in the early 1900s by Osman Ali Khan, the seventh ruler of the erstwhile 
Hyderabad state. Nizamsagar is located in the Nizamabad District of Andhra Pradesh, around 
100 km north-west of Hyderabad.  
The project was originally designed to irrigate 111,375 hectares with its storage capacity of 
821.2 Mm3 of water, but this decreased to 334.1 Mm3 by 1972 due to silt accumulation. The 
present reservoir capacity of 504 Mm3 was obtained by renovating the dam, and the average 
annual irrigated area is presently 67,965 ha (Celio 2007: 4). The catchment area of the 
Manjira River above Nizamsagar is 21,693 km2. The villages under the catchment area of this 
irrigation project undertaken as study sites were Nizamabad and the surrounding villages. 
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Figure 4-5: Catchment Area of the Nizamsagar Irrigation Project  
 
Source: Celio (2009) 
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Figure 4-6: The Ghanpur Irrigation Project, Medak District  
Source: photo documentation (Own) October 2011 
 
Figure 4-7: The Nizamsagar Irrigation Project, Nizamabad District 
Source: photo documentation (Own) October 2011 
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Figure 4-8: The Krishna River Supplying Water to Hyderabad 
Source: adapted from Celio (2007) 
 
4.3.3 The Nagarjuna Sagar Dam across River Krishna 
The Nagarjuna Sagar dam serves as one of the primary irrigation and hydroelectric projects in 
Andhra Pradesh. Besides providing water for irrigation, the Nagarjuna Sagar reservoir also 
caters to the daily drinking water needs for Hyderabad. The two villages under the catchment 
area of this irrigation project taken as study sites are Mukundapuram village in Nidamanoor 
mandal and Yacharam in Peddavoora mandal. While increasing the water transfers from the 
Manjira source to Hyderabad, the Government of Andhra Pradesh in 1986 further appointed 
the Sri J. Raja Rao expert commission to submit alternatives for further augmenting the 
Hyderabad water supply from other sources.  
The commission recommended drawing the required 467 Mm3 of water annually from 
Nagarjuna Sagar reservoir of the Krishna basin. This recommendation implied that water was 
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to be reallocated from the agricultural sector. It was based on the argument that priority had to 
be given to drinking water over irrigation, in accordance with the landmark report of the India 
Irrigation Commission (Government of India, 1972), as well as from the award of the Krishna 
River Disputes Tribunal accorded in 1976 (Government of India, 1976). The commission 
placing criteria for urban water priority further argued the justification of supplying water to 
Hyderabad city. People from all the districts and regions of the state live in the city of 
Hyderabad and therefore high priority was to be accorded on this account (Government of 
Andhra Pradesh, 1987). 
However, the waters of Krishna River finally reached Hyderabad thirty-two years after the 
submission of the report of the Sreenivasa Rao Expert Committee. The current allocation of 
water from the Nagarjuna Sagar project on the Krishna River to Hyderabad is increasing. 
Water from this reservoir has traditionally been used for agriculture. The total allocation from 
River Krishna to the city is 16.5 TMC where 11 TMC of water is being drawn through Phase-
I and II schemes (Krishna Drinking Water Supply Project, Water Allocations Government 
Order: G.O.Ms.No. 264, dated: 29-12-1997 G.O.Ms.No.70, dated: 4-5-2002 G.O.Ms.No.19, 
dated: 5-2-2003) and the remaining 5.5 TMC is expected to be drawn from Phase-III schemes, 
as already mentioned in as already explained in chapter 2, (section 2.4). Celio (2009) stated 
that the water transfers to Hyderabad have been vehemently contested and opposed in the 
water allocation out of Krishna River as the transfer has been mediated without rational 
compensation. Further, the transfer has been made across regions, notably from Rayalseema 
region, a comparatively backward and water scarce region to wealthy urban Hyderabad, 
against previous historical commitment and agreements. 
4.4 Empirical Methods 
Case study research allows the use of multiple data sources, which not only enhances data 
credibility (Patton, 1990; Yin, 2003) but also increases construct validity. The gist of 
using each data from multiple sources is to contribute towards the contextual understanding of 
the phenomenon to allow all the data to finally converge in the analysis process, adding 
strength to the final results (Yin, 1994). Primarily, six sources of evidence (i.e. documents, 
archival records, interviews, direct observation, participant observation, physical artefacts) in 
conducting case studies has been identified by Yin (1994) and Stake (1995). In conducting 
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any policy research, Bardach (2011) informs us that it is almost likely that all the sources of 
information and data will broadly be defined under two types; documents and people.  
In the first phase of data collection, besides preliminary document analysis, interviews were 
conducted with water-related actors in Hyderabad, primarily government actors from the 
Irrigation Department and the Hyderabad Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board. In 
addition, interviews from Non-Governmental organizations and research institutes together 
constructed a platform of how the research should proceed to the next stage.  
While document analysis and interviews were the main sources for data collection, other 
interactive empirical methods were applied such as field visits. Such visits involved a 
participatory approach with more interaction with the village inhabitants. The study also 
carried out narrative walks where people generally share their experiences in a storytelling 
format with the researcher. Here the farmers presented and explained their way of life that 
was deeply entrenched in agricultural activities and the related aspect of irrigation water and 
its availability and management. Photo documentation was additionally used to capture the 
agricultural and irrigation situation depicting the community way of life in general. In other 
words, the research study applied the methodological triangulation, which is simply the use of 
multiple sources of evidence (Yin, 1994: 90). It employed different methods to approach a 
particular research question which included interviews (open ended or structured), participant 
observation (direct or indirect) as well as document analysis (Stake, 1995: 114). Narrative 
walks were especially useful in further enabling the triangulation of data from interviews, 
documents, and in situ observation (Jerneck and Olsson, 2013). 
To undertake the analysis, statements derived from relevant water-related documents 
(Annexure 2) together with statements derived from interviewed actors (Annexure 1) that 
framed their perception and their consequent actions were analyzed. An integrated analysis 
was carried out to examine the coherence of the policy content and provision within these 
water-related policies which likely manifested the phenomenon of water reallocation, which is 
observed in reality. Documents under review provided information and working rules on 
water resource allocation and management in the state of Andhra Pradesh. 
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4.4.1 Document Analysis 
a Document analysis is a process in which the content of the document is interpreted to give a 
meaning of an assessment subject. Documents also provide background information and 
guides in designing the research project, for example prior to conducting interviews. While 
analyzing documents, it incorporates coding content into themes, in a similar way in which 
the interview transcripts are analyzed. Firstly the institutional change in terms of policy 
change and subsequent legislative changes were traced to throw light on organizational 
reforms and also identified the characteristics of the water governance arrangements.  
This was followed by reviewing policy documents on water resources and urban development 
ministries, as well as regional and local government reports. Last but not the least, detailed 
development in the water sector pertaining to socio-economic and political development in 
the state was constructed and combined. Analysis of other types of relevant document such as 
minutes of meetings, presentations, memorandums, press releases, newspaper articles and 
scientific journals were critically undertaken. Therefore the first part of this research consisted 
of a desktop study by examining the following key documents pertaining to the water 
management, with a particular focus on inter-sectoral water aspect in the state of Andhra 
Pradesh: 
1. National Water Policy of India, 1987 
2.  National Water Policy of India, 2012 
3.  Andhra Pradesh State Water Policy 2009 
4.  The Andhra Pradesh Water Resources Development Corporation Act 1997 
5.  The Andhra Pradesh Water Resources Regulatory Commission Act, 2009 
6.  Andhra Pradesh Farmers’ Management of Irrigation Systems Act, 1997 
7.  Hyderabad Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Act 1989 
8.  Andhra Pradesh Water, Land and Trees Act, 2002 
9.  The Andhra Pradesh Housing, Municipal Administration and Development (A2)   
     Department, Government Order Ms No. 190, dated April 12, 1989  
10. The Andhra Pradesh Irrigation and CAD (Irrgn. V) Department, Govern 
      ment Order Ms No. 93, dated February 24, 1990 
11. Krishna Drinking Water Supply Project, Water Allocations Government Order:   
      G.O.Ms.No.264, dated: 29-12-1997 G.O.Ms.No.70, dated: 4-5- 2002 G.O.Ms.No.19,  
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      dated: 5-2-2003.  
12. Report of the Committee on drawing additional water to twin cities from Srisailam or  
      Nagarjuna Sagar or other Projects, Hyderabad. 1973 
13. Report of the Expert Committee on Augmentation of Drinking Water Supply to Twin  
      Cities of Hyderabad and Secunderabad from  Krishna/Godavari River, Hyderabad. 162-B- 
      May 1987 
14. Hyderabad Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board: Detailed Project Report of  
      Augmenting Water Supply to Twin Cities of Hyderabad and Secunderabad from  
      Nagarjuna Sagar Foreshore Near L.B. Canal regulator. January 1991    
In addition to the above key documents, the desktop part of the study also included a review 
of the wider water and natural resources legislative framework as well as baseline information 
and background reports primarily used for documenting the inter-sectoral competition and 
reallocation of water in Andhra Pradesh. 
4.4.2 Interviews 
Interviews were carried out in the selected areas to record perception on water issues 
pertaining to the competition between the city and agriculture. There were primarily two 
categories of water-related actors. One, in the city of Hyderabad mostly confining to water-
related actors in the administrative set up of state water departments; the Irrigation 
Department and the Hyderabad Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board. The second 
category of water-related actors was mostly confined to farmers in the agricultural sector, 
affected by such urban water transfers. Besides these two main categories of water-related 
actors, others from non-governmental organizations and research institutes were also 
included.  
Whilst the document analysis sheds light on the desired policy goals and implementation, 
interview sheds light on the actual situation on the ground and reveals perception, based on 
which they undertake specific actions. The study employed the semi-structured interviews 
which are commonly used in qualitative research (Dawson, 2002: 33). In this type of 
interview, the researcher establishes a set of questions to know more information about 
specific issues on the phenomenon under investigation. Thereafter it sometimes identifies new 
issues. Here the researcher is allowed to be flexible where questions could be added or 
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removed from the scheduled questionnaire. However, it is important to note that the level of 
awareness and the emotional state of the interviewee in the process of the interview may have 
considerable influence on the outcome. This may lead to the possible distortion of the data 
(Patton, 1990). The list of water-related actors as participants in the research study is included 
in Annexure No 2. 
Three stages of fieldwork were carried out. The first stage was the exploratory field work 
which was conducted in 2010 for a period of 2 months (from September to October) to 
construct an overview and gain familiarity with the case to further identify and refine the area 
of research, develop the research question and identify relevant and specific actors to conduct 
interviews. The exploratory field work was carried out to validate the research concept and 
previous finding of water reallocation and its effects on agricultural activity, essentially 
seeking to answer the questions. Who is involved? What is the conflict? What is the situation 
on the ground? Who are the players? Who has decision-making power? How are the 
reservoirs governed? Based on these findings, key actors and stakeholders were further 
identified for key informant interviews. The outcome of the exploratory field work narrowed 
the focus of the research and clearly outlined the second stage of field work to conduct the 
interviews and further focus on specific policy document and academic literature. 
The second stage of interviews was conducted in two phases between the years 2011 to 2012. 
The first phase was carried out from October 18 to December 15, 2011, and the second from 
January 15 to February 15, 2012. The water-related actors interviewed were from a wide 
range of governmental to non-governmental organization, academia, research institutes and 
civil society mostly based in the city of Hyderabad. Here, interviews were conducted based on 
the respondent’s availability and willingness to discuss water-related issues. All interviews 
undertaken in the city of Hyderabad were conducted in English in a structured open-ended 
format.  
In May 2013, the final stage of field work in Andhra Pradesh was carried out for one month 
(May-June), as the research study required further probing. The site selected was under the 
catchment area of the irrigation project which was being affected as a result of reallocating 
water to the city of Hyderabad. The villages in the command area of the irrigation projects of 
Ghanpur and Nizamsagar were situated some 90 km west of Hyderabad.  
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Figure 4-9: Interview with District Level Irrigation Officials and Farmers, Ghanpur Village, Medak 
District, Andhra Pradesh  
 
Source: photo documentation, (Own) October 2013 
 
 
 
Figure 4-10: Interview with Farmers, Ghanpur Village, Medak District.  
 
Source: photo documentation, (Own) October 2013 
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The villages in the catchment area which were affected as a result of reallocating Krishna 
water to the city was approximately 120 km south of Hyderabad. In-situ observations were 
intensively carried in all the irrigation projects sites (Ghanpur, Nizamsagar and Srisailam 
Sagar) and villages under the catchment areas affected, to construct and understand the on-
ground situation. All the interviews (Fig. 4-9 and Fig. 4-10) were conducted in a structured 
open-ended format through a translator (Mr Rao) who was fluent in Telugu, Hindi, and 
English. The translator being a retired bank manager in the district helped gain access to 
interview farmers willingly with the approval of the village Headman. The data analysis was 
based on information about their perception on water issues ranging from access to use, the 
sufficiency of water supply, agricultural activity and livelihood, adaptation mechanisms 
during water scarcity, and ways and means through which they eventually sought means to 
gain access to water through their social and political network.  
4.4.3 Qualitative Data Analysis: Mayrings’s Content Analysis Approach 
Content analysis is a method of analysing written, verbal or visual communication messages 
(Cole, 1988) aiming to attain condensed description of the phenomenon (Kyngas and 
Vanhanen, 1999: 4). This can basically be any kind of recorded communication, i.e. 
transcripts of interviews/discourses, protocols of observation, videotapes, and written 
documents in general. With the whole idea of aiming to attain condensed description of the 
phenomenon,  content analysis essentially distills words into fewer content-related categories, 
and it is assumed that when it is generally classified into the same categories, words, phrases, 
they tend to share the same meaning (Cavanagh, 1997). The purpose of creating categories is 
not simply bringing together observations that are similar or related (Dey, 2003) but to 
provide a means of describing the phenomenon, to increase understanding of such 
phenomenon and to eventually generate knowledge (Cavanagh, 1997). Miles and Huberman 
(1994) define qualitative data analysis as consisting of three components that form a 
concurrent flow of activities; Data reduction, data display, and conclusion drawing and 
display. Data reduction refers to focusing, simplifying and selecting the relevant data that is 
collected from the field notes. In other words, it organizes and sharpens the data. Data display 
organizes and compresses information. The final component of activity involves drawing a 
conclusion and thereafter verifying it, which is an iterative process that must be undertaken 
simultaneously during the field work. The analytical methods employed for this study is 
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loosely categorized in reference to Miles and Huberman’s (1994) three components of data 
analysis, which is embedded in Mayring’s approach of qualitative content analysis. Mayring 
(2000: 2) defines qualitative content as an empirical approach that avoids rash quantification 
and rather follows content analytic rules and step by step models, to methodologically control 
the analysis of texts within their context of communication. 
There are three main phases for both inductive and deductive analysis processes; 
preparation, organizing and reporting. This study adopted the inductive category building 
approach and developed categories from empirical content. It followed an iterative process 
while categories were adapted according to the empirical content. It began with the 
preparation phase where the researcher makes sense of the data and to comprehend ‘what is 
going on’ (Morse and Field, 1995: 126) and obtain a sense of the context in a holistic way 
(Tesch, 1990). According to Dey (2003), the data should shed light on questions to make 
sense of who is telling? What is happening? Where is this happening? When did it happen? 
And why? All of these questions emerge when the written material is read through several 
times (Burnard, 1991; Polit and Beck, 2004). Only after the familiarity with the data sets, it 
begins to shed some insights on theories (Polit and Beck, 2004). Next is the organizing phase. 
Central to the inductive approach of category development is to formulate a criterion of 
definition derived from the theoretical context and the formulated research question, which 
determines the aspects of the textual material taken into account.  
As already mentioned, creating categories is not simply bringing together observations that 
are similar or related (Dey, 2003) but it provides a means of describing the phenomenon 
thereby increasing our understanding to eventually generate knowledge (Cavanagh, 1997). 
Thereafter the text materials are worked through and categories were deduced carefully in a 
step by step process. Within a feedback loop, the categories are periodically revised. 
Eventually, these categories are reduced to main categories and finally checked in respect to 
their reliability (Mayring, 2000). The final phase is reporting, which involves the process of 
abstraction where formulating a general description of the research context through generating 
categories takes place (Burnard, 1996; Polit and Beck, 2004). Here each category is named 
using content-characteristic words. Subcategories with similar events and incidents are 
meticulously grouped together as categories and categories are further grouped as main 
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categories (Dey, 2003; Kyngas and Vanhanen, 1999). The process of abstraction is undertaken 
as far as is logical, reasonable and possible. 
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5 Arbitrary Water Reallocation in Hyderabad 
Overview 
This study adapts Prager's (2010) operationalization of Hagedorn’s (2008) Institutions of 
Sustainability (IOS) Framework where she unpacks the action arenas into concise research 
steps. The analysis starts with the two central elements, actors and policies. It may be noted 
that Prager makes a concise effort to reflect Ostrom’s seven variables in the research steps 
conducted for the actor and policy analysis.  
Firstly for the actor analysis, water-related actors are needed to be identified; i.e. who are the 
actors? This is followed by describing the positions of the most relevant actors. Actors are 
classified according to groups of actors representing the organization they belong to, the 
administrative level they act at and what role they play in policy implementation, i.e. what are 
their positions? Secondly, information on the actors’ characteristics such as interests, 
knowledge, capacities, resources and networks is to be analyzed, i.e. what are their physical 
and personal characteristics? Thirdly, actor’s attitude and perception of water resources and 
the current state of inter-sectoral water allocation and management are examined. This step 
can reveal the actors’ perceptions, e.g. the value they place on water resources, their 
perception of the severity of water scarcity and their perception of policy measures in terms of 
their effectiveness and costs and benefits. In other words, actors’ perceptions and values 
essentially determine their objectives to undertake strategies to secure water for themselves. 
Finally, the resulting behavior and action in the action arena are analyzed. Here it is important 
to examine how the characteristics of each exogenous variable (such as the biophysical 
attribute, the community attribute, the institutional and the political-economic attribute) may 
exert influence on several elements of the action situation in the action arena. This is followed 
by examining the kind of interaction amongst participants that are generated to eventually 
reveal an outcome of water being contested between the two sectors and on numerous 
occasions and water being re-allocated to the agriculture sector against the prescribed water 
allocation guidelines. The following sections operationalize the IAD framework as described. 
The specific policy issue that the study addresses is Hyderabad’s inter-sectoral water conflict 
with the agricultural sector. Water allocations between these two competing sectors are 
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administratively prescribed with allocation guidelines in place. However, arbitrary 
reallocation of water against the prescribed guideline has been persisting over the years with 
detrimental consequences for both the sector. In this light, this study seeks to examine 
the institutional context of the ‘water allocation mechanism’ in place. It aims to further 
examine the underlying process of the interplay of water-related actors and rules and 
dynamics of factors which eventually propagates such arbitrary water reallocations. In 
undertaking the study on policy analysis to understand ‘why a particular set of policy is 
giving a certain outcome’, the framework identifies four exogenous variables (biophysical 
attribute, attributes of community, political-economic context and rules-in-use) and gives a 
good guidelines to analyze how these exogenous variables influences the role of institutions 
which shapes human interaction and decision-making process, to eventually produce an 
outcome of such arbitrary water reallocations against the prescribed water allocation 
guidelines. 
5.1 Biophysical Setting 
Biophysical attributes and material conditions determine and shape the physically possible 
actions, the outcomes that can possibly be produced, how actions may be linked to outcomes, 
and the set of information that the actors may possess (Ostrom 2005: 22). Acheson (2011: 
330) points out the biophysical condition affecting the action arena which Ostrom describes, 
particularly depends on two key attributes of the resources. First, excludability, which 
characterizes the degree to which consumption of resources can be regulated and controlled. 
Second, subtractability, which characterizes the degree to which one person’s consumption of 
resources will eventually reduce or deplete the availability of resources to others (Polski and 
Ostrom, 1999: 10). In addition, the other attributes of the resources which might greatly affect 
their use may be their size, abundance, uncertainty (Wilson, 2002), resilience or vulnerability 
(Ostrom, 2007). The characteristics of physical as well as material conditions can have a 
significant influence on policy action situations as well as constrain institutional 
arrangements. It is, therefore, important to specify these conditions because it can have 
substantial implications for policy design as well as collective action and politics, which 
needs to be critically considered in the process of any policy analysis (Polski and Ostrom, 
1999: 10). The nature of the resources considered is an essential factor for the design of 
appropriate institutional arrangements linked to outcomes, defining resource access and use 
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(Ostrom et al., 1994). According to Mc Ginnis (2011), the IAD framework incorporates 
distinctions among four different types of goods and services which was introduced by V. 
Ostrom and Ostrom (1977) viz. private good, public good, toll good, and common pool 
resources. The resource under review will be contextualized as a common pool resource, 
which is determined by the attribute of the high cost of excludability and subtractability. 
In the context of Hyderabad's case study, the following section describes the characteristics of 
the biophysical conditions and its influence on the action arena. Firstly, with the onset of 
urbanization in Hyderabad, the city started seeking water from the two reservoir sources 
namely Singur and Nagarjuna Sagar. These two reservoirs were originally meant for 
agricultural purposes, which later were diverted to the city with water allocation mechanism 
in place between the two sectors. However with the rapid pace of urbanization, the city’s need 
for water exponentially increased, and it eventually drew more water from these two 
reservoirs. It stretched beyond the capacity of the two reservoirs to the point where allocation 
rules in place have been broken, and arbitrary reallocation of water has occurred over the 
years. While drawing water away from the agriculture sources has always been contested 
since the inception of such inter-sectoral allocation mechanisms, however, conflicts have 
increased as more water was gradually transferred. Secondly, bad monsoon and erratic rainfall 
in the state has greatly influenced the water availability in these two reservoirs. This has 
invariably triggered competition and conflict of water resources amongst users, eventually 
influencing such arbitrary water reallocations in the action arena over the years. 
5.1.1  Attributes of Urbanization and its Influence on Water Reallocation 
Celio and Giordano (2007) articulated the increasing urbanization of Hyderabad which had 
prompted water withdrawal from the two reservoirs across the Godavari and Krishna Rivers, 
originally meant for agriculture. The population of Hyderabad was estimated approximately 7 
million. It has seen an average growth rate of 8.73 percent per year (Government of Andhra 
Pradesh and Centre for Economic and Social Studies, 2008). The current population growth 
rate of Hyderabad is 27 percent per decade, at which rate the population by the year 2015 will 
be approximately 10.5 million. Hence with this rapid pace of population growth and 
economic development, the city eventually increased its water demand as well. Reckien et al. 
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(2011) stated that the provision of adequate amounts of safe water has not been able to keep 
up with the continuing growth rate of the city. 
As early as 1965, Hyderabad started withdrawing water from the Manjira reservoir across 
River Manjira, a tributary of River Godavari. As the city grew exponentially, this source was 
insufficient to meet the growing demand of the city. Consequently Singur dam was further 
constructed across River Manjira in 1990. Consistent with the agreements of the Bachawat 
Tribunal, the construction of the Singur reservoir with a storage capacity of 850 Mm3 was 
commissioned. The system to convey the water to Hyderabad was completed in two phases, 
one in 1991 and the other in 1993 (Government of Andhra Pradesh, 2005). In the allocation 
from the Manjira River, the primary allocation issue was between Hyderabad, and Ghanpur 
and Nizamsagar irrigation projects. The issue was addressed by allocation ‘rights’ through the 
Government Order (G.O. 90). This G.O. stipulated water entitlement to Hyderabad at 197 
Mm3 annually and 352 Mm3 annually for Ghanpur and Nizamsagar irrigation projects.  
It may, however, be noted that the G.O. gave priority to drinking water for Hyderabad. The 
G.O. clearly stated that water would not be allocated to the agricultural sector when water in 
the reservoir falls below a prescribed level. Below this prescribed level, water should be 
reserved only for Hyderabad’s drinking needs. However, over the years it has been recorded 
that water has been released to the agricultural sector (both Ghanpur and Nizamsagar 
irrigation project) even though the water levels in the Singur reservoir were well below the 
minimum prescribed level in the G.O. 
In the case of transferring Krishna River to Hyderabad, the Government of Andhra Pradesh in 
1986 appointed the Sri J. Raja Rao Expert Commission. This Commission was asked to 
submit technically and economically sound alternatives for further augmenting the Hyderabad 
water supply from other sources. In its final report, the Commission recommended drawing 
the required 467 Mm3 of water annually from Nagarjuna Sagar reservoir of the Krishna 
River. Even though this required a reallocation from the agricultural sector, the Commission 
pointed out that priority had to be given to drinking water over irrigation. The justification of 
placing priority on drinking water was based on a landmark report of the Indian Irrigation 
Commission that was issued some years earlier (Government of India, 1972), as well as from 
the award of the Krishna River Disputes Tribunal given in 1976 (Government of India, 1976). 
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Moreover, the Commission asserted that the water supply to Hyderabad city was justified 
because people belonging to all the districts of the state were living in Hyderabad 
(Government of Andhra Pradesh, 1987). The current allocation of water from the Nagarjuna 
Sagar project on the Krishna River to Hyderabad is increasing. Water from this reservoir has 
traditionally been used for agriculture. The total allocation from River Krishna is 16.5 TMC 
where 11 TMC of water is being drawn through Phase-I and II schemes as indicated in Table 
2-1. The remaining 5.5 TMC is expected to be drawn from Phase-III schemes as already 
explained in chapter 2, section 2.4. 
Celio and Giordano (2007) suggested that a number of such arbitrary reallocations of water to 
the agricultural sector seem to have been determined by numerous factors. They noted key 
factors such as such as political pressures on the State Government, or by public 
representatives of farmers in both the Nizamsagar and Ghanpur command area or by electoral 
politics. 
5.1.2 Attributes of Weather Variability and its Influence on Water Reallocation 
 The climate and the rainfall pattern in the study context is an essential attribute to highlight 
because it influences the water availability in the reservoirs. The water availability in the 
reservoirs eventually influences the competition, conflict and reallocation of water resources 
amongst users and uses in the action situation. In general, the climate in Andhra Pradesh is 
predominantly semi-arid. It experiences a hot and dry summer season from March to June, a 
monsoon season from July to September, and a dry winter extending from October to 
February. Droughts and water scarcity in summer months are a recurrent phenomenon in these 
semi-arid zones. Rainfall is unevenly distributed over the state and varies significantly from 
year to year. The annual rainfall of the State is normally 925 mm. Both the South-West 
monsoons (contributing about 68.5 per cent of the rainfall) and North-East monsoons 
(contributing about 22.3 per cent) influence the rainfall pattern. While the summer and winter, 
months receive the remaining 9.2 percent of the rainfall. 
Looking into the pattern of the rainfall distribution in the geographical area of the state, the 
coastal area precipitation ranges from 850 to 1,000 mm (Venot,  2008: 2), while the south-
west area is drought prone and receives only 450 to 600 mm of rainfall annually (Biggs, 
2005). Rainfall variability is very significant in South India which is well exemplified by the 
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fact that Andhra Pradesh has recurrently requested financial assistance from the Central 
Government for drought as well as for flood disasters. Uncertainty in rainfall puts a great 
pressure on those farmers who depend exclusively on surface waters. While exploiting 
groundwater through bore wells has been the commonly adopted strategy for coping with 
drought. Nevertheless, as groundwater resources are becoming overexploited (Shah et al., 
2003) and boring wells in hard rock aquifers entails a high risk of failure, groundwater has not 
been a sustainable option for coping with rainfalls variability. The influence of rainfall 
variability on competition, conflict and reallocation of water has been highlighted by Celio 
(2009). He pointed out that during years with high rainfall, for instance between 1998-1999, 
1999-2000, and 2000-2001, the inflow in the Nizamsagar irrigation project (which receives 
water from the Singur dam) was sufficient to fill up the 504 Mm3 Nizamsagar reservoirs. The 
canal water use exceeded the maximum reservoir capacity. In such cases, the water 
reallocation to Hyderabad had no impact on agriculture.  Conversely, when the annual rainfall 
over the Manjira basin was low, the transfer had the effects of inducing canal water scarcity 
and thereby restricting its use for irrigation. This prompted the competition and conflict for 
water resources between the two sectors. These inter-sectoral conflicts can be seen in 
particular during the year 2001-2002 and 2003-2004. 
5.2 Attributes of the Community (Participants and Water Use) 
 How the attributes of the community affect the action arena depends on the shared values or 
‘culture’ of the community (Cleaver, 2000), level of common understanding or trust within 
the community, its size (Agrawal and Goyal, 2001; Olson, 1965) and heterogeneity (Hong and 
Page, 2004). The attributes of a community may influence and affect a policy action situation 
because of their demographic set-up and their norms and perceptions about policy activities in 
question. Their values and preferences about policy-oriented approaches will largely depend 
on of the degree of a shared common understanding within the community (Polski and 
Ostrom, 1999: 13). 
This section reviews the physical and cultural characteristics of each group of water users and 
water-related actors (government and associated actors, politicians, farmers and urban actors) 
involved in the study context of inter-sectoral reallocation. Based on their interest, this study 
attempts to examine what is their influence and participation in the process of such arbitrary 
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reallocation in the action arena? The attributes of the community which can facilitate the 
stakeholders to self-organise may be influenced by their age and gender as well as their race 
and size of the group.  How collective action may be influenced by the size of the group or 
how the power relations and levels of trust may be influenced by gender and race. Further, the 
cultural attributes of the community which is characterized by their beliefs, norms and values 
construct the community’s perception of the world around them (Whaley and Weatherhead, 
2014: 7). The positions of the water-related actors are particularly established through the 
various reforms adopted and enacted over the years. This is described in the following sub-
sections and the overall actor-interaction is diagrammatically represented in Figure 5-1. 
5.2.1 Government and Associated Actors (Bureaucratic and Political Actor) 
In this group of actors, the study focuses on two key government departments involved in the 
inter-sectoral allocation and management of water resources in Andhra Pradesh with divergent 
interests. The Department of Irrigation and Command Area Development (ICAD) has the 
interest to provide sufficient irrigation waters to agricultural farmers to meet their crop 
requirements. The ICAD Department is responsible for irrigation for agriculture in the state of 
Andhra Pradesh. It organizes and manages to provide irrigation water to agricultural crops 
through its systems such as reservoirs, canals and other irrigation infrastructure. While the 
Hyderabad Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board (HMWSSB) has the interest to 
ensure Hyderabad urban users with sufficient water supply. The Board is essentially 
responsible for all aspects of design, construction, implementation, planning, maintenance and 
operation of the city's water supply. 
There are two key attributes that exacerbate the divergent interest of both the Irrigation 
Department and the Water Board. Firstly, HMWSSB is supposed to have overall control over 
its five water supply sources and its infrastructure. However, the two key water sources 
(Singur reservoir and the Nagarjuna reservoir supplying almost 70 percent of the water to the 
city) are under the control of the Irrigation Department with a water sharing mechanism in 
place. This has been the basis of protracted contention between the two departments. Celio 
(2007) suggested that as a result of such an administrative setup, it has further manifested 
internal struggles between the two department which further characterises the competition and 
conflict between the two sectors.  
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The second important attribute is the positioning of the political actors in the aspect of water 
resource management, which has been embedded in the various water reforms introduced in 
the state. The Constitution of the HMWSSB was crafted with the core purpose to empower 
the Water Board with financial autonomy to operate independently without political 
interference. However, the Constitution also has a provision for the Chief Minister of Andhra 
Pradesh to serve as the chairman of the Board of Directors of the Water Board, which 
accentuates the position of political actors and explicitly diminishes the independence of the 
Water Board from political interference. The Singur reservoir operated by the Irrigation 
Department releases water to Ghanpur and Nizamsagar for irrigation purposes after being 
jointly agreed upon by the Principal Secretary for Irrigation and the Managing Director of the 
HMWSSB, based on the dam operation rules of water allocation for Hyderabad and for 
agriculture. However, in the case of disagreement between the Principal Secretary and 
Managing Director, the Chief Minister takes a final decision on the matter. This interesting 
interplay between these actors is analyzed in the next chapter. 
5.2.2  Rural Water Actors (Farming Community - Water User Association) 
Andhra Pradesh has about 72 percent (approx. 30 million) of the population living in the rural 
areas, with 62 percent of them sustaining their livelihood primarily on agriculture and related 
activities (Reddy, 2011: 394). The land ownership pattern is similar to the rest of the country. 
About 80 percent of the land is largely owned by few rich farmers. While about 80 percent of 
the farmers cultivate the remaining 20 percent of the land. These poor and marginal farmers 
are often characterized by their size of fragmented land holdings which is usually below 1 
hectare which is due to the further division of land on inheritance. Typically, this land is of 
poor soil quality and has insufficient access to water. Farmers cultivate only one rain-fed crop 
a year, which is also known as Kharif seasoned crop (James and Robinson, 2001). Agriculture 
in Andhra Pradesh continues to remain the mainstay of the rural economy supporting the 
largest proportion of people, providing the largest share of total income for their livelihood. 
Besides supporting the rural economy and livelihood, the agriculture sector contributed 23.1 
percent to the Gross State Domestic Product (GSDP) in Andhra Pradesh (Government of 
Andhra Pradesh, 2013). This places irrigation as the primary source of agricultural growth in 
Andhra Pradesh. However, despite major investments in the irrigation sector by the 
Government, irrigation systems were characterized by low efficiency. This was mainly due to 
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lack of established operation and maintenance procedures. Further, damages were caused by 
farmers seeking additional water or timely water deliveries by tampering with irrigation 
structures. As a result, to bring about a reform in the irrigation sector, the Andhra Pradesh 
Farmers Management of Irrigation Systems (APFMIS) Act of 1997 was put in place (Peter, 
2002: 12). The APFMIS Act was intended to reduce the role of government in the direct 
management of irrigation systems and made way to provide the framework for setting up 
Water User Associations (WUA). The constitution of Water User Associations characterizes 
and fundamentally maps the social and structural cohesion of the farming community. 
This made provision for farmers' participation in the management of the irrigated water, as a 
result of which new leadership roles have emerged. In total, 10,292 Water Users Associations 
have been formed for major, medium and minor irrigation system through democratic 
elections. The main functions of these associations were to undertake management such as 
repairs and rehabilitation of the canal, oversee water distribution, manage internal conflict and 
disputes among the members and Water User Association, operation and maintenance work 
and also collect water tax to raise revenue for self-sustenance of these associations. In 
addition, they provide support to the Irrigation Department in monitoring water flow as well 
as assist the department in the process of preparing water demand and water tax (Badatya and 
Mohapatra, 2010). 
The term Farmer Organization (FO) covers different types of organizations, namely the Water 
User Association (WUA), Distributary Committee (DC), and the Project Committee (PC). 
Water User Association is the primary body. For the purposes of setting up Water Users 
Associations, the Act further classifies the irrigation projects as minor (less than 2,000 
hectares), medium (2,000 to 10,000 hectares), and major (more than 10,000 hectares). The Act 
divides the area of operation of a WUA into four to ten which is determined hydrologically 
rather than on boundaries, to ensure fair representation of all farmers in the WUA. This 
hydrological determination rather than on boundaries, according to the World Bank, proves to 
be more efficient and equitable (Raju, 2000). 
The managing committee of a WUA comprises of a President and four to ten territorial 
constituency members. Elections for the WUAs are conducted through a democratic process 
of secret ballots, similar to the election procedure of the Gram Panchayat election. Here each 
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farmer has a vote irrespective of the size of their landholding which levels out the 
representation of large and small farmers (Madhav, 2007). As per the Act, the management 
committee meet as and when necessary. Two general body meetings (GBM) are held 
annually; one each before starting of the Kharif and the Rabi seasons. In these meetings, 
important decisions regarding crops to be grown and water available for irrigation are taken. 
The general body meeting may also be called upon the direction from the Government or the 
Commissioner of the Command Area Development or even by the next higher tier of the 
farmers' organization in regards to any urgent public notification. How this attribute of social 
and structural cohesion influences the action situation to cause arbitrary reallocation of water 
is described in the next chapter. 
5.2.3  Urban Water Actors 
 Sahu (2010) elaborately described the number of government organizations and water-related 
actors responsible for urban water provision in Hyderabad. Principally, the Water Board 
(HMWSSB) is responsible for the provision of urban drinking water. Besides this, even 
though the Municipal Corporation, (i.e. the local government) also has the authority to 
undertake the water supply functions, its limited function is, however, prominent with the 
absence of the Mayor and the Councilors as Members in the HMWSSB. Municipal 
Corporators, in general, are involved in urban governance at the municipal level, serving as 
people's representative to bridge and facilitate communication with the administration. 
Municipal Corporators are elected for a five-year term. They are responsible for overlooking 
the development on various issues in their constituencies, including issues on access to 
drinking water. Together with MLAs (Members of Legislative Assembly) and MPs (Members 
of Parliament) they form a general body and have meetings at regular intervals to discuss 
issues as brought forward in their constituencies. There is no administrative provision of 
formal relations between the Corporators and HMWSSB, but rather their interaction takes 
place informally, primarily based on affiliations of a political party and personal relationships. 
It may, however, be noted that while the Municipal Corporators do not take part in the 
decision-making process, the proposals they forward are reviewed and considered to be 
included in the final urban water plan which is primarily drawn up by the HMWSSB. 
Regarding the urban citizens, they are collectively represented by the Resident Welfare 
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Association (RWA), which are essentially self-managed neighborhood communities. To solve 
the many urban problems, political intervention or intermediation in the urban local bodies 
were not too effective. In response to this, Residents Welfare Associations (RWA) were 
formed to create an opportunity to self-manage and govern on issues in their areas. The main 
objective of RWA is to collectively make representations in addressing any grievances relating 
to urban public service such as water works. The RWA specifically makes an endeavour to 
create awareness of responsibilities and rights of the citizens in order to empower residents. 
Thereby residents may be able to supervise the implementation of various responsibilities 
which have been entrusted to the urban bodies according to 174th Amendment and Article 
232 of the Constitution. Many RWAs are further constituted to be known as the United 
Federation of Resident Welfare Associations (U-FERWAS). The Municipal Corporation of 
Hyderabad now considers the RWAs as partners for efficient delivery of public services to the 
citizens without the baggage of political involvement (United Federation of Resident Welfare 
Associations, 2012). 
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Figure 5-1: Water-Related Actor Interaction Network  
Source: adapted from Sahu (2010). 
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understand the distribution of decision making power amongst them. It also draws attention to 
the way in which the political and economic interests of actors have influenced their decision-
making process within a particular set of rules-in-use (Clement, 2010: 137). Hence, closely 
examining the rules will give some explanation how the current set of rules-in-use affects the 
pattern of power distribution amongst participants, particularly the administrators and 
politicians. The following section firstly examines rules which inform how the current set of 
rules-in-use affects power distribution. Secondly, it examines the way in which water 
allocation and management rules are in place in Andhra Pradesh in general and Hyderabad in 
particular. 
5.4 Water Management and Allocation Rules 
 Ostrom defines rules-in-use as the understanding shared among participants referring to 
enforced prescriptions pointing out what actions are required, prohibited or permitted 
(Ostrom, 1999: 50). They refer to both formal and informal prescriptions, e.g. legal 
documents issued by central governments, and the informal rules allowing interpreting these 
documents with relative freedom. To understand how the rules-in-use affect the action arena, 
we need understand the interaction of formal and informal rules affecting the behavior in the 
action arena. Within the action arena, there is the action situation which is the social space 
where individual interact to make choice. The structure of this action situation as given by 
Ostrom (2011: 19) depends on a set of seven variables. They contain a set of actors, positions 
that are filled by those actors, a set of allowable actions, some level of control over the 
choices of each participant, information that is used to guide choices and identified costs and 
benefits or actions. Ostrom views the action situation as partially dependent on rules and 
therefore provides us with a set of working rules that affect these seven set of variables in the 
action situation. However, Ostrom emphasizes that working rules alone never provide a 
necessary and sufficient explanation of the structure of an action situation.  It may be noted 
that other factors, such as the biophysical and the community attributes, besides rules also 
affect the action area. The seven types of rules should constitute the minimal but necessary set 
of rules, which is needed to offer an explanation of actions and results based on the working 
rules used by participants to order their relationships within an action situation. 
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Ostrom (2011: 19) explains these seven types of rules as follows. Boundary rules define the 
attributes and conditions required to enter or gain a position in an action situation. In applied 
terms, this means that boundary rules define who has a right to enter and use a resource. In 
other words, who has a right to a position in the resource use or management system? This 
eventually affects the types of participants with whom other participants will be interacting in 
relation to a particular resource. The position rules are placeholders for participants to enter 
the process (Crawford and Ostrom, 2005). Sets of rules assign different kinds of authority to 
different positions. For example, the resource user, government agency and the community-
based organization are likely to have different positions and different types of authorities over 
natural resource management based action situations. Authority rules specify the actions that 
participants in a particular position may undertake. Scope rules specify the jurisdiction of 
outcomes that can be affected. Information rules specify the amount and type of information 
for interaction and communication between participants in an action arena. Payoff rules 
specify how costs and benefits are assigned in the action arena. The entire exchange of 
choices, interaction and outcomes are made possible by the presence of rules. Rules are the 
limitations created by humans with the intent to solve specific problems. It includes all 
components that require, permit or prohibit a certain action and the consequences that ensue if 
the rule is not followed or adhered to. The rules in questions may be in the form of statutory 
policies, cultural framework, established laws, social norms or regulatory structure. Laws by 
the central, regional, local or special government are no doubt important rules to be 
considered. 
The focus of the institutional analysis examines how the rules-in-use affect the action arena 
by understanding the interaction of formal and informal rules affecting the behavior in the 
action arena. It is important to focus on the operational rules (informal rules) largely used by 
most participants. In order to examine what these informal rules are, how they evolve, the 
reason why participants choose to either follow these rules or not, a sample of the population 
is selected. This sample of the population is then probed with the above seven types of rules 
(Polski and Ostrom, 1999: 16). Ostrom further provides ample guidelines by presenting a set 
of questions that are designed to undertake the analysis of rules-in-use that essentially 
structures an action situation, which is described in the next section. 
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By the constitutional provision of water resources in India, various water institutions in 
Andhra Pradesh can be found at the national level and the state level (Sahu, 2010). However, 
since this study focuses specifically on the inter-sectoral water allocation, it identified and 
took into consideration only those relevant institutions to carry out the institutional analysis. 
The key water provisions under review are briefly described chronologically. To take care of 
the urban water provision, the Hyderabad Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Act was 
passed in 1989. In the year 1997, the State passed the Andhra Pradesh Farmers’ Management 
of Irrigation Systems (APFMIS) Act that provided for the handing over of water management 
responsibilities in irrigation canal systems to associations of farmers. In the same year, the 
Andhra Pradesh Water Resources Development Corporation (APWRDC) Act was enacted 
sanctioning the setting-up of a corporation in charge of managing water resources in an 
integrated manner, notably through planning and coordinating water use by different sectors. 
In the National Water Policy (NWP) issued in the year 2002, it reflected the need for planning 
as well as setting up the institutional mechanisms in order to handle multi-sectoral water uses. 
It also reiterated that drinking water was to be given highest priority over all other uses.  In 
the year 2002, Andhra Pradesh Water Land and Trees (APWALTA) Act was passed to deal 
with issues concerning the protection of groundwater and surface water. The Andhra Pradesh 
State Water Policy of 2008 explicitly called for the establishment of the Andhra Pradesh Water 
Resource Regulatory Commission. The key documents pertaining to the water management 
which focuses on the inter-sectoral water management are indicated in section 4.4.1 in the 
previous chapter. How each legal entity within these documents embeds Ostrom’s seven types 
of rules, and how it eventually influences the action arena is described in the next chapter. 
5.5 Integrating the Analysis 
 The action arena is the core unit of analysis in the Institutional Analysis and Development 
(IAD) framework.  Within the action arena, there is the action situation as well as the actors 
who take part in the interactions in the action situation (Polski and Ostrom, 1999: 6). 
Typically in an action situation, individuals undertake wide range of interaction like 
exchanging goods and services. It may also involve interaction which solves problems or 
conflicts, amongst the wide range of interactions they may be involved in. Participants present 
in this situation and the roles are they assigned with to undertake particular actions are all 
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influenced by factors in the bio-physical world, the attributes of the community, and the rules-
in-use. Ostrom builds on the game theoretical language to create a systematic way to classify 
generic rules in the assumption that any human interaction is composed of seven working 
parts. She describes the seven working parts characterizing such action situation in which 
participants decide upon how to act (Ostrom, 2005: 187-192). These seven clusters of 
variables are: who are the participants present in this situation and what are the roles are they 
assigned with, to undertake particular actions. What is the possible level of control that each 
participant has, and what could be the possible outcomes for this situation? What amount and 
level of information does the participant have regarding the action situation? And finally, what 
cost and benefits do participant experience when they take undertake such actions in this 
particular situation? Ostrom (2005) summarizes the links between these variables as follows 
(see Fig. 5-3): “a) actors and actions are assigned to positions, b) outcomes are linked to 
actions, c) information is available about the action-outcome linkages, d) control is exercised 
over action-outcome linkages, and e) costs and benefits are assigned to action-outcome 
linkages” (Ostrom et al., 2014: 272). In other words, actors in positions choose among actions 
at particular stages of a decision process, in light of their control over a choice node, the 
information they have, the outcome that is likely, and the benefits and costs they perceive for 
these outcomes. 
 
Figure 5-2: The Internal Structure of an Action Situation of the Institutional Analysis and Development 
(IAD) Framework 
Source: Ostrom (2005: 33)  
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Figure 5-3: Rules as Exogenous Variables Elements of an Action Situation Source: Ostrom (2005: 33)  
5.6 The Action Situation 
Up to this point, all participants were identified and characterized independently. In addition, 
the biophysical setting of the case study was presented. This section goes one step further and 
characterizes the action situation as the focal unit of analysis (Ostrom, 2005: 32). First, the 
positions of the actors as the connecting link between participants and actions (Ostrom, 2005: 
41) are elaborated, which is important in understanding the kind of interaction that happened. 
5.6.1 Position and Boundary Rules 
 Analysis of who takes part in the action situation to carry out the reallocation of water against 
the prescribed guidelines, i.e. participants, and allowable actions is carefully undertaken by 
examining how the exogenous variables (position and boundary rules within the rules) 
influence the participation of water-related actors. 
As a precursor to understanding the subsequent section, it is important to understand that 
'Water' in India is a State subject. Here the respective Indian states exercise legislative powers 
over water. However, the Union, i.e. the Indian Ministry of Water Resources, is responsible 
for laying down policy guidelines and programmes for the development and regulation of the 
country's water resources. It looks into the overall planning, policy formulation, coordination 
and guidance in the water resources sector in general. In addition, the Union also looks into 
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the aspect of inter-state river waters as well as with the aspect of resolving a dispute between 
the states in relation to sharing of river waters.  It may be noted that all the rivers in India are 
inter-state. 
The legislatures of each State in India have their own laws that deal with all the characteristics 
relating to control, regulation and distribution of water. Hence, there is an elaborate network 
of laws regarding all use of water sources including groundwater, canals and irrigation and 
drainage and sewerage. According to the Constitution of India, the state takes the 
responsibility of water supply not only for all the sectors but also for all purposes. This is 
executed through the urban local bodies, Water Boards at the state level or either the statutory 
or non-statutory bodies through various departments at the city level. However, there are 
some instances where states such as Andhra Pradesh give the responsibility to Water Boards 
in large metropolitan cities, such as the Hyderabad Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage 
Board. The Irrigation and Command Area Development (CAD) Department is responsible for 
the irrigation needs of the state of Andhra Pradesh and owns almost all the surface water in 
the state. Whenever water supply schemes are based on surface water, the user department 
needs to coordinate with the Irrigation Department to negotiate water allocation.  
Considering water as an economic good, water sector reforms across the country made 
provisions of transferring power from government ministries and departments to independent 
water authorities. This was mainly to give more freedom from political interference as well as 
to facilitate private sector participation (Koonan and Bhullar, 2012). This section examined 
how these various water reforms over the years have placed 'formal' positions of various 
water-related actors, which allow or deny their participation in the management of water 
resources. Subsequently, how various actors positions themselves 'informally' to participate 
(in the action situation) to secure water for themselves in times of scarcity is examined. In the 
study context, boundary rules are essentially entry and exit rules. Here, who has the right to 
access and use of water resources in the state of Andhra Pradesh is described. Position rules 
describe the relevant actors and their position by classifying them according to groups of 
actors. Such classification may be based on the organization they belong to, the administrative 
level at which they exercise their role, and the possible role they are entitled to play in policy 
implementation. Here positions are created and specify which actions are assigned in terms of 
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duties and responsibilities. In other words, set of rules assigning a different kind of authority 
to a different position in the inter-sectoral water resource management in Andhra Pradesh.  
For instance, the resource user, government agency and the community-based organization are 
likely to have a different position and different types of authorities over the natural resource 
management based action situation. Here the distribution of management roles of various 
relevant participants and actors across various departments are specified. This subsection will 
also highlight the distribution of power indicating which group of actors with their assigned 
role will have varying influence in the management of inter-sectoral water allocation, which 
eventually plays out in the outcome of arbitrary water reallocations. Taking a cue from the 
water reforms passed in the state of Andhra Pradesh, the following Acts (HMWSSB Act of 
1997, AFPMIS Act of 1997, APWRDC Act of 1997 and APWRRC Act of 2009) defines how 
various actors were positioned in water resources management over the years, pertaining to 
the case study of Hyderabad.  
Ambiguous Responsibility Entrenched in the HMWSSB ACT (1997) 
As per the Hyderabad Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Act, 1989, the Hyderabad 
Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board (HMWSSB) was constituted on 1st 
November 1989. The Board is an autonomous body under the Act. It was created to give 
administrative and financial independence in a bid to empower the Water Board a greater 
control over operation and decision-making and also safeguard it from political interferences. 
However, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh serves as the Chairman of the Board and 
therefore has not been able to be independent of the political establishment as it was 
originally intended to. 
Secondly, as per the mandate of the HMWSSB, it essentially should exert control over 
Hyderabad water supply infrastructure. However, the Irrigation Department has a strong 
influence on the supply of water to Hyderabad. It may be noted that both the sources 
supplying water to Hyderabad (Singur reservoir on the Manjira River Nagarjuna Sagar 
reservoir on the Krishna River) are in charge of the Irrigation Department. Water from Singur 
reservoir is released to both the agricultural sector and the city as per the sanctioned dam 
operation rules by the government in 1990. This is done upon consensual agreement between 
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the Principal Secretary for Irrigation Department and the Managing Director of the 
HMWSSB. However, in the case of disagreement between the two, the matter is taken up to 
be resolved by the Chief Minister of the state. A similar situation is seen as water transfer to 
Hyderabad from the Krishna River is carried out through the Akkampally balancing reservoir 
under the control of the Irrigation Department. Currently, the Water Board is trying to obtain 
Government approval and financial assistance for constructing an independent structure over 
which it would have total control.  
AFPMIS ACT (1997) and the Farming Actors  
The 1997 APFMIS Act provided for the establishment of Water Users Associations within the 
farming community. This act made provision for the Water User Associations an entitlement 
to plan the distribution of water among their members and regulate water use which was 
previously entrusted to the Irrigation Department. This act was implemented to specifically 
deal with the gradual decrease of the irrigated areas, low rate of water fee collection, 
infrastructure maintenance of and the overall decline in agricultural productivity.  Despite the 
implementation of the reform, there have not been any changes regarding the water users in 
terms of their rights over water. The only difference noted is that, whereas the State still kept 
in its hands the proprietary rights over canal water, usufruct rights were vested in the control 
of the Water Users Association (Celio 2007). Whilst the farming community forms a major 
share of water users, they were kept out of issues pertaining to inter-sectoral water allocation 
and management.  
APWRDC Act (1997) and the Political Actors  
The idea of setting up a separate authority at the state level for water regulation was taken up 
in Andhra Pradesh. This authority was in essence envisioned to take charge of managing 
water resources in an integrated manner by coordinating water use by different sectors. Hence 
the Andhra Pradesh Water Resources Development Corporation Act, 1997, was implemented. 
However, it continued to be controlled by the government. The Act made provisions for 
members of the Corporation to be either elected by the Government or be an existing member 
of the Government of Andhra Pradesh.  
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APWRRC Act (2009) and the Government and Farming Actors  
The purpose of setting up the regulatory authorities across the country was in a bid to transfer 
regulatory powers from the government ministries and departments to ‘autonomous’ water 
regulatory authorities. These regulatory authorities were to not only exercise the rulemaking 
powers to regulate water, but also to carry out the implementation and dispute settlements. 
The core idea behind setting up such sector-specific regulatory authorities was to ease away 
from government and political interference, as well as to encourage and facilitate the 
participation of water management from the private sector. However, with the exception of 
some few states, the functioning of the regulatory authorities across the country including 
Andhra Pradesh is entrusted to civil servants; as a result, it compromises the independence of 
the authority.  
5.6.2 Authority, Scope and Aggregation Rules 
 While this chapter describes what are the provisions within the Authority, Aggregation and 
Scope rules in Hyderabad study context, the next chapter will explain how the provision 
within these rules (authority, aggregation and scope) eventually influence the action situation 
to cause arbitrary water reallocation against the prescribed allocation guidelines 
In the study context of Hyderabad, authority rules prescribe authority over whom and how the 
water resources are to be managed and allocated between the city and the agricultural sector. 
The officials authorized to implement this water allocation rules are from the Irrigation 
Department and the Hyderabad Water Board. They ‘must’ jointly agree on the water to be 
released as authorized, but however ‘must not’ give water to the agricultural sector beyond 
certain prescribed limit as per the allocation rules set in the Government Order 90. In the case 
of discordance between the two authorized officials, the matter was to be taken to the Chief 
Minister. This ambiguous and multiple jurisdictions of water authority in the case of 
Hyderabad necessitates a careful examination of aggregation rules to determine the level of 
control each authorized position has in the decision-making process of inter-sectoral water 
allocation and management. In addition, the scope rules describe the condition under which 
authority rules for water allocation must be observed. 
  
 
105 
 
In the reallocation of water from the Manjira River, the primary allocation issue was between 
Hyderabad and Ghanpur and Nizamsagar irrigation projects. The issue was addressed by 
allocation ‘rights’ through the administrative authority in India - the Government Order (G.O. 
90). The G.O. stipulated Hyderabad water entitlement to 197 Mm3 annually from the Manjira 
reservoir. The Ghanpur and Nizamsagar irrigation projects were allocated 352 Mm3.  It may 
be noted that the G.O. gave priority to drinking water for Hyderabad, where it clearly stated 
that water would not be allocated to the agricultural sector when water in the reservoir falls 
below a prescribed level, which should be reserved only for Hyderabad’s drinking needs. The 
Government Order 93 (IRRIGATION and C.A.D. (Irrgn. lV) DEPARTMENT G.O. (Ms). 
No.93, Dated: 24-02-1990) specifying the operational rules of the Singur reservoir typically 
represents a combination of Authority and Scope rules. Para 1 of the document determines 
what actions the participant may undertake to carry out the water allocation and management 
process (“Manjira Water Supply Scheme Phase-III has been taken up for an additional supply 
of 4 TMC of water to Hyderabad with Singur reservoir as a source. Singur dam was 
constructed by Irrigation Department to meet the said requirements for the city of Hyderabad 
and to stabilise the Irrigation under existing Nizamsagar, Fatehnagar and Mahaboobnagar 
systems”). Para 17 of the document sets the conditions for participant to undertake the 
authorized actions (“Water for Irrigation shall be released only when the water levels are 
higher than the minimum levels indicated in para 16(c).”) 
Authority rules also determine whether a decision by a single or multiple participants is 
needed prior to an action at a decision point in a process. In cases where authority rules 
provide multiple positions partial control over the same sort of actions, aggregation rules are 
needed, which may be symmetric or asymmetric. Whilst the authority and scope rules are 
straight forward in Hyderabad’s case, aggregation rule makes an interesting case. In the study 
context, aggregation rules are symmetric, i.e., multiple participants have joint control over the 
decision-making process (Ostrom, 2005). As per the mandate of the Hyderabad Metropolitan 
Water Supply and Sewerage Board (HMWSSB), the board was meant to have total control 
over Hyderabad water supply infrastructure."On and from the date of coming into force of this 
chapter, all public reservoirs, tanks, cisterns, fountains, wells, and bore wells, pumps, pipes, 
taps, conduits and other works connected with the supply of water to the Hyderabad 
Metropolitan area, including the head work, reservoirs ( ... ), shall vest in the Board and be 
  
 
106 
 
subject to its control" Chapter IV, Section 17, Hyderabad Metropolitan Water Supply and 
Sewerage Act, 1989. 
However, both the reservoirs (Singur across the Manjira River and Nagarjuna Sagar across 
Krishna River) are multipurpose, serving Hyderabad for drinking water, agriculture, and 
hydropower. Both are principally controlled and operated under the responsibility of the 
Irrigation and Command Area Development (CAD) Department of Andhra Pradesh. This 
makes it necessary to share jurisdiction for water management between the Irrigation 
Department and the Water Board. The water allocation between the agriculture and the city of 
Hyderabad is carried out through the administrative water allocation mechanism in place. This 
was put into effect by the Government of Andhra Pradesh via two Government Orders (see 
G.O. 90 in 1989 and G.O. 93 in 1990). The release of water from the Singur reservoir for the 
agricultural sector is sanctioned as per the allocation rules in place, according to the 
consensual agreement between the Principal Secretary for Irrigation and the Managing 
Director of the HMWSSB.  However, in the case of any dispute between the two, the matter is 
directed to the Chief Minister, who is also the Chairman of the HMWSSB eventually decides. 
A similar arrangement is in place for Krishna water. Here again, the water transfer to 
Hyderabad from the Krishna River is carried out through the Akkampally balancing reservoir 
which is yet again under the control of the Irrigation Department. This paramount powers 
vested in the Chief Minister accentuates the level of control that a participant holding a 
certain position exercises in a decision-making process, which Ostrom and Crawford (2005) 
understands as aggregation rules. This makes ways and has a profound influence on how 
water allocation and management in Hyderabad is deeply entrenched under political 
influence, which is explained in the next chapter. 
5.6.3 Information Rules 
 According to Ostrom and Crawford (2005), information rules affect the level of information 
available to participants. It not only determines how information should flow among 
participants, but also the form in which communication should occur. In other words, these 
information rules determine the arrangements for interaction and communication between 
participants. For instance, through regular meetings and between participants and other actors, 
stakeholders, the public and other institutions; through annual reports and public consultations 
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and newsletters. While this section unravels the level of information available to the 
participants within the provision of information rules, the next chapter discusses how the 
provision within the information rules influences the actor interaction to eventually cause 
arbitrary water reallocation. 
The Andhra Pradesh Water Resources Development Corporation Act of 1997 laid foundation 
for an independent body for planning and management of water resources in the State of 
Andhra Pradesh. However the constitution of the committees of the Act laid down the rules 
that “The Corporation or any of its Committees may invite any officer of the Central 
Government/ State Government/ local authority or any organization or any person to attend 
its meeting or meetings as a special invitee for the purpose of assisting or advising/ on any 
matter or matters. The person so invited may take part in the proceedings/ but shall have no 
right to vote”.   
Subsequently, the Andhra Pradesh Water Resource Regulatory Commission Act of 
2009 evolved and was entrusted to carry out major water planning for all the sectors (such as 
irrigation, municipal/rural drinking water, electricity and industry) in the state of Andhra 
Pradesh. “The powers, functions and duties of the Commission shall be as under (1) a) To 
determine the water requirement for various categories of users (such as irrigation, 
municipal/rural drinking water/industry etc) on a yearly / seasonal basis, b) To determine the 
requirement of irrigation water for the various levels of Farmers Organizations (namely, 
Project Committee, Distributory Committee and Water User Association) based on the 
cropping pattern approved by the project authorities on a yearly / season basis and implement 
the same,” which can be found in the Andhra Pradesh Water Resources Regulatory 
Commission Act 2009, Chapter III, para 14, Section (1). 
These acts, in general, provided information about how various actors should participate and 
interact while managing water resources in the state of Andhra Pradesh. However no farmer’s 
organizations were included in the planning process which was outlined in the act that “The 
Commission may as and when needed and decided by them invite special invitees from,- a) 
experts who are having adequate knowledge, experience or proved capacity in dealing with 
the problems relating to engineering, agriculture, drinking water, industry, law, economics, 
commerce, finance or management for assisting the Commission in taking policy decisions. b) 
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members from farmers Organizations within the State” which can be found in the Andhra 
Pradesh Water Resources Regulatory Commission Act 2009, Chapter II, Para 4, Section (2) 
Provision of ‘Special invitees as and when required by the Commission’.  
There is a provision in the act which allows representatives of important actors to participate 
in the decision-making process. However, it states that the regulatory authority ‘may’ invite 
experts and members from farmers’ organizations, but only as special invitees. It may be 
further noted that the decision to invite them is at the discretion of the members of the 
regulatory authority. It explicitly allows 'experts' to assist the authority in recommending 
policy decisions. However, members of farmers’ organizations have been granted with no 
such role. This non-inclusion of farming actors in the planning process has kept them away 
from access to information about the actual resources available. How this factor of 
information or the lack of it influences the process of actor interactions and arbitrary water 
reallocation is discussed in the next chapter. 
5.6.4 Payoff Rules   
Payoff rules identify sanctions for taking ‘mustn’t’ actions.  In the water regulation, allocation 
and management; payoff rules determine who bears the cost if rules are violated. In the same 
way, it also assigns the benefits of following rules in the action situation. Regarding costs and 
benefits, an institutional analysis should distinguish between the physical outcome, the 
external reward or sanction, and the valuation that the participant assigns to each of those 
aspects (Ostrom 2005a: 52). i.e. how various actions could either cost to each type of 
participants or benefit as a result of various group outcomes is played out in the action 
situation. Ostrom and Polski (1999: 17) explain that information rules specify the amount and 
type of information available to participants concerning enforcement in an action arena.  The 
rule that makes information about the enforcement of water management pertaining to its use 
and allocation can influence the way water-related actors interacts and behaves in the action 
situation.  
Taking the study context of Hyderabad, provision for imposing sanction rules has been 
prescribed in the Andhra Pradesh Water Resources Regulatory Commission Act of 2009 under 
the clause of Powers, Functions and Duties of the Commission to “Fixing and monitor 
implementation of stipulated quality standards for management of water resources by various 
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water users/departments and recommend actions against violations”. It further outlines that 
“the Commission shall in case of non-compliance of the specific directions in discharge of the 
powers under this Act, recommend to the Government suitable disciplinary action against 
such Government officials”. In this regard, specifically looking at the Government Order 93 
ordering the operational rules of the Singur reservoir (IRRIGATION and C.A.D. (Irrgn. lV) 
DEPARTMENT G.O. (Ms). No. 93, Dated: 24-02-1990) Para 1 determines the amount of 
water allocated for the city and the agricultural uses. Para 17 of the document sets the 
conditions for participant to undertake the authorized actions (“Water for Irrigation shall be 
released only when the water levels are higher than the minimum levels indicated in para 
16(c).”) However within this G.O. 93, there is no clause of sanctions against violation of this 
prescribed limitations and conditions of water allocation rules, in compliance with the Andhra 
Pradesh Water Resources Regulatory Commission Act of 2009 which is vested with the 
authority to impose sanctions against violations. 
5.7 Participants Perception of Water Resource and its Management 
 This section documents a typical representation of farmer’s perception on their daily way of 
agricultural life specifically pertaining to water access and management which was 
documented during the field work conducted in the year 2013. Mr Srinivas, a farmer is the 
official Village Servant, Rampur Village under the command area of Ghanpur irrigation 
project in Medak District (Figure 5-5). He has been the official village servant for the last four 
years, who took over the position after the passing away of his father. As we walked along the 
canal, he explained the canal water from Ghanpur irrigation project  (which originally gets 
water from the Singur reservoir) flows into their village from Kistapur village, then flows on 
to Rampur, Macharam, Bolaram, and then on to Medak. There are about 400 farmers in the 
village and each farmer has cultivable land between 1-3 acres. For water to flow into their 
fields, for 1 acre each, a farmer pays Rs.200/year/per crop. Water is drawn out of the main 
canal to their field through pumps as long as there is electricity. Generally, all farmers have 
the same level of water requirement because they grow the same crop in the same season.  
The crops primarily grown are paddy which is purchased by the Food Corporation of India 
(FCI) located in Medak. Sugar cane is also grown and is sold to the Deccan Sugar cane 
factory which is 2 Km away, where the crops are deposited individually. The Singur reservoir 
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releases water into the Ghanpur irrigation project twice a year for Kharif (summer crop) and 
rabi (winter crops). When there is no water released from the Singur reservoir, the canal goes 
dry. To manage the water resource system, there is a water body Committee called ‘Mehbub 
Meher’ Committee (consisting of one president, one vice-president and six members) from 4 
villages i.e. Rampur, Kistapur, Machavaram and Perur (2 each). For election to this 
committee, the Irrigation Department picks up a suitable day to organize the election. The 
villagers nominate the candidates and voting take place. The farmers in the village are also 
aware that as per government order, only if the water is above 8 TMC yearly, the water from 
the Singur reservoir will be released twice (end of June to October-November) and the other 
time during January to May 1st week.  They are aware that the water and all irrigation 
structures are owned by the Irrigation Department, to which they pay taxes to use the water. 
The water depending on the electricity is available for seven hours.  
 
Figure 5-5: Interview with the Official Village Servant, Ghanpur Village  
Source: photo documentation, (Own) October 2013 
Three years ago, as a result of four dry months, the Singur reservoir went dry and hence could 
not release any water and there was a crop failure (Rabi crop) which is their second crop. In 
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such instance of water scarcity, the people approached their MLA, who then approached the 
District Collector. Depending on the water assessment of the requirement of the village, the 
District Collector forwarded the recommendation to the Irrigation Department. With pressure 
from the politicians, water was eventually released according to the ratio of the land under 
cultivation. Eventually, whatever water released is equally distributed. In order to adapt to 
such rainfall variation, the farmers usually change the crop from paddy to crops requiring less 
water such as maize, groundnut and sunflower. It may be noted that when there is a crop 
failure, the way the farmers earn their livelihood is through government supported scheme 
such as ‘Work for Food’. This involves building and repairing canals, roads etc. for which 
they are paid. This alternative arrangement goes on for about four months. Additionally, the 
bank loan repayment against the previous loan is extended and new loans are provided which 
is aided through Societies called Primary Agricultural Co-op Society, where all farmers in the 
village are members of such society. There is a President, Vice President, Secretary and a 
Member. The area of land to be cultivated during the season is assessed by the society. 
Accordingly, they arrange the finance for the farmers by approaching the bank, which is the 
State Bank of Hyderabad, Agricultural Development Bank. There are 22 villages under this 
jurisdiction and hence twenty-two such Co-operative societies exist.  In Medak district, there 
are 46 villages and if total agricultural production falls below 33 percent, it is considered a 
drought affected area. Another alternative to supplement income in times of crop failure is 
also through dairy and livestock. 
5.8 Key Intersectoral Conflicts and Arbitrary Reallocation of Water 
Based on the data I have collected, this section charts the key events documenting 
competition and contestation between the urban needs of Hyderabad and agricultural uses. 
These intersectoral water conflicts have persisted since the inception of water structures 
constructed across the Manjira River as well as the transferring of Krishna River water 
through the Nagarjuna Sagar Dam, primarily meant for agricultural purposes originally. Set 
against the background of prevailing adverse climatic factors, events indicating such conflicts, 
which have been expressed through hunger strikes, public hearings, representations and 
meetings, have been well documented. Based on my own data, this section seeks to more 
precisely set the context of this research study in order to eventually understand and unravel 
the processes and causes leading to such conflicts. 
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Celio and Giordano (2007) have noted how, due in part to uncertainty over monsoon inflows 
into the Singur Reservoir over the years, the agricultural sector surrounding Hyderabad has 
largely failed to secure its share of water within the existing intersectoral water arrangements. 
Under such conditions, it has proven to be a tricky situation for the government of Andhra 
Pradesh to take the risk of providing the agricultural sector with the amounts of water it is 
supposed to be allocated, which would mean reducing the stock in the Singur Reservoir 
available for Hyderabad's drinking needs. Since the Singur Dam came into being in 1990, its 
supplying water to Hyderabad as well as for agricultural purpose has ignited such conflicts. 
The seeds of contention were first sown in 2003, when the Congress political party staged a 
102-day relay hunger strike, demanding Singur water for irrigation in the Medak and 
Nizamabad areas. This sentiment continues to resonate to the present day, where an 
anonymous farmer during one of my field stay revealed: “We really do not know what is going 
on at the high level. All we know is water from Singur will first fulfil the needs of Hyderabad 
city and then only will come to us. However, this water originally belongs to us and we will 
fight for it”. 
The hunger strike was based on the historical mandate of the Singur project, where the 
original plan was to supply 4 TMC water for Hyderabad's drinking purposes and enough to 
irrigate 45,000 acres of agricultural land in the Jogipet and Sangareddy areas of Medak 
District and release water to the Nizamsagar project for irrigation in Nizamabad. The plan 
went haywire, as 13 TMC water was supplied to Hyderabad at the expense of meeting the 
irrigation requirements of Medak and Nizamabad. Mr Appi Reddy, Farmer’s Leader from 
Nizamabad, grieved how “The construction of the Singur project for diversion of water to the 
twin cities was the biggest injustice to the Nizamsagar peasants, as they had never got more 
than 8 TMC of water after the project came up” (The Hindu, 2010). 
It had become evident that the Singur project was increasingly dedicated to being a drinking 
water project to cater to the growing needs of Hyderabad, with Government Order 93 further 
strengthening that process. Venkateshwar Rao, a farmer from Renjal Mandal, was reported to 
lament "I used to cultivate paddy in the entire stretch of 10 acres when water from 
Nizamsagar project was available. But now, I cannot cultivate paddy because of construction 
of Singur project in the upper reaches of Nizamsagar project" (Times of India, 2010). An 
irrigation expert, as quoted in the Times of India (2010), further corroborated the farmer's 
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plight by saying "In view of taking Manjira water to Hyderabad for drinking purposes, Singur 
balancing reservoir was built in Medak district. Since the reservoir came into being, inflows 
into Nizamsagar have dwindled. The farmers are hit badly because of this". 
The momentum picked up in 2005, leading to a key event in this conflict. A public hearing on 
water issues related to Telangana was organized by the Telangana Natural Resource 
Management. It garnered considerable attention due to the presence of the former Judge of the 
High Court, the former Vice-Chancellor of Padmavati Mahila University and the former Chief 
Engineer of the Central Water Commission. The very purpose of the public hearing was to 
register their demand to restore the rights of the Manjira basin farmers. The public hearing 
proceedings were sent to the Chief Minister and other ministers and officials concerned. The 
representatives of the Nizamsagar Ayacutdars Protection Committee reiterated that successive 
governments preferred to quench the thirst of the urban dwellers, leaving farmers high and 
dry. The state government eventually issued orders for the diversion of 2 TMC from the 
Singur Dam out of Hyderabad's share of drinking water to stabilize an ayacut of 40,000 acres 
in Medak district. The state government's decision was based on the pre-electoral demands 
put forth by the Telangana Rashtra Samithi with the Congress Chief Minister, much to the 
dismay of the Hyderabad Water Board officials, who argued the irrationality of the 
government's decision which contradicted the future city’s water needs being met from the 
Krishna River.  
It was also in 2005 when the first arbitrary allocation of water to the agricultural sector took 
place against the prescribed water allocation guidelines. Following a poor monsoon, the 
government gave in to the demands of the farmers of Medak district, and about 1 TMC of 
water from the Singur Reservoir was let into the Ghanapur channel for the Rabi crop. This 
release of water for the farmers was announced by the sitting Major Irrigation Minister, 
despite concerns and protest being raised by the Hyderabad Water Board authorities. Marred 
by bad monsoons, water supply to the city was similarly facing a severe crisis, as the water 
levels in the two other water sources – Osmansagar and Himayatsagar dwindled. The water 
level in Himayatsagar was 1,734 ft, which was 4 ft short of the level from which it could be 
brought to the city by the force of gravity. Similarly, at the Osmansagar source, the level was 
1,765 ft, with only a capacity of 0.4 TMC, putting the city’s drinking water supply under 
severe stress. The Hyderabad Water Board protested that of the 7 TMC in the Singur 
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Reservoir, almost 1 TMC amounted to the dead storage level and an equal volume should be 
accounted for as evaporation losses. If another TMC of water was given away for agriculture, 
then the remaining 4 TMC would barely meet the city's drinking water needs until year-end. 
However, eventually, as already mentioned 1 TMC of water from the Singur Reservoir was let 
into the Ghanapur channel for the Rabi crop. 
In 2009, the State government yet again decided to release 0.3 TMC of water to Ghanapur 
ayacut from the Singur Reservoir. The decision was taken by the sitting Congress Chief 
Minister Rajasekhara Reddy, and orders were issued to this effect. In addition, the 
Nizamsagar ayacut was under acute drought conditions. The Minister for Major Irrigation 
convened a District Irrigation Advisory Board meeting, based on the conclusions of which the 
government also decided to release 2.5 TMC of water from the Singur Reservoir to the 
Nizamsagar irrigation project. 
In 2010, the Singur Reservoir, which has a maximum storage capacity of 30 TMC, was left 
only with 12 TMC due to poor rainfall. About 0.6 TMC was allocated for drinking water 
purposes every month, while 2.5 TMC was required for irrigation. With such a bad monsoon, 
it was reported that crops on 2,500 acres under the Ghanpur ayacut were on the verge of 
withering, as water had not been released in time from the Singur Reservoir. So, the Ayacut 
Committee chairperson lodged a complaint to the Sri Krishna Committee, lamenting that they 
should have received 4.06 TMC of water as their right under the ayacut but never received 
that much water, as it was being diverted to Hyderabad for drinking purposes. Further, a team 
of farmers also met the State Human Rights Commission Chairman to address the problems 
of water not being released from the reservoir. The Chairman henceforth directed the 
Principal Secretary of Minor Irrigation to release water for Ghanapur ayacut from the Manjira 
Reservoir. This mounting pressure from the farmers on the Irrigation Department to release 
water to Nizamsagar Ayacut and Ghanapur Ayacut for cultivation put the Water Board in a 
critical situation, urging the Irrigation Department not to release the water. The Water Board 
eventually took up the issue with the sitting Chief Minister, Rosaiah, and the Irrigation 
officials were henceforth directed to ensure supply of water for agriculture without disrupting 
drinking water supply to Hyderabad. 
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At the same time, in Nizamabad district the problem of water scarcity was hitting paddy 
farmers the worst. The Kharif paddy sown covered only 45,512 hectares, though under 
normal circumstances it would have covered 94,267 hectares of the command area. But the 
water level in the Nizamasagar Reservoir, which normally received water from the Singur 
Reservoir was almost at dead storage. Although the storage capacity of the Nizamsagar 
Reservoir was 17.8 TMC, not even 1TMC water was available. As a result, the farmers in the 
Nizamsagar irrigation ayacut complained to A.D. Mohile, irrigation consultant to the Justice 
Sri Krishna Committee that the construction of Singur project had turned out to be a bane for 
them. A farmer’s representative was reportedly quoted as saying “In fact, we were happy 
when the Singur project was built as we were told that it was a balancing reservoir for the 
Nizamsagar project and was being constructed in view of the silt problem in the Nizamsagar. 
However, we were duped by Andhra rulers, as they had diverted water to Hyderabad for 
drinking purpose” (The Hindu, 2010). The former Central Water Commission Chairman 
conducted a public hearing in which Farming leaders, people's organizations and the TRS 
political party participated. Eventually, 3 TMC water was released from the Singur Reservoir 
to save the standing crops under the Nizamsagar irrigation project, which ended up pushing 
the city into a severe water crisis.  
This release of water from the Singur Reservoir to the Nizamsagar irrigation project was 
announced by the concerned Minister. As per Government Order 93, water from the Singur 
Reservoir was only to be released for the Nizamsagar irrigation project under the condition 
that 29 TMC of water was available. However, the Minister, sharing the sentiments of the 
farmers under severe drought, persuaded the government to release the water to the 
Nizamsagar project from the Singur Reservoir. This highly accentuates the role and influence 
of political actors in the arbitrary water reallocation practices of the study context. 
In 2010, Hyderabad's water contestation with the agricultural sector for Krishna River waters 
surfaced yet again, when the state government decided to divert around 10 MGD of water 
from the Krishna Phase I project to en route villages of the Mahbubnagar and Nalgonda 
districts. The Water Board at that point of time supplied 332 MGD of water every day to 
Hyderabad against a demand for over 400 MGD. To supply 332 MGD of water to the city, 
180 MGD of water was drawn from Krishna Phase I and II. This decision to divert water to 
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the en route villages meant reducing 10 MGD of water supply for Hyderabad, which would 
have otherwise fulfilled the water needs of about three lakh of its population. 
In the beginning of 2012, the water level at the Singur Reservoir reached a disturbingly low 
level of only 520.142 meters. This was just enough water to either supply the city of 
Hyderabad with drinking water or the farmers for irrigation. The dam, controlled by the 
Irrigation Department, is obliged to abide by Government Order 93 to stop releasing water for 
irrigation and reserve it for Hyderabad’s needs if the water level falls to 520.254. However, 
the Irrigation Department continued to supply water to the farmers, much to the dismay of the 
Hyderabad Water Board once again (The Deccan Chronicle, 2012). 
5.9 Interaction 
Interactions are a result of exogenous variables affecting an action arena and leading to 
outcomes. More specifically relevant to the issues addressed here, faced with acute water 
crises, water-related participants need to choose between different possible actions to secure 
water for themselves. An action “can be thought of as a selection of a setting or a value on a 
control variable […] that a participant hopes will affect an outcome variable” (Ostrom 2005a: 
45). In the study context, the undertaken actions amongst competing urban and rural actors – 
ranging from representative actors requiring Hyderabad’s drinking water to those in the 
agricultural sector needing water for irrigation – are a result of a decline in availability of 
water over time. They undertake various actions in the hope of eventually securing water for 
their respective needs. I have identified the following six major actions from the data gathered 
during the field research: water users appealing to political representatives of their 
constituencies, appealing to government authorities, appealing to the state’s Human Rights 
Commission, conducting hunger strikes and, finally, engaging in public hearings. These 
interactions are further characterized below. 
The first type of possible action involves water users appealing to political representatives of 
their constituencies in order to improve their water access and availability. This type of action 
is mainly taken by rural actors and, out of all of the identified actions, has been by far the 
most effective. It typically entails a farmers’ group approaching its relevant political 
representatives, which may then involve taking the issue further to the Chief Minister, the 
Major Irrigation Minister and the Irrigation officials of the state. As already explained, the 
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Singur reservoir is a contested source of water for the two sectors of the Hyderabad area, 
where the management and allocation of water are under a rather complex arrangement. The 
release of water from the Singur dam for irrigation is authorized upon the joint decision of the 
Principal Secretary for the Irrigation Department and the Managing Director of the 
HMWSSB, based on existing dam operation rules. In cases of disagreement on any issues of 
water management and allocation between them, the matter is forwarded to the Chief 
Minister, who is empowered with the authority to eventually make final decisions. 
Data from the field work reveal the interactions that prevailed in the study area in 2010, 
generally representative of this first possible type of action. In view of the drought conditions 
affecting the area served by the Nizamsagar ayacut, 5 TMC of water from the Singur 
Reservoir was released into the Nizamsagar project in August, as during this month rice is 
transplanted to paddy fields from nurseries and requires a good supply of water due to high 
evapotranspiration. The Minister, on behalf of the farmers as their political representative, was 
Sudarshan Reddy, who met the Major Irrigation Minister, the Chief Minister and Irrigation 
Department officials and was able to convince the government to immediately release the 
water, though this was an infraction of allocation guidelines. Upon reaching the Nizamsagar 
project, water was thereafter released for irrigation purpose to the affected area, as per the 
decision taken by the District Irrigation Advisory Board. 
The second type of possible action involves farmers appealing to government authorities, 
particularly the Irrigation Advisory Board, which is chaired by the District Collector and has 
MLAs and MPs as members. Here, a farmer’s group approaches the District Collector, who 
then calls for an Irrigation Advisory Board meeting to request the government to release 
water. In such meetings, the Chairman of the Water User Associations and the Chairman of 
the Zila Parishads are also present. As a result of such meetings initiated by the farmers, the 
District Collector, on behalf of the District administration, then puts in a request to the 
government, addressed to the Principal Secretary of Irrigation, to release water to the 
irrigation project from the Singur Reservoir. On some occasions, the District collector also 
forwards the request directly to the Chief Minister as well. Such a course of action was 
particularly prevalent in 2009, when elected representatives mounted pressure to release 
Krishna River waters from the Nagarjuna Sagar Reservoir, despite the water level hovering at 
527.6 feet, as against the full reservoir level of 590 feet. Similarly, in 2010, Manjira River 
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water from the Singur Reservoir was released for farmers in the Nizamsagar and Ghanpur 
irrigation projects, facilitated through the government authorities. 
The third type of possible action involves appealing to the state of Andhra Prdesh’s Human 
Rights Commission, where a team of farmers meet the Chairman of the Commission to 
present their grievances about water not being released from the Singur Reservoir. A 
memorandum is submitted by farmers to which the Chairman responds by directing the 
District Collector to submit a formal report. The Chairman finally directs the Principal 
Secretary of Minor Irrigation to release water as deemed necessary. Instances of such action 
have been documented where Justice B. Subhashan Reddy, Chairman of the state Human 
Rights Commission (HRC), has directed the Principal Secretary of Minor Irrigation to release 
water for Ghanapur ayacut from the Manjira Reservoir in 2010. Here again, because of the 
nature of the contestation over Manjira River water, the Hyderabad Metropolitan Water 
Supply and Sewerage Board (HMWSSB) vehemently opposed releasing of water on the 
ground that there was an acute scarcity of drinking water. 
The fourth type of possible action revolves around organizing hunger strikes. In 2003, for 
example, a 102-day relay hunger strike was organized by workers from the Congress political 
party on behalf of the farming community. They demanded water from the Singur reservoir in 
the Medak region. The hunger strike was based on an appeal to the historical rationale for the 
Singur project, the original plan for which was to supply 4 TMC of water to Hyderabad for 
drinking purposes, irrigate 45,000 acres in the Jogipet and Sangareddy areas and release water 
to the Nizamsagar project for irrigation in Nizamabad. However, the landmark Government 
Order 93, issued in February 1990, further strengthened Hyderabad's water priority, increasing 
its share by further supplying 13 TMC of water at the expense of meeting the irrigation 
requirements of Medak and Nizamabad. The hunger strike was eventually called off; 
following a promise by Mr Rao and other senior leaders in the Congress political party, 
assuring that water would be released from the Singur project to 40,000 acres in the 
Zaheerabad and Andole Assembly constituencies, as contemplated originally in the project 
proposals, if the party was returned to power. Eventually, in 2005, the state government, with 
the Congress party now in power again, issued an order for diverting 2 TMC from the Singur 
Dam out of Hyderabad's share of drinking water, to stabilize an ayacut of 40,000 acres in the 
Medak district. This decision for water diversion met one of the six demands put forth by the 
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Telangana Rashtra Samithi to the Congress Chief Minister, Y.S. Rajasekhara Reddy, during 
the elections.  
The fifth type of possible action involves organizing public hearings.  For instance, a key 
"public hearing on water issues of Telangana" was organized by the Telangana Natural 
Resource Management Group (TNRMG) in 2005. It was primarily organized to demand 
restoration of the right of farmers to Manjira River waters from the Singur Reservoir, which 
was being shared with Hyderabad for its drinking needs. The farmers represented were from 
the Medak and Nizamabad districts, on behalf of whom M. Appi Reddy, Chairman of the 
Nizamsagar Ayacutdars Protection Committee, lamented that successive governments had 
placed priority on Hyderabad’s drinking water needs, leaving the farmers in despair. 
Prominent officials and citizens present at the public hearing included Justice Vaman Rao, a 
former Judge of the High Court; K. Rajyalaxmi, former Vice-Chancellor of Padmavati Mahila 
University; and R. Vidyasagar, former Chief Engineer of the Central Water Commission of 
Andhra Pradesh. The public hearing proceedings were eventually sent to the Chief Minister, 
Ministers and concerned officials. 
Another key public hearing in which ryot leaders and farmers association representatives 
participated was organized in 2010 concerning the Nizamsagar irrigation project. In the 
presence of A.D. Mohile, the Irrigation Consultant to the Justice Srikrishna Committee, the 
former Central Water Commission Member R. Vidya Sagar Rao conducted the proceedings of 
the public hearing. The farmers from the Nizamsagar project ayacut lamented that the 
construction of the Singur project has turned out to be more of a curse than a blessing for 
them. The farmers also expressed a feeling of being cheated out of their water rights. Initially, 
they were made to believe that the Singur project was to be constructed as a balancing 
reservoir to stabilize silting problems in the Nizamsagar irrigation project. However, 
gradually with time, all the water from the Singur Reservoir was eventually diverted to serve 
Hyderabad’s drinking water needs. The farmers further recounted the injustices meted out to 
Telangana over a period of 54 years under the united Andhra Pradesh and expressed a strong 
belief that only the separation of Telangana from Andhra Pradesh would solve the problem. 
The proceedings of the public hearing were further brought to the attention of the Chief 
Minister’s office and officials of the concerned departments. 
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5.10 Outcomes 
 To carry out analysis using the IAD framework, it is important to carefully define the 
objectives of the policy analysis and the analytic approach to be used. Polski and Ostrom 
1999: 8) mention two possible approaches. The approach chosen for the present study is 
generally used when well-established policy situations are to be analyzed, with the focus 
being on observing and outlining outcomes of activity in the policy arena. This involves 
working backwards through the flow diagram of the IAD framework to evaluate such policy 
outcomes. Here, the questions that come into focus include: Where do these outcomes occur? 
When and why do they occur? Who are the actors involved? The set of outcomes for the study 
area of Hyderabad have been described in section 5.8.  Thereafter, focusing on a particular 
class of outcomes, relevant patterns of interactions have been identified in section 5.9.  At this 
point, the backward-flowing diagnostic analysis leads with the need to specify the action 
arena, its physical and material conditions, relevant community attributes, as well as existing 
rules-in-use. Therefore, the next chapter identifies and examines which factors of the 
biophysical conditions, community attributes, political-economic context and the rules seem 
to be affecting the structure of the action arena that produces the outcome under investigation: 
arbitrary water reallocation in Hyderabad.
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6 Determinants of Hyderabad's Arbitrary Water 
Reallocation 
 This study was undertaken to examine the key water institutions determining inter-sectoral 
water allocation in the Hyderabad area and their roles and influence under increasing 
urbanization, based on the backdrop of prevailing agricultural needs and climate variability. It 
has aimed at analyzing the reasons for institutional change, seeking to answer the following 
research questions. Firstly, to inquire how rules-in-use persist despite the rules-in-form 
already in place. In order to understand this persistence of rules-in-use, an integrated actor and 
policy analysis was carried out by employing the IAD framework, forming the basis to 
critically examine the interplay and dynamics of water institutions, the decision-making 
process and its resulting arbitrary reallocation of water. To this end, the IAD framework was 
combined with the theoretical foundation of property rights and the identification of 
exogenous variables to unravel how property rights have changed over time in the study 
region, leading to such arbitrary water reallocation practices. Secondly, based on Knight's 
bargaining theory of institutional change, examining the question of why such change has 
occurred in the study area has been pursued by seeking to identify its causes and the factors 
which perpetuate it. Both of these research questions have been systematically addressed by 
using the IAD framework in an iterative process of linking the empirical evidence (chapter 
five) with the theoretical concepts (chapter three). 
To recap the basic aspects of the approach I have employed here, the IAD framework  
(Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom et al., 1994) provides a platform to analyze variations in institutional 
form in complexly nested institutional structures, determining the specific choice situations of 
individual actors. Meanwhile, the institutional economics perspective understands property 
rights institutions as a result of individual decisions to support specific institutions, as nested 
within broader institutional structures, and property rights are best understood as occurring 
within rules whose design is sometimes exogenous to individual decision-makers. These 
individuals then react to the external rules they are confronted with and can then create other 
institutions to reallocate the benefits and responsibilities assigned to various goods, depending 
on the incentives offered by the external institutions. The IAD framework has been employed 
to examine the persistence of such rule-in-use in spite of already existing rules-in-form in 
order to examine why arbitrary reallocation of water persists in the Hyderabad area, despite 
allocation guidelines already in place. Here I analyze how the seven working components of 
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the action situation, as conceptualized by the IAD framework, appear to be influenced by 
exogenous variables (physical and material conditions, community attributes, politico-
economic context and rules) that either encourage or discourage actor behavior and decision-
making processes that eventually cause water reallocation against prescribed guidelines.  
6.1 Biophysical Attributes 
The previous chapter has highlighted the perpetual conflicts and competition over water 
between Hyderabad’s urban needs and the agriculture sector’s for irrigation, often leading to 
arbitrary reallocation of water against the prescribed allocation guidelines. This chapter 
specifically examines those factors influencing the perpetuation of such arbitrary water 
reallocation practices, by examining the institutions in place which facilitate water sharing 
between the two sectors. In addition, it also discusses how climate variation has been exerting 
an influence on reallocation. 
First and foremost, the reviewed documents in section 5.6 reveal that in Andhra Pradesh the 
rules and legislations embedded in acts and policy documents defining water access and use 
between the city and the agriculture sector do not seem to have been formulated from a multi-
sectoral approach. For instance, in the Andhra Pradesh Water Resources Development 
Corporation Act of 1997, the provisions for planning and managing irrigation projects, 
drinking water supply schemes and industrial supply are all dealt with separately, rather than 
in an integrated manner. Also, the Andhra Pradesh Water Resource Regulatory Commission 
Act of 2009 similarly makes no effort towards multi-sectoral provision of water management 
and regulation. This act authorizes determination of the water requirements for different 
categories of users independently, rather than taking a holistic approach. 
Siddiqui (2008) has similarly reviewed the water policies and frameworks in India, noting that 
none of the state governments have been equipped with laws that specified the basis for water 
allocation between different segments of basins which were within their territory. Instead, 
states have had the liberty to change water allocation not only between but also within a 
particular system. They have also been free to alter water allocation between users and uses 
(i.e. drinking water and irrigation or hydropower) at their own discretion, without abiding by 
any consistent application of rules, regulations and procedures that have been formally 
defined by law. The National Water Policy of India (2002) did raise concerns about setting up 
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institutions to deal with multi-sectoral uses of water. However, at that time there were no 
strategies geared towards how this could be implemented. A decade later, the National Water 
Policy of India (2012) acknowledged ongoing inter-sectoral disputes in water-sharing and 
highlighted how such inter-sectoral disputes could potentially strain relationships and hinder 
better utilization of water. In this regard, it called for an institutional solution to be established 
within each state to resolve differences between competing water users. However, seriously 
initiating such a move has yet to be seen among the states, particularly in the state of Andhra 
Pradesh.  
For climate variability and its influence on arbitrary water reallocation, results from 
secondary data have revealed that water conflicts have been more prevalent during years of 
drought. Even though the National Water Policy (2012) of India proposed how the impact of 
climate change on water resources availability should be considered in water management 
related decisions (Singh et al., 2013), these ideas have yet to be realized and practically 
implemented in the state of Andhra Pradesh. In order for the rules governing water resources 
to be effective, they must fit the nature of the resource that is being managed. 
6.2 Community Attributes 
 As already outlined in the previous chapter, the attributes of a community in the action arena 
(pertaining to a policy action situation) are influenced by the demographic set-up of the 
community, norms of behavior, level of common understanding, homogeneity of preferences 
and distribution of resources. The physical and cultural characteristics and attributes of the 
group of water-related actors in the study context of Hyderabad were examined. I discuss here 
how the community structure and the interests of each group of actors influences their 
participation in the action situation and the process of arbitrary water reallocation. 
Firstly, community attributes which can facilitate stakeholders to self-organise may be 
influenced by the size of the group as well as how their race and gender may affect power 
relations and levels of trust between participants. Collective action may be influenced by the 
size of a group (Whaley and Weatherhead., 2014: 7). In this regard, this physical attribute of 
the farming community was given special emphasis through enactment of the AFPMIS Act, 
1997. In a bid to reduce the role of government in the direct management of irrigation 
systems, this Act provided a framework for the setting up of Water User Associations and 
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fundamentally characterizes and maps the social and structural cohesion of the farming 
community under review. Data from my interviews with the farming community as well as 
from media reports have revealed how farmers have organized various ways to secure water 
for themselves. It is quite evident that, based on the ways they are formally organized through 
the AFPMIS, it has been easier for farmers to engage in various interactions by employing the 
five different strategies indicated in section 5.9.  
It is also to be noted that the AFPMIS Act made provisions for establishing a highly structured 
multi-layered system, where the term Farmer Organization (FO) covers different types of 
organizations in hierarchical order, namely the Water User Association (WUA), the 
Distributory Committee (DC), and the Project Committee (PC), which essentially organizes 
committees into small units, breaking down the organizations into smaller groups or number 
of tiers depended on the size of the irrigation system. Groupings of such smaller units, such as 
the Water User Associations, theoretically have an advantage in cooperation because the 
strategies they use are more likely to be clearly observable among them and interlinkages 
among group members are likely to be more important (Bardhan, 1993; Meinzen-Dick et al., 
1997). Analysis of experiences from Asia within traditional WUAs have suggested that it can 
be more difficult to organize WUAs if they are too large (Meinzen-Dick, et al., 2002).  
Secondly, the data reflecting the socio-economic attributes of actors in the study area reveals 
their dependence on irrigation for agriculture within a hydrologic unit, implying that it is 
easier for water-related actors in the farming sector to collectively lobby for a common cause. 
Having the same socio-economic background and addressing the same problem of water 
scarcity, seems to explain the homogeneity of their preferences regarding distribution of 
resources. This can also explain how such attributes can influence preferences over policies as 
well as whether these policies actually operate as intended (Imperial, 1999).  
The attributes of the urban water-related actors already described in the previous chapter are 
much less structurally cohesive, compared to the farming communities. Coming from a wide 
variety of socio-economic backgrounds, urban citizens in the city are collectively represented 
by the Resident Welfare Associations (RWA), which are essentially self-managed 
neighbourhood communities. Municipal Corporators elected in each constituency are 
generally responsible for overseeing developments in the community, including issues of 
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access to drinking water. However, there is no administrative provision for formal relations 
between the Corporators and the Water Board (HMWSSB), which itself is principally 
responsible for the provision of urban drinking water. 
This comparison of the physical and socio-economic attributes of the communities of water-
related actors from both the rural and urban sectors – based on the relationship between water 
scarcity and participation – has helped us to understand and more particularly focus on the 
collective action of lobbying by farmers. Although such programs to encourage the formation 
of WUAs have been implemented to increase participatory irrigation management, studies 
have suggested that they have not only provided a platform to facilitate farmers in calling for 
a variety of lobbying activities but also strengthened the effectiveness of their lobbying 
efforts. In other words, they have been influential in giving more credibility to farmers in their 
interactions with politicians and government officials, especially when demanding a greater 
voice in decision making (Meinzen-Dick et al., 1997; 2002). 
In the study context, lobbying activities are largely directed towards politicians, whose role is 
indispensable, largely because of the authority vested in them over water resource 
management by the state through the enactment of various policies and acts over the years, as 
described in the following.  To conclude here, it is the physical and socio-economic attributes 
of the farming community that places them in a position to organize themselves effectively 
which, in turn, enables them to successfully take part in the process of arbitrary water 
reallocation against the prescribed allocation guidelines so as to eventually secure water for 
themselves. Thus, a key community attribute here is the extent to which potential participants’ 
beliefs, values and preferences about water policy-oriented strategies and outcomes are 
homogeneous (Polski and Ostrom, 1999:13).  
6.3 Rules-in-use 
6.3.1 Position and Boundary Rules 
Boundary rules outline actors’ rights regarding use and management of a resource, specifying 
who is allowed to manage them. On the other hand, position rules place actors in 'formal' 
positions, which allow or deny their participation in the management of water resources. 
Three key inferences can drawn from the boundary and position rules influencing the action 
situation in the context of Hyderabad's arbitrary water allocation problems. First, ambiguous 
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and overlapping responsibilities of various water authorities exist in the state. Second, too 
much power is vested in political actors. Third, although they have made some headway 
through collective organizing, farming-related actors are still relatively excluded from the 
management of water resources in Andhra Pradesh. This section attempts to explain how the 
ambiguous and overlapping responsibilities of water authorities and strengthening of political 
actors influence arbitrary reallocation of water in Hyderabad. 
By virtue of control of water in India being a state matter, the government has the authority to 
set all rules on water resource management. Hence, it is position rules which order water-
related actors and their relations to statutory powers, prescribing the administrative levels at 
which they act and what roles they play in the policy process of water allocation and 
management. Various water-related acts in Andhra Pradesh have been critically reviewed 
here, revealing how the role of the state has been gradually strengthened as well as the 
ambiguous and overlapping responsibilities of water authorities in the management of water 
resources in Andhra Pradesh.  
The ambiguous responsibilities articulated in the HMWSSB Act (1997) have been well 
documented in the previous chapter. This act mandates the Irrigation Department and 
HMWSSB to share control over inter-sectoral water management. It also has provisions for 
when disagreement between the two authorities arises, whereupon the matter may be 
forwarded to the Chief Minister, who is also the Chairman of the Water Board. In other words, 
it opens opportunities for vesting immense power in political actors in the management of 
water resources in Andhra Pradesh. The previous chapter has also explicitly documented how 
all arbitrary water reallocations over the years have been facilitated under the influence of the 
Chief Minister. With regard to the overlapping of water authorities and jurisdictions, in 
principle, the HMWSSB is supposed to have overall control over its water supply sources and 
its infrastructure. However, the two key water sources supplying almost 70 percent of total 
water were previously meant for agriculture and, hence, fall under the control of the Irrigation 
Department. The conflicts between the Irrigation Department and the Hyderabad Water Board 
over the issue of water management and allocation, and which have preceded all water 
reallocations, particularly in the years 2005, 2009, 2010 and 2012, have been well 
documented in the previous chapter. In a bid to have total control over Hyderabad's water, the 
Water Board has been making attempts to obtain government approval and financial 
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assistance for constructing independent structures to convey water, over which it would have 
complete jurisdiction. This conflict situation confirms Ribot's (2002) observation that 
conflicts are likely to emerge when the management and use of natural resources normally 
involve multiple and overlapping responsibilities and jurisdictions, often requiring mediation. 
Regarding the non-inclusion of farming actors in water resource management in Andhra 
Pradesh and its influence on the process of arbitrary water reallocation, let us examine the 
AFPMIS Act of 1997 as a starting point. The Act made provision for water rights to farmers 
to manage the water which was already allocated to them; however, they were kept away from 
the overall management of water issues in the state. The State Water Policy of 2008 required 
mandating development and management of water resources with the involvement of primary 
stakeholders, which would also seem to imply stakeholders in the farming sector, who are the 
greatest consumer of water in the region. However, the Andhra Pradesh Water Resource 
Regulatory Commission (APWRRC) Act of 2009 tells a different story. The Act was entrusted 
with carrying out major water planning for all the sectors in the state (such as irrigation, 
municipal/rural drinking water, electricity and Industry) as well as providing information 
about how participants should interact in the management of water resources there. However, 
a role for farmer’s organizations was explicitly left out of the planning and decision-making 
processes. It has been well documented in the previous chapter how the farmers in catchment 
area affected by arbitrary reallocation appear to have no clue with regard to the availability of 
water resources. 
This reveals a likely reason for the uncertainty of farmers and their feeling of being sidelined, 
as they perceive that water from the reservoir will come to their fields only after quenching 
the thirst of the city of Hyderabad. This exclusion of  the farming sector in Andhra Pradesh  
can be countered by the argument of Moote et al. (1997), suggesting the need for a 
participatory approach where all actors whose interests are affected can participate in the 
process of natural resource management, which has been increasingly advocated (Rockloff, 
2004; Trachtenberg and Focht, 2005). Margerum and Born (1995) also suggest that a 
participatory approach of including farmers may not only provide a holistic view on the 
natural resource in question and its problems but, more importantly, bring multiple 
perspectives together. Such a participatory approach can provide various water-related actors 
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an opportunity to explore their differences and potentially bring about agreement and the 
resolution of conflicts (Wondolleck and Yaffe, 2000). 
The reviewed documents reveal that, in Andhra Pradesh, the rules and legislation established 
in acts and policy documents defining water access and use between the city and the 
agriculture sector have been dealt individually rather than taking an inter-sectoral approach. 
For instance, the Andhra Pradesh Water Resources Development Corporation Act of 1997 
makes individual provisions for planning and managing irrigation projects, drinking water 
supply schemes and industrial supply, rather than handling them in an integrated manner. 
Also, the Andhra Pradesh Water Resource Regulatory Commission Act of 2009 similarly 
makes no effort towards inter-sectoral provision. This act is authorized to determine the water 
requirements for different categories of users independently, rather than taking a holistic 
approach. 
6.3.2 Authority, Scope and Aggregation Rules 
The previous chapter described the provisions laid out within the authority, aggregation and 
scope rules for Hyderabad. This section explains how the provisions within these rules have 
eventually influenced the action situation to cause arbitrary water reallocation against the 
prescribed allocation guidelines. Whilst the authority and scope rules are straightforward, the 
aggregation rules make for an interesting case. The position and boundary rules for 
Hyderabad map out water-related actors and their positions with respect to authorization for 
water management roles and responsibilities, often with overlapping and multiple 
jurisdictions, primarily between the HMWSSB and the Irrigation Department. Vesting the 
authority with the Chief Minister to resolve matters in cases of discord between these two 
authorities represents the aggregation rules here, which essentially determine the level of 
control in a decision-making process. This immense power vested in political actors – 
enabling them to facilitate the described arbitrary water reallocation practices – is evident 
from the field data as well as secondary data. As already explained in the previous section, 
lessons from Maharashtra need to be learnt, as there the Water Resources Regulatory 
Authority Act provides for the constitution of a Water Regulatory Authority, the membership 
structure of which excludes political actors, so as to reduce political interference and 
Government influence. 
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6.3.3 Information Rules 
 In theory, information rules determine the arrangements for interaction and communication 
between participants in a particular action arena. For instance, interaction may be facilitated 
through regular meetings between participants and other actors, including stakeholders, the 
public or other institutions. Such interaction may be channeled through annual reports, public 
consultations or newsletters. However, the non-participatory nature of the rules and acts 
imposed in the state of Andhra Pradesh regarding water resource management is clearly 
evident in the documents reviewed. Farmers – the principle users of water in the area – are 
kept out of managerial decision-making processes, generally leaving them with relatively no 
access to factual information about the availability and management of water. This also leaves 
virtually no chance for farmer groups or representatives (as participants) to inform the interest 
groups they represent about the process of water management. Thus, the representatives have 
no way to solicit and respond to the views of the farming community, which would have 
otherwise enhanced their representative function in the management of water resources in the 
state (Trachtenberg and Focht, 2005). 
Information governing water allocation and use are legally prescribed in government orders 
and legislation, as already described in the previous chapter. However, the policies and acts 
provide very little provision as to how such information about the resources management may 
be disseminated to water-related actors and stakeholders across all communities. Data from 
my field interviews reveals that farmers have very little information about water availability 
or management. They perceive that the city’s drinking needs are given utmost priority, upon 
which the rules have been established, and only after the city’s needs are met is water given to 
farmers. They have, thus, been fighting to overturn the prevailing allocation rules. Leaving 
out the farming group of actors from the management and decision-making process has also 
blocked grassroots information from coming to light, which could have led to better 
understanding of the resource for making integrated and holistic water management and 
allocation strategies. According to Margerum (1999), channels of information exchange and 
communication can improve decision-making and promote policy-oriented learning when 
participants share perspectives, preferences, values, resources and goals. Communication, in 
general, is believed to provide an ongoing process through which all participants verify 
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information, goals and actions, which is critical to processes such as collaborative natural 
resource management (Margerum and Born, 1995). 
6.3.4 Payoff Rules 
Payoff rules generally identify sanctions for taking forbidden actions and determine how costs 
and benefits are meted out in the action arena. In water regulation, allocation and 
management, payoff rules determine who should bear the cost of rule violation as well as the 
benefits of complying with different types of rules in the action situation. This section 
explains how sanctions for such noncompliance within the provisions of the payoff rules 
determine how costs and benefits are meted out in the Hyderabad action arena. The interplay 
of resource dependence and payoff rules that ultimately influence the action area is especially 
examined and discussed.  
The provisions for imposing sanction rules as prescribed in the Andhra Pradesh Water 
Resources Regulatory Commission Act of 2009 have been well documented in the previous 
chapter. However, there is a lack of such sanction rules with relation to the rules for inter-
sectoral allocation of water between the urban and agriculture sectors in Andhra Pradesh. 
Studies on water policy in India have raised serious questions regarding the state’s authority 
for regulating the use of water and the manner in which this authority is to be exercised (Sahu, 
2010). 
Regarding costs and benefits, an institutional analysis distinguishes between physical 
outcomes, external rewards or sanctions, and the valuations that participants assign to each of 
these aspects (Ostrom 2005a: 52), meaning how costly various actions could be for each type 
of participant and what kinds of benefits they can expect as a result of various group 
outcomes that can be played out in the action situation. In the study context, costs and benefits 
also vary in terms of their effects, according to the dependence of each group on water, which 
differs considerably among the resource users. 
Data from the farmer interviews I conducted reveals that the farmers in the agricultural sector 
who share water with the city of Hyderabad are highly dependent on the canal water they 
receive from the Singur Reservoir. During times of water scarcity, farmers are faced with high 
costs, as there are no alternative sources of irrigation, which ultimately affects their food 
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security and livelihoods. In comparison, the city dwellers generally have alternative sources 
of drinking water through private providers in the city. Therefore, farmers face high costs if 
they do not plan for securing water for themselves by resorting to various strategies, primarily 
approaching their political representative with a bargain for water against their electoral 
support, in other words 'votes for water'. Political actors, on the other hand, due weakly 
prescribed ‘sanction’ rules, are not hindered by any costs from breaking the rules, although 
they have been explicitly outlined. Hence, they are in a position to facilitate arbitrary 
reallocation of water against prescribed water allocation guidelines, as they would likely incur 
a higher cost of losing out on electoral support if they do not. As explained in the previous 
chapter, there is strong evidence of electoral politics influencing such arbitrary water 
reallocation practices, where water released to farmers in the agricultural sector has preceded 
key electoral milestones. 
The Indian constitution vests both the central and the state government claims to having 
absolute right over water in the country. It is, therefore, not surprising to observe all water-
related functions – ranging from developing water resources to its management and the 
carrying out of regulatory functions as well as conflict resolution – are vested in the executive 
arm of the government. Hyderabad is also a typical case of this, and the exercising of arbitrary 
and absolute power by political actors in areas where there is no regulatory provision for 
sanctions that would limit them is regularly exercised. In reviewing the "Water policies and 
legal framework in India”, Siddiqui (2008) interestingly observed a similar trend, arguing 
how vesting too much authority in the state without any limitations prescribed to the exercise 
of the power at its discretion has created opportunities for arbitrariness. Hence, there is an 
urgency to vest such authority with bodies that are entirely independent of government, if 
decision-making processes regarding the creation and change water entitlement rules and 
allocation are to be made transparent. Some lessons can be learnt from the success story of the 
South-Indian State of Maharashtra, where the membership structure of the water authority 
excludes political actors, hence allowing it to operate autonomously from the government of 
Maharashtra, without any political interference. 
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7 Distributional Conflict in Rural–Urban Water Contes-
tation 
7.1  Conflicts in Arbitrary Resource Allocation 
 Knight’s bargaining theory of institutional change explains institutions as a by-product of 
conflicts over distributional outcomes, also proposing that conflict is inherent to processes of 
creating social regulations in the form of institutions that distribute benefits. As Knight (1992) 
has noted, the role of distributional conflicts to explain formal rules has been explained by a 
range of authors (Bates, 1990; Libecap, 1989; North, 1990). However, the role of such 
distributional conflicts with reference to informal rules, norms and conventions has not been 
given enough attention and, therefore, Knight has generally focused his attention to this area 
of research. 
In this vein, Knight (1992) explains that actors with greater bargaining power will make a full 
effort to further their distributional goals, while other actors who are dissatisfied with 
the agreement will try to change it. However, any institutional change will only occur only if 
and when weaker actors either acquire more bargaining power or the distributional outcome 
somehow shifts in their favour (Knight 1992: 183). As long as neither change occurs, there 
will be no substantial change in the agreement, and conflict will continue to persist. Under 
such circumstances, actors with different power resources continually negotiate resource 
distribution.  
Hence, institutional development is fundamentally influenced by a group’s relative abilities to 
force others to act in ways contrary to their unconstrained preferences in an ongoing 
bargaining game between actors (Knight, 1992). From this perspective, asymmetries 
in bargaining power and resource ownership that lead to bargaining outcomes in favour of one 
of the actors are explicitly brought into focus and the factors that create them 
are identified and analyzed. Therefore, considering actor bargaining power as a function of 
their resource provision, various power resources are described here in applying the 
distributional theory of institutional change with reference to Hyderabad's arbitrary water 
allocation. 
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7.2 The Role of Empirically Driven Power Resources in Arbitrary Water Reallocation 
a As a result of Hyderabad’s increasing urbanization, water being drawn from pre-existing 
agricultural uses led to persistent conflicts in questioning property rights between these two 
sectors. Which factors created such asymmetries in bargaining power by water-related actor 
groups to facilitate such arbitrary reallocation of water is identified and explained.   
The empirically derived power resources that emerge in bargaining for water was inferred 
from the empirical data collected mostly from interviews and secondary literature. The data 
was linked with the theoretical foundation of the distributional theory of institutional change 
(Knight, 1992) which suggests that the bargaining power of an actor is a function of his 
resource provision. It focuses on power asymmetries of actors as the main determinant of 
institutional change. It may be noted that the empirically derived power resources were 
inferred and deduced from the variables classified as per the Institutional Analysis and 
Development (IAD) framework, as most of the variables relevant to the study as prescribed 
by Knight are similar to that of the IAD framework (Bues, 2011: 79). Hence, it also 
emphasizes the compatibility in employing Knight’s theoretical explanation while using the 
IAD framework to study the conflicts in natural resource management. 
7.2.1 Actor Characteristics: Physical and Cultural Characteristics. 
 The IAD framework considers community attributes as one of the exogenous variables where 
their physical and cultural characteristics are determined. Thereafter how these characteristics 
of different groups influence their participation and decision-making in the process of such 
arbitrary reallocation in the action arena is examined. The attributes of the community which 
can facilitate the stakeholders to self-organise may be influenced by their age and gender as 
well as their race and size of the group.  It may be interesting to note how collective action 
may be influenced by the size of the group or how the power relations and levels of trust may 
be influenced by gender and race.  
The attributes of the farming community were highlighted in the previous chapter with the 
setting up of the Water Users Association. The attributes of the urban actors represented under 
the Resident Welfare Associations were however not structurally cohesive as that of the 
farming communities. It may also be noted that the physical attribute of the community which 
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can facilitate the stakeholders to self-organise may be influenced by the size of the group; for 
example, the size of a group generally influences stakeholders’ incentives to act collectively. 
Links were therefore examined between the physical and socio-economic status, to identify 
the conditions under which farmers were most likely to collectively participate in securing 
water for themselves. 
Regarding the socio-economic characteristics of the farmer's group, the study area is 
representative of about 72 percent (approximately 30 million) of the population living in the 
rural areas in Andhra Pradesh, where 62 percent of them sustain their livelihood primarily on 
agriculture (Reddy and Kumari, 2007). The farmers are generally poor and marginal which is 
often characterized by their size of fragmented land holdings which is usually below 1 
hectare. Such small size is mostly attributed due to further division of land on inheritance. 
Since agriculture is their primary livelihood, dependence on irrigation is a high priority and 
becomes a collective issue and a common problem, during water scarcity. 
The socio-economic status and structure capturing both the physical and cultural attribute 
differ markedly among the two competing group of actors. The study revealed a strong 
structural cohesion of the farming community in contrast to the fragmented social structure of 
the urban actors. Therefore to conclude, it is the physical and social attribute of the farming 
community as described above that places the farming group of actors in a position to 
organize themselves and take part in the process of arbitrary water reallocation against the 
prescribed allocation guidelines. In this regard, Knight mentions organisabilty of a group as a 
power resource (Knight, 1992: 197) where their bargaining power depends on their ability and 
act collectively. In other words, actors capable of organizing and acting collectively have a 
higher bargaining power than actors that are relatively fragmented. 
7.2.2 Resource Dependence 
 While charting out the attributes of the community in the IAD framework, the characteristics, 
particularly the socio-economic status throws light on how a particular group of actors’ 
dependence on the resource is likely to influence the action situation in the action arena. In 
this regard, resource dependence greatly differs amongst the two competing groups of actors. 
Data from primary (interviews) and secondary (media) sources and information available on 
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the background of the community in the farming sector revealed their heavy dependence on 
irrigation for agriculture-based income of farmers within a hydrologic unit. 
In the years where arbitrary reallocations occurred, it was particularly during the critical 
season of paddy transplantation when the Singur reservoir had fallen below the minimum 
level. This is the period when the inter-sectoral competition for scarce water ensued. Here the 
farmers came together to partake in process of arbitrary water reallocation, as their livelihood 
is highly at risk since there are no other alternatives for livelihood if the crop production 
failed. The farmers' high dependence on water resources, which ultimately puts their 
livelihood at risks explains Knight's concept of attitude toward risk as a power resource, 
which is determined by the actor's available resources. Specifically, Knight stated that there 
exist a dynamics of a positive relationship between ownership of resources and risk 
acceptance. At the same time, there exists a negative relationship between ownership and risk 
aversion (Knight, 1992: 133). Actors with the higher provision of resources have a tendency 
to a higher level of risk acceptance (Knight, 1995: 109). 
Therefore, securing water for irrigation becomes very crucial, which is highly contested with 
Hyderabad's share of water from the Singur reservoir; bearing in mind that water below the 
prescribed level was to be reserved only for Hyderabad. Most importantly, since water is very 
specifically required at the particular time of transplantation, timely release of water becomes 
a critical factor. Time preference according to Knight represents another power resource. 
Bargaining is expensive and those actors with higher patience i.e. with lower time preference 
will have advantages in the bargain (Knight, 1992: 135). Due to the farmer's high dependence 
on water resources, they are typically more risk averse than the competing actor groups in the 
urban sector. For the urban actors, alternative sources for drinking water are arranged on 
which their livelihood is not dependent on.  In order to save their standing crops, the farmers 
are therefore compelled to organize themselves to secure water by employing various 
strategies, amongst which, approaching political actors comes under focus for further 
discussion in the next section. In this regard, it may be noted that attitude towards risk is also 
closely linked with exit costs, as a player who has less to loose from a breakdown is more 
likely to risk it (Knight, 1992: 33) In contrast, a risk-seeking actor is more likely to challenge 
a commitment which represents a form of bargaining power. 
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The two factors,  time preference and attitude towards risks, have a considerable impact on 
the exit costs, which were defined as the costs that arise for an actor in case an agreement is 
difficult to reach or ultimately fails. Farmers pursue to lobby for water because not 
undertaking such course of lobbying action for water put their agricultural crop to risk, which 
in turn have a high risk of losing their livelihoods. More importantly, the farmers put great 
emphasis on the pressure of ‘time’ to undertake lobbying action for water because water is 
needed for the crucial seedling and transplanting stages which characterizes their high 
preference to time. 
Hyderabad’s case revealed that the power resources attributed to resources dependence (i.e. 
risk aversion, time preference and exit cost) is inversely proportional to the sanction power. 
Knight states if an actor is less dependent on the bargaining outcome because he or she 
possesses sufficient resources, the actor can be more patient to attain an outcome (i.e. he has 
better power resources as he can survive several rounds). However, because of farmers’ high-
risk aversion, high time preference and high exit cost as a result of their high dependence on 
water resources, they exert more sanction powers in negotiating ‘vote against water’ with 
political actors, which is left for further discussion in the next section. 
7.2.3 Electorate Influence 
 In the Institutional Analysis and Development framework, analysis of the political-economic 
as an exogenous variable revealed the ways in which power is distributed among the actors in 
a management arrangement.  How the 'politico-economic' variable affects the action arena 
depends on how the participants are positioned in the action situation. This variable not only 
explained the distribution of decision making power among actors who take decisions but also 
how the political and economic interests have influenced and driven actors' decision within a 
particular set of rules-in-use (Clement, 2010: 137). The physical and socio-economic attribute 
and dependence on the resources explained how the collective action of lobbying by farmers 
is structured. Empirical data revealing five sets of interaction in the previous chapter found 
that farmers mostly secured water arbitrarily through the lobbying activities largely directed 
towards politicians. Besides, there are strong evidence of electoral politics influencing such 
arbitrary water reallocations, where water released to farmers in the agricultural sector has 
preceded key electoral milestones. 
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This is typically represented by the data in the year 2010 where Nizamabad district 
experienced a severe drought condition. This greatly affected the agricultural crops under the 
catchment area of the Nizamsagar irrigation project which primarily received water from the 
Singur project, which also catered to Hyderabad city. The farmers of the ayacut were 
compelled to congregate and approach their political representative of the constituency. It is 
always within an understanding of how their demand for water in exchange for electoral 
support is the underlining agenda. In this instance, the political actor representing the famers’ 
interest was Minister for Medical Education, Mr Sudarshan Reddy. The process of negotiation 
at the higher level involved the Minister meeting the Major Irrigation Minister, the Chief 
Minister and Irrigation Department officials. He eventually convinced the government to 
release the water for irrigation, thereby overruling the water allocation guidelines (G.O. 93) as 
prescribed by the government of Andhra Pradesh.  
To break down this process of lobbying to cause water reallocation and infer the power 
resources that is employed; typically, leaders of the farmers’ representative come to 
negotiating terms with the political representatives of the constituency. Here ‘vote in 
exchange of water’ is laid on the bargaining table. Political process is interpreted as a market 
in which political goods, or institutions, or institutions are exchanged for votes (Meyer, 1996; 
Hagedorn, 1996). Because of the well-structured organization of the farmer under the 
umbrella of the Water User Associations, the large rural ‘vote bank’ that they command 
becomes crucial. Henceforth the farming actors put forward their demand of water on political 
actors with their commitment in return for votes in the next election. It has been found that 
programs such as setting up of water User Association sought to increase participatory 
irrigation management, also have had additional outcomes. (Meinzen-Dick et al. (1997; 2002) 
suggested that it not only promoted participatory irrigation management but also provided a 
platform to facilitate farmers to call for a variety of lobbying activities. This may have 
attributed towards strengthening the effectiveness of lobbying efforts by giving more 
credibility to the farmers in interacting with the politicians and government officials. In such a 
process, it has facilitated the farmers to demand a stronger voice in not only for access to the 
resources but also in decision-making in natural resource management. 
In this regard, Knight explains that sanctioning is a mechanism that ensures commitment. In 
general, sanctions reduce the expected benefits of non-compliance; where farmers pledge “we 
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will not vote for you if you don’t give as well as keep your commitment to give us water” and 
make compliance a more beneficial long-term strategy (Knight, 1992: 179). In other words, 
sanction power refers to the threat of sanctions imposed by one actor (farmers) on the other 
(political actors) in the case of non-compliance. This threat influences the bargaining situation 
of the threatened actor (political actors) to the benefit of the threatening actor (farmers group). 
Under the threat of sanctions for non-compliance, compliance to informal rules (by the 
politicians) becomes a rational long-term strategy (Knight, 1992: 179).  The threat of 
retaliation implies the ability of an actor to influence the extractable benefits of the other actor 
as in the case of bargaining breakdown or distributional disadvantage. Again, the question 
arises whether this strategic threat is credible or not. Credible commitment is a believable 
attitude demonstrated by actors that they will in fact do what they claim. For instance, farmers 
in the past have voted in favour of a particular 
 Table 7-1: Actors' Characteristics Impacting on Power Resources 
Actor Characteristics Power Resources  Rural Urban 
Physical and Cultural                    Organizability                 High  Low 
Resources Dependance  Risk Aversion  High Low 
 Time preference High Low 
 Exit cost  High Low  
Electorate Influence Sanction power High Low 
  Credibility High Low 
Source: adapted from Theesfeld (2005: 78) 
 It is interesting to note that some power resource (with negative outcome) can inversely 
amplify the other power resources. For instance, in Hyderabad’s case, the power resources 
attributed to resources dependence (i.e. risk aversion, time preference and exit cost) is 
inversely proportional to the sanctioning power. However, Knight stated if an actor is less 
dependent on the bargaining outcome because he or she possesses sufficient resources, the 
actor can be more patient to attain an outcome. In other words, he has better power resources 
as he can survive several rounds (Knight, 1992: 132). However, empirical data reveals that 
because of farmer’s high risk aversion, high time preference and high exit cost as a result of 
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their high dependence on water resources, they exert more 
Sanction powers in negotiating ‘vote against water’ with political actors.
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8 Conclusions 
The competition and conflict of Hyderabad’s urbanization and its inter-sectoral water 
contestation with agriculture was the focal attention of this study. Water allocations between 
these two competing sectors were administratively prescribed with allocation guidelines in 
place. However, arbitrary reallocation of water against the prescribed guideline persisted over 
the years with detrimental consequences for both the sector. In this light, this study examined 
the institutional context of the ‘water allocation mechanism’ in place. It specifically examined 
the dynamics of the ‘water allocation mechanism’ and the underlying process of interplay of 
water-related actors and rules and dynamics of factors which eventually propagated such 
arbitrary water reallocations. Within the backdrop of change in the dynamics of urbanization, 
agriculture and water variability, the key research question addressed was “how has the 
water-allocation mechanism in place propagated the way rules and actors currently interact 
to influence and employ strategies that eventually causes arbitrary reallocation of water 
resources?”. This study unravelled the factors of how and why water-related actors break 
formal rules, to create their own rules and eventually play their own game of water allocation 
in Hyderabad's context. 
The key research question of why such arbitrary reallocation persists against the allocation 
guidelines was translated into Ostrom’s language, i.e. to examine the persistence of rules-in-
use, despite the rules-in-form already in place. The Institutional Analysis and Development 
(IAD) framework developed by Ostrom ( 1982; 1990; 2005; 2011) was employed for this 
study, as it provided a good platform for guiding such research studies of rules-in-use and 
rules-in-form. In addition, Knight provides a good explanation of human interaction in the 
context of such conflicts over limited resources (Acheson and Knight, 2000; Theesfeld, 2004). 
Therefore the study used Knight’s (1992) concept to deduce the power resources of the water-
related actors for securing the contested water in the study context. Overall the study 
employed the theoretical explanations of property rights within the realms of the IAD 
framework and made an attempt to provide a case on the applicability of contemporary 
theories of institutional change to the context of water resource management in Hyderabad.  
Empirical field work for data collection was carried out under the catchment area of irrigation 
projects affected by the water reallocations. Interviews were also collected from a wide range 
of water-related actors in the state of Andhra Pradesh (Please see Annexure no 1. List of 
Interviewees). In addition, the content of the relevant policy documents as indicated in 
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Chapter four was critically analyzed. In the process of understanding why such arbitrarily 
water reallocation took place, the study conceptualized water rights as property rights (based 
on allocations rules). The process and the influencing factors of 'how' property rights change 
over time, was conceptualized within the institutional perspective of property rights explained 
through the IAD framework. The factors which influenced the process of arbitrary water 
reallocation were determined by employing the variables prescribed by the IAD framework. 
Thereafter to understand 'why' property rights change over time, this study employed Knight's 
distributional theory. It explained determinants of institutional change by taking the concept 
of Knight's power resources, which facilitated such arbitrary water reallocations. 
8.1 Empirical Conclusion 
 
8.1.1 Lack of ‘Inter-sectoral’ Element and Climate Variability in Water R-source 
Management 
 The empirical data revealed numerous factors within the biophysical attributes that led to 
such arbitrary water reallocation. Amongst which, the increasing urbanization of Hyderabad 
and its water needs has not been holistically integrated with the water needs of the agricultural 
sector. It has instead been marred with ambiguous and overlapping responsibilities of water 
jurisdictions. Andhra Pradesh being predominantly semi-arid, it has experienced unpredictable 
drought over the years, whereby it also gave rise to such conflicts. In general, when scarcity 
of resources increases, inter-sectoral tension builds up between competing users and attempts 
are made to look into institutions to oversee the sound utilization of water in large water units. 
The idea of setting up a separate authority at the state level for water regulation, was to take 
charge of managing water resources in an integrated manner by coordinating water use by 
different sectors was taken up in Andhra Pradesh. This was in the form of the Andhra Pradesh 
Water Resources Development Corporation Act which was implemented in 1997. However, it 
has not been successful to contain these inter-sectoral conflicts. In this regard, the National 
Water Policy (NWP) issued in 2002 has a clear indication of the need for planning and setting 
up institutions and governance structures capable of dealing with multi-sectoral water uses. 
However, there was no concrete suggestion how to actually implement it at the state level.  
Recognizing such conflicts and contestation of water resources between the competing users, 
with increasing water scarcity, attempts were made to address the issue within National Water 
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Policy 2012. It suggested a mechanism be established within each State to amicably resolve 
differences in competing demands for water amongst different users of water. However, to 
date, such institutions and governance structure have not been put in place in the case of 
Andhra Pradesh. Regarding the inter-sectoral water conflicts in context to climate variability; 
it is paramount to understand that the significance of climate variability. Contestation for 
water increases as the availability of water resources decreases, which is highly dependent on 
the erratic monsoons pattern as in Andhra Pradesh.   
The National Water Policy of 2012 acknowledged the way in which climate change is going 
to impact on water resources availability. The policy, therefore, addressed the need to consider 
the variability and impacts climate change into decisions related to water management. 
However, in the case of Andhra Pradesh, it is far from any mention in any state water policies, 
acts or regulation. In regard, what actions (of water allocation and management between the 
city and the agricultural sector) are authorized to be carried out by actors in position is clearly 
laid out within the provision of authority rules of the IAD framework. The scope rules within 
the IAD framework stated water beyond a prescribed level not to be supplied to the 
agricultural sector but reserved only for drinking needs of the Hyderabad. However, this 
prescribed limit does not consider the possibility of climate variability.     
In addition, the National Water Policy of 2012 acknowledged the anticipated increase in 
variability in the availability of water because of climate change. Therefore it advocated the 
need for increasing water storage in various forms. In the state of Andhra Pradesh, there is a 
huge potential for rain-water harvesting technology. However, not much space has been given 
in policy discussion yet. Whilst theoretically, the potential of rainwater harvesting, even in 
semiarid areas such as Hyderabad (with an annual rainfall level of 700-850 mm), is enormous 
(Narain, 2006). George et al. (2009: 695) show that in an average rainfall year in Hyderabad, 
80,000 liters of water can be generated from a 100 square meter roof area. This can potentially 
meet 35 percent of the domestic demand annually. Expert interview from Member of Central 
Water Commission revealed how water policy and reforms in the state of Andhra Pradesh 
have paid little attention to rainwater harvesting techniques due to the lack of governmental 
incentives. For instance, rainwater harvesting is optional non- mandatory under the urban 
renewal plans in Hyderabad. The government’s withdrawal of the 50 percent subsidy on 
structures related to the Hyderabad rainwater harvesting initiative (HMWSSB, 2008; 
JNNURM, 2011) reflected a lack of governmental support and incentive. 
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8.1.2 Participation: Too little of the Farming Community and too much of the Political 
Actors 
 The exogenous variable in the IAD framework determined the provision of the participation 
(or non-participation) of water-related actors within the position, boundary and aggregation 
rules. The water policies, both central and the state made clear provision for inclusive 
participation within and across all stake holders and water related actors.  At the state level, 
the Andhra Pradesh State Water Policy of 2002 made clear provision for “Mandating 
development and management of water resources with the involvement of primary 
stakeholders for efficient and optimal utilization of water through progressive re-engineering 
and reorientation of institutions, practices and processes”. The National Water Policy 2002 
also advocated for a participatory approach to Water Resources Management “by involving 
not only the various governmental agencies but also the users and other stakeholders, in an 
effective and decisive manner, in various aspects of planning, design, development and 
management of the water resources schemes”  
However various acts and reforms in Andhra Pradesh reflected differently. The landmark 
AFPMIS Act was implemented to hand over management powers of water to the farmers. 
This Act made way for the formation of Water Users Associations (WUAs) with statutory 
powers to collect and retain a portion of water charges, manage the volumetric quantum of 
water allotted to them and maintain the distribution system. However, they had their 
management jurisdiction only once the water entered the canal, and kept out from the overall 
water management in the state. The Andhra Pradesh Water Resource Regulatory Commission 
Act of 2009 further alienated the farmer's group by excluding them from any planning process 
and decision-making process, but only to be invited for meeting at the regulatory authority’s 
discretion. 
In contrast, the participation and authority of political actors in water resource management in 
Andhra Pradesh have progressively gained control over the years. In India traditionally, it is 
the government and ministries which are vested with responsibilities for water resources 
regulation. However, In India, the water underwent a process of reforms where it considered 
water as an economic good. It, therefore, pushed towards the adoption of the institutional 
framework, where some of the functions as well as the regulatory powers vested in 
government departments and ministries were to be transferred to water regulatory authorities 
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which were to be either autonomous or independent. The regulatory authority was to be 
vested with power and authority to exercises rule-making, as well as  implementing and 
settling disputes relating to these rules. The core idea behind setting up such sector-specific 
regulatory authorities was to ease away from government and political interference, as well as 
to encourage and facilitate the participation of water management from the private sector.  
However, in the APWRRC Act (2009) the functioning of the regulatory authorities was 
entrusted to civil servants; as a result, it compromised the independence of the authority. The 
act was entrusted to carry out major water planning for all the sectors in the state (such as 
irrigation, municipal/rural drinking water, electricity and industry). It was also entrusted to 
provide information about how the participants should interact in the management of water 
resources in Andhra Pradesh. The role of farmer’s organizations was explicitly kept away in 
the planning process and decision-making process. In other words, it further vested more 
authority to political actors over water resource management in the state of Andhra Pradesh. 
Further, the Water Resources Development Corporation constituted in 1997 on the contrary, 
strengthened the role of the State. It had made provision for the members of the Corporation 
to be state officials or be elected by the Government. The HMWSSB was constituted in 1989 
to operate and manage Hyderabad’s water independently. However, provision was made to 
grant joint-authority with the Irrigation Department since the water supply for the city was 
sourced from irrigation sources, which were under the control of the Irrigation Department. It 
further made provision that in the case of disagreement between the Irrigation Department  
and the Water Board, the matter was to be taken up to the Chief Minister who was vested with 
the authority to eventually resolve the issue. 
In this regard, it is interesting to report the case of water law reforms in the neighboring State 
of Maharashtra and Uttar Pradesh, passed their own Water Resources Regulatory Authority 
Acts, which provided for the constitution of a Water Regulatory Authority. Unlike in the case 
of Andhra Pradesh, the membership structure of the Authority excluded any Member of 
Parliament or Legislature of the state.  It called for the holder of a post in any political party to 
be ineligible and be disqualified from membership of the regulatory commission. This was 
put in place in order to keep away from interference and influence from both the political and 
the Government functionary.  
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8.1.3 Weak Sanctions for Water Management and Regulation 
 The case of Hyderabad revealed that too much power was vested in political actors, while the 
farmer's group was largely kept out of the decision-making process in water resources 
management in the state of Andhra Pradesh. There is enough evidence to reveal numerous 
violations of the prescribed allocation rules facilitated by political actors over the years. In 
this regard, it is important to note that the Andhra Pradesh Water Resource Regulatory 
Commission enacted in 2009 had the provision to impose sanctions for non-compliance with 
rules.  
Here the Commission was obliged to recommend to the Government a disciplinary action 
against officials in case of non-compliance of the specific directions in the discharge of the 
powers under this Act. However, there is no indication how this should be implemented in 
various government orders in management and allocation of water resources. Vesting too 
much of authority on the state without any limitations prescribed to exercise power at its 
discretion has created opportunities for persistent arbitrariness in regulation, management and 
decision-making process.  
An overall conclusion may be drawn that discordance between central and state policies 
exists. According to the constitution, a joint jurisdiction between the central and the state 
government is in place to manage water resources. Various states have their own legal 
position on ownership of water. This has led to the absence of uniform laws and policies on 
water management in India, which remains largely uncoordinated. The study revealed that 
considering the central policies of water resource management has given a lot of attention to 
issues ranging from planning, development and management of the water resources taking 
into consideration intersectoral, multi-disciplinary and participatory approach. It called for the 
need to appropriately reorient the existing institutions at various levels under the water 
resources sector or even create new institutions, wherever necessary. However, in line with 
Siddiqui’s (2008) argument, various states have their own legal position on ownership of 
water, where none of the state governments has existing laws specifying the basis for water 
allocation between different users within the basins falling within their territories. States have 
had the liberty to change the allocation of water between users and uses at their discretion (for 
instance, between irrigation and water supply) without observing any consistent application of 
well-defined rules of management, procedures and implementation laid down by law. 
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8.2 Theoretical Implications 
 Araral and Yu (2012: 7) pointed out that, studying water governance particularly conflict in 
allocation and use of property rights inherently involves a political dimension, yet not much 
attention has been laid on the politics of water governance in the existing literature. Therefore, 
this study attempted to empirically analyze the political dimension and the dynamics involved 
in the arbitrary reallocation of water resources by employing Knight’s (1992) concept in 
understanding such resource conflicts, and how one actor group secure the resources over the 
other actor group. 
First, in order to facilitate the political dimension of such arbitrary resource allocation, this 
study adapted the 'politicized' IAD framework, adding the 'politico-economic' context as the 
fourth exogenous variable as illustrated by Clement (2010) in analyzing natural resource 
governance in Vietnam. This fourth exogenous factor not only assisted in identifying 
‘political’ elements and associated relationships that should be considered for institutional 
analysis (Ostrom, 2005), but also used to create a coherent structure for inquiry to empirically 
define the dynamics of political influence as a ‘power resource’ in rural-urban water 
governance by taking the case study of Hyderabad. 
This variable helped to understand the distribution of decision making power among actors 
who essentially made decisions. It highlighted the influence of the political and economic 
interests in such a decision-making process, within a particular set of rules-in-use (Clement, 
2010: 137). The ‘politicized’ IAD framework was developed to explicitly bring focus to 
political dimension in policy analysis in natural resource management. Here, the role of 
political interplay in the natural resource management is diagnosed early on and further lays 
emphasis when examining natural resource management and allocation in rural-urban context. 
Secondly, the study characterized the concept of bargaining power in various ways which 
Knight (1995) mainly referred to resource ownership. The study identified power resources as 
being important pertaining to analyzing an actor's bargaining power to secure the contested 
water resources. According to Knight, If an actor scored low in most of these power resources 
in relation to the other actor, it is understood that bargaining does not take place, and the 
stronger actor decides about how and which rules are to be implemented. 
However, in the Hyderabad’s case study, empirical results have revealed how some power 
resource (with a low score) can inversely amplify the other power resources. For instance, the 
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power resources attributed to resources dependence (i.e. risk aversion, time preference and 
exit cost) is inversely proportional to the sanction power. Knight stated that if an actor is less 
dependent on the bargaining outcome because he or she possesses sufficient resources, the 
actor can be more patient to attain an outcome. In other words, he or she has better power 
resources on three accounts of risk aversion, time preference and exit cost, which enables the 
actor to survive several rounds. However, the empirical data revealed that because of farmer’s 
high-risk aversion, high time preference and high exit cost as a result of their high dependence 
on water resources on which their livelihood depends, they exerted more sanction powers in 
negotiating ‘vote against water’ with the political actors. 
Thirdly, the electorate of people as one of the power resources, which the study inferred as the 
key factor in negotiating for water, needs to come to the forefront whilst examining rural-
urban conflicts in natural resource management. In consistent with the findings by Celio 
(2007) in Hyderabad’s context, because of the way the farmer's groups were organized, it was 
found that supplying water in fulfilling the needs of Hyderabad brought about lower electoral 
payoffs when compared to providing farmers with water. 
8.3 Policy Implications 
 The central government water policy espouses the need to adopt a multi-sectoral perspective. 
Provision for inter-sectoral allocation and management of water resources in Andhra Pradesh 
which is dealt independently, need to have an integrated and holistic approach. Therefore 
appropriate central directives should be put in place to streamline for the individual state 
legislations to take leadership towards this direction in managing their water resources. 
The central government water policy espouses the need to consider the impact of climate 
change and its effects on water variability, and availability in water resource management. 
The state of Andhra Pradesh, in order to handle water conflicts in event of monsoon 
uncertainties, should formulate policies pertaining to water resource management, as 
appropriate. Augmentation of water through the direct use of rainfall which indicates 
tremendous potential in the city should be implemented. 
The central government water policy advocates the need for a participatory approach to Water 
Resources Management and encourages the involvement of not only the governmental 
agencies but also the users and multitudes of stakeholders. The state of Andhra Pradesh needs 
to consider curtailing the authority vested on state actors and increase farmer’s participation, 
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taking lessons from Maharashtra and Uttar Pradesh. Water Resources Regulatory Authority 
Acts should have provision to exclude any Member of Parliament or Legislature of the state.  
It should call for the holder of a post in any political party to be ineligible and be disqualified 
from membership of the regulatory commission. Strong sanctions rules, in the case of non-
compliance, while exercising authority for water management, also need to be put in place 
with robust enforcement mechanisms.  
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Annex 1: List of Interviewees 
Sl Respondent name Designation Category Interview 
mode 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
Dr. K.Thirupathaiah 
Sri. Ram Reddy 
Dr. Rao V.B.J. 
Chelikani 
Sri. CH.Balraj 
Sri. Panduranga Rao 
Sri Parameshwaran 
Sri. R. Vidyasagar 
Rao 
Dr. Suhas P Wani 
Floriane Clement 
Sri. Krishna 
Kakumanu 
Dr. V. Ratna Reddy 
Sri. Y Vishnu 
Murthy 
Director General 
Water and Land Management 
Research and Training institute- 
Department of Irrigation, AP 
Executive engineer 
Department of Irrigation 
Singoor Project, Medak Dist. 
Andhra Pradesh 
President  
United Federation of Resident 
Welfare Associations, 
Hyderabad  
Executive Engineer, IB, 
Sangareddy, Dept. of Irrigation  
Telangana Matti Manishi 
Venepally 
Member, Resident Welfare 
Association, Hyderabad 
Irrigation adviser and former 
chief engineer of Central Water 
Commission, Hyderabad 
Principal Scientist 
The International Crops 
Research Institute for the Semi-
Arid Tropics, Hyderabad 
Researcher-Institutional and 
Policy Analysis, 
International Water 
Management Institute, (IWMI) 
Hyderabad  
Special Project Scientist 
International Water 
Management Institute, (IWMI) 
Hyderabad  
Director  
Livelihoods and Natural 
Resources Management 
Institute 
SGA PandA (HMWSSB) 
Hyderabad Metropolitan Water 
Supply and Sewerage Board 
Government 
Government 
Civil Society 
Government 
Farmer 
Association 
Civil society 
Expert 
Research 
Institute 
Research 
Institute 
Research 
Institute 
Research 
Institute 
Government 
Face to face 
Face to face 
Face to face 
Face to face 
Face to face 
Face to face 
Face to face 
Telephonic 
Face to face 
Face to face 
Face to face 
Face to face 
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13 
 
 
 
14 
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20 
 
 
21 
 
22 
 
 
 
 
23 
 
 
 
24 
25 
 
 
 
26 
 
 
27 
 
28 
Dr. Priyanie 
Amerasinghe 
 
 
Sri. Celio Mattia  
 
 
 
Sri. Sayed Yusuf Ali 
 
 
 
Dr. M. Devender 
Reddy 
 
 
Dr. Padmanabha 
Rao   
 
Prof. C. 
Ramachandraiah 
 
Sri. Reddy  
 
Ms.Meghna  
 
 
Sri. Srinivas 
 
Sri.T.Sidda Goud  
 
 
 
 
Sri.Srinivas 
 
 
 
Sri.N. Reddy  
S. Narisimlu 
 
 
 
Sri. Srinivasulu  
 
 
Sri. Murthy 
 
Sri.Bangara 
Senior Researcher  
International Water 
Management Institute, (IWMI) 
Hyderabad  
Science and Technology 
Counselor  
Embassy of Switzerland ,  
New Delhi 
Project Director  
Mission for Elimination of 
Poverty in Municipal Areas 
(MEPMA), Andhra Pradesh 
Director 
Water Technology Centre 
ANGRAU Rajendranagar 
Hyderabad 
Associate Professor 
Centre for Economic and Social 
Studies (CESS) 
Professor 
Centre for Economic and Social 
Studies (CESS) 
Sup. Engineer 
Department of Irrigation, AP 
Asst. Engineer (Mechanical) 
APGENCO – Andhra Pradesh 
Power Generation Coop Ltd 
Village: Rampur, Kulcharam 
mandal, Medak Dist 
President 
Primary Agricultural Co-op 
Society 
Village: Rampur, Kulcharam 
mandal, Medak Dist 
Local Reporter   
Andhra Jyoti  
Village: Rampur, Kulcharam 
mandal, Medak Dist 
Kulcharam mandal, Medak Dist 
Work Inspector,  Ghanpur 
Irrigation Project 
Irrigation Department,  
Govt. of A.P 
Village: Ghanpur Village, 
Tupran Mandal, Medak District 
 
Village: Ghanpur Village, 
Tupran Mandal, Medak District 
Village: Ghanpur Village, 
Research 
Institute 
 
 
Expert 
 
 
 
Expert 
 
 
 
Academia 
 
 
 
Reserach 
Institute  
 
  
Reserach 
Institute  
Government  
 
Government  
 
 
Farmer 
 
Farmer 
 
 
 
 
Media 
 
 
 
Farmer  
Government 
 
 
 
Farmer   
 
 
Farmer 
 
Farmer 
Telephonic 
 
 
 
Face to face 
 
 
 
Face to face 
 
 
 
Face to face 
 
 
 
Face to face 
 
 
 
Face to face 
 
Face to face 
 
Face to face 
 
 
Face to face 
 
Face to face 
 
 
 
 
Face to face 
 
 
 
Face to face 
Face to face 
 
 
 
Face to face 
 
 
Face to face 
 
Face to face 
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29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
Sri. Sudhakar 
Sri. Dattahi 
Ms.Sanghamitra 
Malik 
Dr.Jasveen Jairath 
Ms. Sreoshi Singh 
Dr. Geetha Reddy 
Anant 
Sri.P.Shravan Reddy 
Dr. Biksham Gujja 
Sri. Reddy 
Tupran Mandal, Medak District 
Village: Ghanpur Village, 
Tupran Mandal, Medak District 
Asst. Executive Engineer  
Dept. of Irrigation,Nizamsagar 
Irrigation Project  
Forum for a better Hyderabad 
Forum for a better Hyderabad 
Research Fellow 
Saci WATERS 
Professor of geography 
Osmania University, Hyderabad 
Banjara Hills, Hyderabad  
Founder and Chairperson  
AgSri Agricultural Services 
Hyderabad 
Sup. Engineer  
Department of Irrigation,  
Gov. of Andhra Pradesh 
Farmer 
Government 
Civil Society 
Civil Society 
NGO 
Academia 
Politician 
NGO 
Government 
Face to face 
Face to face 
Face to face 
Face to face 
Telephonic 
Face to face 
Face to face 
Face to face 
Face to face 
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Annex 2:  G.O. (Ms). No.93 Singur Dam- Reservoir Operating Rules  
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